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Public Administration in Great Britain

Mexican Culture Seminar
State of Mexico's Institute of Public Administration
Whoever shall read the admirable treatise of Tacitus on the manners of the Germans, will find that it is from them the English have borrowed the idea of their political government. This beautiful system was invented first in the woods.

Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, 1741

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PROLOGUE

In studies of public administration, it is a common practice to concentrate on the cases of Germany and France. Both countries are considered exemplar models of the evolution of public administration. On one hand, Germany stands out by its public service and its schools of public administration. On the other, France enjoys of a celebrated reputation form its intendences (quartermasters) and centralization.

In contrast with both countries, Great Britain tends to be less attractive despite the prestige achieved by its civil service, which is usually considered behind the German and French, and with poor originality. Similarly, its administrative thought is usually judged as underdeveloped and unsubstantial. Naturally, these points of view are the product of not knowing the evolution of British administration, and in consequence, of wrong and biased interpretations. In fact, Great Britain is fascinating because of the hidden secrets of its public administration, which provide a wide and stimulating research agenda.

The objective of this book is to bring the transcendence of British public administration into perspective. By studying Britain’s public administration from a perspective outside the country, we show that its historical evolution has an ascendant character that originates in a chaotic organization that eventually was replaced by a rational scheme. More specifically, the amateurs that initially formed the British public service were replaced by professional public servants that today enjoy of a similar reputation to that of Germany and France. For this purpose, we make use of administrative culture as an epistemological resource that facilitates the observation of its own singularities, i.e. its being, doing, feeling and thinking. Such a resource exposes a country endowed with a modern and efficient public administration. Moreover, it shows that Britain has developed an outstanding administrative thought, necessary to understand its peculiar case.

Great Britain is not well known in the administrative literature. For example, recent studies have paid more attention to the Roman heritage and its transcendence in the development of the country. Besides Adriano’s wall and the public baths from Bath, Roman public administration developed important projects such as the roads and, a masterpiece, the postal service. Beyond the Roman legacy, Britain has developed an outstanding theory of the administrative estate. This comprises the Exchequer, public enterprises, centralization, and administrative law. One of the fundamental contributions of the British political regime, self-government, has evolved asymptotically close to the local governments form the European continent, and progressively interacts with various centralization processes.

Two British authors outstand among the main contributors to administrative thought. The first is William Harrison Moreland, founder of the science of public administration in Great Britain. The second, Edgar Norman Gladden, systematized the study of public administration through the development of three texts that today remain as masterpieces for the teachings and diffusion of the discipline. The ideas published in a world-class book in the
1940s by a forgotten author, Richard Warner, are central to understand the evolution Britain’s public administration. Britain leded the privatization of the public administration, not only as a detachment process of public companies, but also as scientific of knowledge. However, the antidote to neoliberalism was found in the same academic halls; developing a body of knowledge in favor of public administration.

In summary, we can say that in British public administration, what is unknown seems to be more interesting than what is known.

The book is organized in ten chapters, grouped into two parts. Chapter one introduces the idea of a British administrative culture by studying its Briton, Saxon, and Roman components. In chapter two we emphasize the insular aspect of the country through the lens of its language and politics. The purpose of chapter three is to analyze the formation process of a British state by looking at internal factors such as the development of a judicial administration and the industrial revolution. In contrast, chapter studies the external factors that contributed to the raise of a British state: the British experience in India and the administrative revolution. In chapter six, we focus on the British administrative culture, from which its civil service, public enterprises, and local governments stand out. Moreover, this chapter introduces the public management in Britain, where it originated and subsequently diffused across the globe. These chapters integrate the first part of the book, providing a general overview of the public administration in Britain.

The second part of the book treats the British administrative thought in depth. It begins with chapter seven, where we explore the early origins of seminal administrative ideas in the country. Chapter eight carefully studies the ‘London Circle’, a group of remarkable intellectuals who leaded the frontier of administrative thought in Britain. Some of its most prominent members were Harold Laski and Herman Finer. Additionally, we restitute the place of an outstanding forgotten thinker, W. H. Moreland, as the founder of the discipline of public administration in Britain. In chapter 9 we study the contributions of Richard Warner, E. N. Gladden, and C. H. Sisson, as part of a worldwide process in which countries assimilated public administration ideas as part of their institutions. Finally, chapter ten provides a detailed exposition of contemporary administrative thought.

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INTRODUCTION

It was some time ago that the study of public administration first began to examine administrative culture from development and comparative methodology points of view. One of the pioneering works in this regard appeared in the mid-1950s, and stimulated the contributions of further researchers whose many years of work laid the foundation for a cosmopolitan vision of public administration. Among them were Lynton Cladwell, Ferrel Heady, Albert Lepawsky and Fred Riggs (Siffin, 1957). This research, which is still ongoing, focuses on analyzing the unique aspects of the administrative culture of each respective country on the basis of its degree of overall “administrative development” as well as more specific features, such as the degree of coordination between politics and administration, and the professionalism of the country’s public servants. The results bring to light truths that cannot be hidden, such as the relative failure of Western styles of administration when they are implemented in Asia, Africa and Latin America; the preeminence of local administrations and the clear limitations of technical support. An examination of administrative culture reveals traits related to organizational diversity, in which the contrasts between administrations, not to mention hybrid specimens, are clearly reflected (Hood, 1998: 6–7).

The most surprising result, however, was that the argument about the universality of the principles of Western public administration —taken for granted thanks to the globalization visible since the 1960s— was still incomplete and immature. It should be noted that this theory was endorsed by distinguished academics with high-flying theories, but whose work in the area was not entirely fruitful. Some of the most notable of these include Paul Appleby, Albert Lepawsky and Pedro Muñoz Amato, whose books are required reading in the public administration curriculum (Appleby, 1949; Lepawsky, 1949, Muñoz Amato, 1954). The discernable cause was that in Europe and the United States of the 1960s, a triumphalist spirit —if not arrogance and academic vanity— prevailed with regard to the development of the theory of public administration, along with a crass ignorance of administrative realities in Asian, African and Latin American countries. It was at this point that the science of public administration lost its innocence.

The lack of studies on administrative culture in general, and on the unique administrative cultures of individual countries, became evident. Unfortunately, studies of administrative development were abandoned.

The aim of this book is to contribute to a revival of the study of the development of public administration, with the novel perspective of fully adopting the concept of culture. Thus we take as a principle the perspective of A.L. Kroeber, who explained, firstly, that culture is endowed with inherent qualities. It is transmitted not by genetic inheritance mechanisms but by mutual conditioning among “zygotes,” since it constitutes a social fact. Fred Riggs emphasizes the hereditary nature of culture, which, in his view, means any practice, standard or technique invented by humans that is transmitted from generation to generation. While it can be modified in the course of transmission, its distinctive character is its relative continuity (Riggs, 1970: 103). Secondly,
Riggs’s claim helps us understand why culture, whatever its origins in or through individuals, rapidly tends to become supra-personal and anonymous. Thirdly, culture is generally defined in terms of patterns or regularities of form and style, as well as meaning. Moreover, it is distinguished by its incorporation of values that can be publicly formulated, such as practices, felt implicitly as customs by the society holding the culture (Kroeber 1952: 104).

In a previous work, where we treated the general aspects of administrative culture, we defined it in a broad sense: administrative culture is transmitted by the social conditioning between administrators and the administered, not by genetic inheritance mechanisms, because it constitutes a social fact. This explains why even though its origins emerge from or through individuals, administrative culture rapidly tends to evolve into something that is supra-personal and anonymous. By extension, administrative culture is also defined in terms of patterns or regularities of form and style, as well as meaning, whose configuration is usually, all though not exclusively, reflected in organization and bureaucracy. Finally, public administration is distinguished by the incorporation of publicly formulated values that facilitate explaining their procedures as customs and practices. By this, its ritualism and bureaucratization are made intelligible (Kroeber 1952: 104). In summary, administrative culture implies any practice, norm or technique invented in the administrative process that is transmitted from generation to generation. While it can be modified in the course of transmission, its relative continuity is what gives it its distinctive character (Riggs, 1970: 103).

Style, in turn, refers to the overall impression created by a large number of individual habitual acts and behavioral facets, each of which has its own critical rationality, and each of which is responsible for its own set of conditions and demands (Chapman and Dunsire 1971: 17). These conditions and demands change in response to transformations of the environment.

In brief, the culture of public administration consists of the existence, activities, ideas and feelings of politically organized men as these are reflected in their administrative institutions, works, knowledge, and practices.
II

Administrative culture is not fully universal, since the way public affairs are managed in other parts of the world is doubtless different from how they are managed in your country or ours. A first iteration to categorizing administrative cultures is to distinguish – and contrast – “Western” and “oriental” cultures. Let us begin by doing so.

I have often retold this personal anecdote: Around the middle of 1998, in Santiago de Chile, I participated in an international seminar where I heard a speaker say, more or less, that people should stop using the word “administration” in its Latin sense, and rather use “management” in its English sense, since it has a more flexible meaning (sic). This advice, which was spoken with certain disdain, clearly reflects two problems: first, an attempt to resolve a complex problem with the simple substitution of a word, not to mention the incongruity which arises. Secondly, the speaker’s semantical, conceptual and etymological ignorance of the two words leap out: both ‘management’ and ‘administration’ are from the Latin language.

In other words, in addition to blatant ignorance, prejudice in public administration can take a number of different forms. As we noted, this was evident until recently in some academic sectors by their scorn for the expression “public administration” for being Latin and outdated, and their glorification of the term “public management” for being English and modern. This is obviously an issue in the English language, where it can be assumed that there is a clear distinction between public administration and public management, the two expressions having dissimilar meanings with respect to what public servants do. Thus public administration, on one hand, tends to be considered to be outdated and ineffective, while public management on the other is exalted as modern and active. It even reaches the point where the former is pictured as a traditional activity based on the mere passive carrying out of functions, aimed at defending and perpetuating the status quo, while the latter has the halo of an action-oriented, problem-solving function performed with innovation and creativity.

The role of prejudice in social issues is long-standing; it may perhaps have started and been perpetuated in the contrast between East and West, and persisted through the Manichean dichotomy between the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon within Western administrative culture, a topic to which we return in the next chapter.

Hence the need to take a clear position on the issue of “Britishness” which can be one of the most confusing terms, for there are not a few who say “England” when they mean “Great Britain,” and vice versa. Moreover, “Britain” is not equivalent to “Great Britain” since the latter includes England, Scotland and Wales, nor is it the “United Kingdom,” which is Great Britain plus Northern Ireland. It should be added that Great Britain has growing ethnic minorities and clusters of immigrants, due to its imperial past (Giddens, 1998: 159–160). Its ethnic and cultural diversity is an obstacle to reshaping an all-encompassing national identity but not an insurmountable barrier, because it is an integral part of the meaning of the United Kingdom as a cosmopolitan nation.
But there is something else which is very important: when it comes to England, many of its people know and claim themselves to be Anglo-Saxons. This is crucial because, in addition to the vigorous debate about the role and effect of the Norman Conquest, it has a decisive effect on the periodization of the administrative history of the island. This important point includes such prominent figures as Rudolf Gneist, who in one of his most famous books begins by stating that it can be said that the political history of England begins around 800, due to the extensive migration flows in Europe (Gneist, 1892: 1). The island had been invaded and settled by Angles, Saxons and Jutes migrating from the forests of Germania to which Montesquieu referred. The epigraph of this book thus serves its purpose well, because the choice of that date omitted a vast prior history, both British and Roman. As we will see later, these are much more important than Gneist thought, or George Thomas Reid (Reid, 1913: 5) who calls for a return to the practices and models of Anglo-Saxon times in the first book on the administrative history of England. This view is shared by the most prominent administrative scholar in Britain, E.N. Gladden, for whom the birth of the civil service lies in the same period (Gladden, 1967: 18).

Whether it is prejudice or national conviction, the fact is that Great Britain has an administrative culture which we propose to examine. However, in doing so, we will not neglect the contributions from other times and other civilizations that have had a presence on the island since ancient times and even to the present. Many of the great figures of Western civilization, such as Thomas Hobbes and John Stuart Mill, were English. Many others, although born elsewhere, are thought of as English. John Knox (1510–1572), a leader of the Protestant Reformation and founder of Presbyterianism, was born in Scotland. Likewise, Adam Smith (1723–1790), the father of political economy; Arthur Ignatius Conan Doyle (1859–1930), the creator of fictional detective Sherlock Holmes; noted philosopher David Hume (1711–1776); and Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), critic and author of a seminal book about heroes and heroism were born in Scotland. Former prime ministers Anthony Charles Lynton “Tony” Blair and Gordon Brown were also born in Scotland. Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington (1769–1852), the victor of the Battle of Waterloo, was born in Ireland, as was Edmund Burke (1729–1797), the great reformer and greatest enemy of the French Revolution; and George Bernard Shaw (1856–1950), awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1925. All of these illustrious men were British, and shared the culture which here, examined from the administrative angle, is the subject of this book.

Britain’s combination of unity and diversity is a factor that confuses and baffles the researcher, for the muddle exists, as Ernest Barker wrote, not only in the political area, but also in social institutions. Sometimes our organizations or social groupings cover the whole of the British nation, other times they belong only to one of its nationalities, and in other cases they are mixed and constitute unique situations in neighboring countries. The trade unions generally have members in the whole country and the whole United Kingdom. The churches are sometimes general and other times particular, but there are some that are part of the general Church, and simultaneously in a particular Church. The Anglican Church, for example, is somewhat unique to all Great Britain, but it also exists separately in four different directions: the Church of England,
established in England; the former Church in Wales among the Welsh; the Episcopal Church of Scotland among the Scots; and the former Church of Ireland (Ireland in general, not just Northern Ireland) among the Irish. Great Britain is truly a complicated country (Barker, 1944: 14–15).

Thus, we refer in this book to Great Britain, except when we clearly indicate that we are speaking of England or another particular British country.
III

One of the most telling manifestations of the administrative culture of a country is how its ideas are converted into principles to be transmitted. This mechanism facilitates the processes of adoption and adaptation of one nation’s administrative institutions to another, since it determines the scope of their applicability when their existential locus changes.

In public administration the creation of ideas emerges from the very occupation of public servants, who, having become practitioners of a field of knowledge, establish principles which they then make an effort to transmit. Such is the case of the great administrators of history such as Sextus Justus Frontinus, Water Commissioner of the aqueducts of Rome and governor of Britain; Nares, Grand Chamberlain of the Byzantine emperor and conqueror of Italy, and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, Controller-General of Finances of Louis XVI. It occurs in this manner because these ideas are often an expression of their times, while at the same time they influence their course (Meinecke, 1998: 20–23).

To generate principles it is necessary that the officials whose ideas led them should feel inspired to develop their theoretical analysis. Public administrators, the epitome of the practical man, have left many records of their work, including many writings, almost all of these stemming from their activities, but little theoretical reflection. In public administration, ideas do not only deal with theoretical concepts and their clarification over the course of time, but comprehend the main actors of each era within it, being influenced and influential in their time.

Ideas emerge from the activity of the public administrator, because their originator is advancing and developing while carrying out his work. Authorship and writing proceed at the same time when the author, in the course of his own development, conceives the idea emerging from his pen. It often happens that statesmen do not learn anything new from what they know a ruler did, because the novelty of an idea stems from what is communicated. Only by their conception as a principle, in fact, is what lends historical trends their penetrative force that raises them to what we can call an “idea” (Meinecke, 1998: 39).

Thus the concept of public administration underwent a process of increasing exposure and historical emergence. Certainly, the author develops while producing his work, during the process of shaping the idea. Charles-Jean Bonnin observed that although some longstanding laws and regulations assumed a public administration endowed with its own elements, divisions and laws; that is, a relatively differentiated specific institution within the government, no progress was made in codifying it, and the shape, scope and limits that had been developed were soon forgotten (Bonnin, 1808: 27). That is, although the idea of public administration had existed in embryonic form since ancient times, it had not solidified into a precise concept, neither of its nature, nor its functions, nor its relationships with the government and the courts, nor its connections with those under its administration. In ancient times, the state ran the administration but its efforts in that respect were anonymous and incognito,
since administrative work was indistinguishable from the state's other functions. As Bonnin claims, it never crossed the mind of any legislators of any peoples that administration might have its own laws, forms, or fixed and invariable rules.

This vital principle of the idea in public administration is unique. No one is unaware of the weight of continuity in public administration, which strives to pursue and conclude the matters it deals with, to continue and conclude again. This has given rise to a considerable portion of administrative thinking: as can be observed in many writings, the administrative idea takes its impetus from a prior idea, and so on back along a chain whose beginning is often not known; its end even less. The crux here is to find the origin of the idea, which often first arises in a time of crisis. As Juan Beneyto noted, the main data point that the historian of public administration seeks, to write "with black ink on that white stone" that marks the beginning of a period, is the awareness of a crisis (Beneyto, 1958: 28). There have been not a few periods in history whose origin can be distinguished by a change in the form of public administration, whether by its failure or because of belief in its future success.

A crisis points to the fact that a government makes decisions in situations marked by urgency. Thus choices are made in a situation in which the government faces an immediate problem, and based on the situation facing it, calculates the probable consequences of each possible course of action. In fact, the word “decision,” which in Greek is krisis (from the verb krinein: to separate, decide, judge), carries the meaning of urgency, imperative need, and crisis (Majone, 1992: 346-349). Crises shape the evolution of public administration which, flowing in the direction it is pushed by ideas, produces new institutions which coexist with the old surviving ones after a period of crisis; that is, sifted through a sieve that separates the useful from what is damaging, burdensome and superfluous. Crisis, in fact, derives from sifting (VillarPalasi, 1952: 129–130).
Part One

THE BRITISH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Chapter 1
THE BRITISH CULTURE

The diversity of administrative cultures between countries is known among academics but this awareness does not date very far back. Previously not only was the innate superiority of Western culture taken for granted, but it was believed that less developed countries must adopt the systems of developed countries if they were to prosper. In the past, administrative culture, like political theory, was observed by academics in the field only partially and incompletely, if not wholly by traditional methods enshrined in custom. For example, Eastern political thought evoked an atmosphere of exoticism and rarity, and of curiosity, since it amazed them or left them uncomprehending. Sometimes they also observed it with prejudice and contempt, as seen in the work of Paul Janet, for example, who formed the opinion that Hindu lacked the concept of state, nation or law; and that a fervent Hindu belief in heaven caused them to judge real life as so hopeless that the best thing was to rapidly leave it (Janet, 1947: I, 67). Following these lines, one could even believe that Eastern political thought is barbaric and lacking in creativity.

D. Mackenzie wished to test this prejudice by analyzing the epistemological position of the political scientist W. W. Willoughby, famous for his work on the state and Prussian government (although Mackenzie erroneously attributed these views to his brother W. F. Willoughby, with whom he confused him) (Mackenzie, 1965, 32). W. W. Willoughby claimed that Orientals, in spite of having organized their political life earlier than the ancient Greeks, were unable to generalize their political ideas as an ordered, complete system worthy of being called political philosophy (Willoughby, W.W., 1903: 13.). As an aside, it is worth noting that the W. W. Willoughby thought in a similar way to his brother. As treasurer and secretary of Puerto Rico he had no qualms whatsoever in declaring that the American “Army of Deliverance” that occupied the island in mid-1898 not only was received as a band of heroes, but as the beachhead of a political and administrative reform highly desired by the islanders, who would bring American institutions to Puerto Rico. This passage from the work of W.F. Willoughby is an emblematic specimen of colonial mentality, one of the best examples of the way that the metropolis looked upon the “backward peoples” (Willoughby, W.F., 1909: 409). The outdated Spanish modes of colonial administration, he believed, would be replaced by American Modernity.

Cultural Diversity in Administration

The reality is, of course, otherwise, and more recently Western social scientists have placed great emphasis on the value of Eastern studies on politics and administration. Particularly notable is their acknowledgment of the pre-existence of institutions in Eastern countries following independence, since it has been concluded that the colonial implantation of the concept of the state and its administration failed because they ignored the actual conditions of these
countries. When a public administration model was implemented according to French and German models, it eventually had to adjust, rather, to the prevailing local situation (Heady, 1966). The same result came out of the colonial strategy for establishing a civil service based on these models, more oriented to the maintenance of law and order, which shaped the development of the country (Pye, 1966). However, the survival of the colonialist bias led John Stuart Mill to conclude from the fate of the East India Company a theory of how a civilized country would rule a “semi-barbaric” people and then “die” (Mill, 1858: 270). The wrongness of such an appraisal became abundantly clear in India when it was discovered that many of the country’s ancient administrative institutions were functioning better than those designed under Western models imported by metropolitan governments. It was found, in fact, that this was due not only to the positive relationship between social conditions and established administrative feasibility, but the preservation of national and local values (Riggs, 1961: 3–14). Asian – and African – countries that received technical assistance during the post-war period with a view to improving their public administrations suffered from the clash between two implementation models: one native, which was called substantive administration; and the other external, called formal administration.

These observations were dramatically substantiated in India in particular, where the eminent administrativist Paul Appleby, serving as a consultant to the Ford Foundation, found that his administration in India was as good as the American administration (Appleby, 1953: 1), a discovery that inspired one of his major works (Appleby, 1961). What is most notable is that Asian countries conceived highly developed public administrations at a time when Europe was still in a state of barbarism. Indeed, administrative development originally shifted from East to West, and it was not until much later, perhaps at the beginning of the nineteenth century, that it began to return from the West to the East. The last stage of this process began in the 1960s, when the theory of administration for development first appeared. This theory is predicated on the diversity of administrative culture, based not on a diametric opposition between the primitive and the civilized, but between underdevelopment and development. The latter category replaces the concept of civilization: development lies in the increased ability of human society to shape its physical, human and cultural environment (Riggs, 1970: 73–74). Administration for development means organized efforts, by means of programs or projects, to achieve development goals.

Analogous to the forging of Western “superiority,” the so-called “Anglo-Saxon peoples” have tried to ennable their industrial successes and military conquests, praising their ethnicity for what they view as its natural or providential supremacy. Yet this has been the custom of all winners, in all ages, because they feel the need to “intellectually worship their material triumphs” (Fouillée, 1903: 515–516). This can be contrasted with another diverse cultural world, that composed of the so-called “neo-Latin peoples;” that is, the nations of Spain, Portugal, Italy, France and Latin America, which distinguish themselves by their religious traditions and linguistic kinship, and other similarities based on classical culture and a love for the arts. The neo-Latins suffer the burden of the black legend of their decline; that is, the claim that the peoples of the Romance
languages share the common fate of having an inferior mission compared to the higher calling that the Anglo-Saxons attribute to themselves.

**Neo-Latins and Anglo-Saxons**

Since the authentic Latin people was the ancient Roman nation, the supposed inferiority of the neo-Latin “race” must be sought in its defects rather than in its achievements of conquering, organizing and reforming the ancient world. But such a search is unnecessary because it is difficult today to find the "neo-Latin" element, biologically speaking. For example in France, any remaining Latin vestiges are mostly only the language and some of its traditions. The people of France are half Celtic, one quarter Germanic, and the other quarter Latin (Fouililee, 1903: 516–517). In Spain, what dominates are the Mediterranean peoples mixed with Celts and Germans, similar to France, but with the order of the components reversed. Nor in Italy does the Latin element dominate, but rather the Celtic-Slavic and Mediterranean. Thus the Latin component is sparse, demographically speaking, in the neo-Latin peoples, whether we consider the Italians, Spanish or French. What then of the Latin American nations, also partly descended from the neo-Latin peoples of Europe?

**Causes of the “decline” of the neo-latin peoples**

The neo-Latin peoples are also burdened with a reputation of degeneration over the centuries, but the truth is that all peoples incessantly undergo renewal in the struggle against decline. In this sense, a population or a culture is always young. The problem consists, rather, in understanding what elements make it up at a given moment in its timeline. An unceasing selection process operates among these elements, sometimes choosing the best, sometimes the worst (Fouililee, 1903: 516–521). The former case leads to progress; the latter to retrogression. One of the prides of the Anglo-Saxon people is their success in colonizing. But it was the Romans who were the first to do so, and the French were also great settlers; for instance in Canada. What then of the Spanish and the Portuguese, who colonized the New World long before the English? And the Germans, who did not do so at all?

Another supposed justification of the “inferiority of the Latin nations” is their decline due to “immobility.” This view, which has a biological basis, refers to the law of adaptation of species to the environment they inhabit. That is, when the physical environment changes, the species must also change or disappear. Similarly, as the environment changes through the centuries with the progress of civilization, science and the arts, each nation must adapt to the new environment or disappear: its lack of flexibility and progressive adaptation is due to immobility (Fouililee, 1903: 521). There would be, thus, a social paleontology that enables specimens from past eras and backward peoples, unable to adapt to new conditions, to persist. If this version of humanity’s development were true, all empires would have collapsed from immobility, and it would explain why the Latin nations are in decline: because they languish in immobility. Yet if immobility is detrimental, so is excessive mobility. It is true that some neo-Latin nations, such as Spain, are not noted for their flexibility but this
characterization does not fit Italy: when Italians receive education, they apply what they have been taught and use it to prosper.

The French, if anything, have suffered rather from an excess of mobility than from immobility. Were it not so, France could have been spared numerous revolutions, wars, political changes, and fallen governments. About France, it has been said that its own history, given the toxic effects of absolutism and centralization, shows notable pathological traits that still resonate in the present day (Röpke, 949: 66–73). From this it has been concluded that the claim that France is the birthplace of modern revolutionary spirit and of socialism is credible. It is also suggested that in such a situation, a people can react against government excess in different ways. One is to accustom itself to subservience and devotion to the state; perhaps a normal response, as occurs in the case of the Germans. Moreover, Bakounine suggests that the Germans carry a passion for order and discipline in their blood, which is the source of their state spirit (Bakounine, 1967: 237). Another response is to expose themselves, as the French do.

Finally, the neo-Latin decline has also been attributed to their religious inferiority, a thesis which begins by making Catholicism a sort of common property of the neo-Latin peoples. But this is at best relative, because there Catholics in Belgium, Cologne, Aachen, on the banks of the Rhine, in Bavaria and in Austria, just as there are in New York and many places more (Fouillee, 1903: 530, 534). In the political sphere, the Latin peoples have been attributed a congenital quality of suffering voluntary submission to a single power; that is, an innate need for government protection. In fact, it is not the neo-Latin, but the Germans who have a reputation for submission and for carrying a passion for order and discipline in their blood, from which arises their state spirit. Germany is a serious and hardworking nation, endowed with education, order and precision, thus superior to other nations when a fighting spirit is required. But what mainly distinguishes the Germans is that they accept the terms of compulsion freely and with conviction, because their freedom consists in being willing to voluntarily submit to authority (Bakounine, 1967: 238). Finally, it is alleged that there is no nation to rival the Germans in terms of “statist” organization, which would explain why they seek their life and liberty in the state.

But it was not the feeling of submission but that of equality that originated in the nations with Latin culture, due mainly to the fact that Roman law and institutions had a general and universal quality that erased individual differences. This is characteristically visible in France, where the love of uniformity has spread in the opposite way to the tendency among Anglo-Saxons. The purest representation of the universal search for equality is of the rights of man and of the citizen (Sánchez Viamonte, 1956). But the tendency to draw a distinction and differentiate hierarchically among occupations does indeed persist among the Anglo-Saxons (Friedrich, 1946: 29). It is their division of labor that holds the secret of British prosperity. Indeed, the cornerstone of Adam Smith’s economic theory lies in the division of tasks (Adam, 1952). Its politics is also based on the division of work, which puts a dynasty responsible for the interests of the nation on one side and the House of Lords responsible for maintaining government traditions on the other. Neither the monarch nor the
House of Lords nor the House of Commons is entrusted with the whole government; each has its particular job for the general good. This political division of the job of government is constitutionalism, one of the contributions of Great Britain. It is a “divided powers” principle. Nor should we forget that the division of powers in the modern state was first proposed by John Locke in his book The Second Treatise of Civil Government (Locke, 1948), while Montesquieu formulated his interpretation based on Locke’s thinking, given that the chapter where he develops it is called “The constitution of England” (Montesquieu, 1961). By dividing power, constitutionalism puts effective limits on government action, because it consists of a system of norms that ensure fair play, which holds the government responsible (Friedrich, 1946: 33–34). Although constitutionalism is not the result of any “mysterious national character,” it is true that the English-speaking peoples developed their political traditions by moving steadily in the constitutional direction, thereby becoming leaders of modern constitutionalism.

This is why the tendency to do everything, mix everything, level everything and reduce everything to uniformity does not mean that the neo-Latins are intellectually inferior, but rather that their intellectual aptitudes are diverse for the purpose of concentration. It explains why the Anglo-Saxon and the German are better craftsmen, whereas the neo-Latin is the better artist. As a consequence, it is not so prudent as some might think to pressure the Latin nations to attempt a servile imitation of the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic peoples (Fouillee, 1903: 534, 540). In fact, if we trace the course of the Anglo-Saxons in America, it is undeniable that they had their greatest success there. But also it is true that the Anglo-American is increasingly diverse and multicolored according to the country, ethnic group and religion of the emigrant, although they are still given the symbolic label of Anglo-Saxon even though the name is no longer scientifically nor historically accurate.

Looking to the future

If we subscribe to the opinion of Fouillee, we can claim, in summary, that there is nothing truly scientific in the theories that attribute native inferiority or degeneracy to the so-called neo-Latins. The explanation must be sought, rather, in the fact that the chorus glorifying the supposed Anglo-Saxon superiority yields, in the end, to a barely-disguised fondness for utilitarianism; its members feel the same admiration for industrialism as for commercialism, which is nothing else than an admiration “to put it bluntly, for money” (Fouillee, 1903: 543). Nevertheless, this very obsession for money is not innate in the Anglo-Saxon, but a neo-Latin gift. Actually, we must remember that no Anglo-Saxon ethnicity explains the Genoans and Venetians, so powerful in their day on account of their bank – an Italian invention that would later bloom luxuriantly in Anglo-Saxon soil – the promissory note, and the generalized use of credit, barely known by the British of the day. They can also thank the Latins for the concept management, derived from the Latin word manus (hand) and meaning literally “maneuver.” The manager thus is the one who organizes maneuvers; holding reality in his hands, he makes the business run and operate successfully under shifting conditions. One author explains that “management” is from Latin, and in the Middle Ages took the form maneggiare in Italian.
meaning to maneuver, to direct. Lombardian and Genovese businessmen no doubt transmitted the word at the same time they passed on their banking techniques to the English businessmen of the time. This adoption of the term could even have a symbolic value; "maneuver" evokes contact with facts and the idea of evolution. The Venetians can also be credited with the first shipyards on the island of Great Britain; several ports were built in the first half of the sixteenth century, the shipyards of Deptford being particularly notable (Perpiña, 1965: 174).

In terms of geographic exploration, it must be noted that it was not Anglo-Saxons, either, but Portuguese who rounded the Cape of Good Hope and opened the route to the Indies for the British (Fouillée, 1903: 545).

In consequence, the admirers of the Anglo-Saxons are mistaken to condemn other peoples for their supposed inferiority or decline, because all peoples have their value, their merits, and their strivings in the present and hopes for the future. In fact, the future is as uncertain for the Anglo-Saxons as for the neo-Latins, for no people can flatter itself that it is the repository of virtue, nor of perpetual power. No single nation can boast of eternal primacy, nor is any nation inevitably doomed to fatal decline. There is room for every nation in the human family, because not a one of them is predestined to decline on account of its nature or ethnicity. History shows that scientific, social, intellectual and moral factors win out, by means of the progress of modern civilizations, over ethnic, geographic and climate factors. As Fouillee pointed out, the future does not belong only to the Anglo-Saxons, nor the Germans, the Greeks, or the Latins, but rather to the peoples who are the wisest, the most industrious, and the most moral (Fouillee, 1903: 546).

But who are the Anglo-Saxons?
Germanic Peoples in Britannia

Before undertaking a study of the Anglo-Saxon people, it is necessary to examine the history of the Romans in Britannia: the history of that nation – as well as that of modern Great Britain – is linked to the world they found. The Roman presence in Britannia was far from fleeting; it lasted nearly 400 years (43–440 C.E.) and left footprints that have persisted into the present day. For the Romans, Britannia was an *El Dorado* before the Conquest, as distant from the Italian *ecumene* as Siberia (Birley, 1964: 154–155). The Romanization of Britannia, like that of other provinces of the empire, was mainly oriented to establishing a Roman government within the borders of the territory held by the Romans. Urbanization played an important role, both in demographic appropriation, and in promoting the organization of public life. The cities served in large measure to support road building and the establishment of a postal service, while both supported urban development.

Roman Britannia

Before the Roman conquest, Britannia had no cities or towns, except for Celtic villages where the local people lived (Bennett, 1988: 7). Rome pulled Britannia out of its social backwater and changed it from a tribal to an urban society. If by *civilization* we understand the transition from an agricultural existence to an urban society, Rome civilized Britannia, giving her her first cities (Bagby, 1952: 84). This was how Colchester (*Camuludunum* or *Colonia ClaudisVictreensis*) was founded, as well as York, Lincoln (*Lindum*) and Gloucester (*Glevun*), as well as London (*Londinium*). The latter, the capital of Britannia, began as the seat of one of the four provinces of Britannia (*MaximaCaesariensis*), while Cirencester was the capital of *Britannia Prima*, York of *Britannia Secunda* and Carlisle the capital of Velentia. That is, Rome effected the first territorial division of the island, and its first municipal organization. Colchester, Lincoln and Gloucester, founded as colonies (*coloniae*), were populated by Roman civilians, as well as by licensed veteran soldiers, while the other towns (*civitetas*) were occupied by the Britons as in their traditional settlements, although the Roman invasion caused them to resettle and change their distribution. Once the town had become a city, it became a supply port, or its Romanized residents acquired citizenship (Salway, 1984: 23). Military demobilization was a source of urban development for Lincoln and Gloucester, whose population was augmented by veterans of the Ninth and Second Legions, as well as their families and servants (Birley, 1964: 22, 61). All the Roman cities of Britannia were doubly new because, being located in previously unsettled country, they were not built on top of existing construction, and each of them was situated for specific purposes. In other words, they emerged from a general country-wide urban development plan. For this reason, they must be distinguished from military forts and sites, which are generally considered as the main cities (Morris, 2005: 6).

Colchester and London are particularly notable among the cities of Roman Britain. Modern-day Great Britain is well-supplied with cities; that is, it
has an active urban life. Colchester is an important contributor to the history of why this is so, for it was the place where the urbanization of the country began. As the Romans founded cities in order to ensure their control of the territory, exploit natural resources and establish civilization, they caused the Britons to adopt urban life, and by extension, the government and culture of the invaders (Crummy, 1997: 5–7). Thus it was the cities that were the typical expression of this civilization, that with the passing of time caused the line between the invaders and the invaded to blur, giving way to a British-Roman society. Colchester was undoubtedly the first and most important civil seat of society in Britannia, and the first capital of the province. Since then, public utilities, commerce and recreation for the residents of the city developed as a surrogate for urban life. Colchester was thus the seed from which sprouted education, technological innovation and social progress.

John Morris claims that “London is a Roman city.” It was founded by the Roman government to serve a variety of purposes, for it was established expressly for this reason: what brought the city into being was the government and administration of Britannia. Being located in a potentially troublesome territory, the choice of the site of the city was geopolitical; it must be a natural center that connected with the rest of the territory in order to govern it and stimulate its economic activity. And the choice was astute, because of the many great cities founded by Rome, London stands out among them. It was in London that the overall government of Britannia was installed, where all the main roads carrying the imperial mail set out from, and where the fiscal, judicial and administrative offices were located. The history of London is thus not the biography of just any British city, but the history of the government and economy of Britannia (Morris, 2005: 6–7). Rome also built Paris, Cologne, Vienna and Belgrade, but none of them grew as London did, nor were any of them such a dominant political center from the time of their foundation, as London’s history from its beginning to the present day has shown. This important fact is due to the location of the capital of Britannia having been chosen deliberately.

Rome also established the municipal government: each city was governed by a Senate whose elected members (100 decurions) appointed the magistrates annually from among its members, the duoviri, to preside over the administration of justice and other functions. They also appointed the councilors whose duty was to oversee public works, payment of taxes, and spending by the state treasury. The quaestors served as secretaries of the Senate (Morris, 2005: 22–24). Representatives from the cities in each province made up a provincial council. The advance of urban life spilled over into the countryside: farming on a large scale arrived with the Romans, as did commerce, money coining and manufacturing. Rome organized a complex economy in Britannia. Together Colchester, Saint Albans (Verulaminium) and London had a total population of 70 thousand, although London in its heyday had only 45 thousand (Bennett, 1988: 11).

Each city was built on a master plan, mainly because its construction not only implied the achievement of Roman citizenship, but because its founding was also a deliberate state policy. There were planned urban areas in the streets, and in the public squares and buildings, such as the city center (forum)
that served as the core of public life (basilica) and the municipal government. Planning included the construction and management of public utilities, mainly the drinking water supply and sewage. The first city of Britannia, Colchester, and the first capital reached a population of three thousand after being populated by the influx of demobilized veterans (Bennett, 1988: 59, 72–73). Rome can be credited with the original urbanization of Great Britain. As a consequence of municipal life, Rome operated the first public utilities. In addition to the water and sewage mentioned above, the Romans built baths and aqueducts, as well as theaters – in Saint Albans and Canterbury – and a racetrack in Lincoln.

Rome left a vast material heritage in Britannia, but also an intellectual heritage, mainly through its language. Although it was replaced by the Saxon language (which itself absorbed some Latin words, such as “street” from strata), Latin remained alive mainly in the educated classes (Bennett, 1988: 72–73, 169). Rome left Britain King Arthur and his legend, perhaps Ambrosio Aurelio or a Romanized Briton who defended his land against attacks by the Anglo-Saxons. One of the early mentions of Ambrosio Aurelio was made by Gildas (circa 494–570) in his work On the Ruin of Britain – De Excidio Britanneae – (Gildas, undated: 30). This valuable document was written around 570. All the evidence points to the origin of King Arthur lying in a real person of that name who held the position of Count of Britannia (Comes Britanniarum), the highest position of Roman authority on the island together with the Duke of the Britons (Dux Britanniarum), who guarded the territory north of Hadrian’s Wall. They were also under the authority of the Counts of the Saxon Shore (Comes litoris Saxonici) who guarded the south (Squire, 1994: 313-314). Taking into account that after the departure of the Romans, their administrative and military organization was inherited intact by the Britons, it is likely that that position was assimilated to that of emperor, according to the Welsh custom.

While the British element of the society survived in reduced form, the Roman part disappeared from the history of Britannia, but leaving three gifts as a permanent legacy: London, Christianity, and the Roman roads. Although it is not certain whether London was completely abandoned at the time of the Anglo-Saxon conquest, it was soon reestablished as a modest city. By 700 it had again become an important commercial center, within the standards of the modest mercantile system of the time. It was the concentration of Roman roads near the Thames that ensured London’s resurgence, for when the Romans left Britannia, “they could not take their roads with them” (Trevelyan, 1976: 51).

Welsh Christianity, although more recently imported to Britain, outlived the older, more traditional institutions of the country. It left few archeological traces on the Roman–British world, but this makes its survival among the Welsh, as the only vestige of Roman civilization, all the more notable. One reason was that when the Roman military and political regime left Britannia forever, missionaries continued traveling to the Latinized continent to sustain the spirits of the Welsh after the destruction of Hadrian’s Wall allowed the Picts and the Scots to attack from north and west while the Saxons pressed in from the East and South. If the Welsh were abandoned by the civilized world, they were not neglected by the Christian missionaries.
The importance of the Roman roads is a bright chapter in the history of Great Britain. Since the Romans left, no further roads as solid as theirs were built again until the eighteenth century, when the toll road system was constructed. Even throughout the Middle Ages, the stone roads built by the Romans continued to cross an island sunk in discord and barbarism. It was the Roman roads that facilitated the Saxon, Danish and Norman conquests, but also worked to the benefit of the Saxon and Norman kings to unite England as a state, and helped form the English nation. Thanks to the Roman legacy of their roads, Great Britain had better royal roads in the time of the Saxon Heptarchy than much later during the Stuart period. These roads contributed to the defense of the island – while the Roman army was still there, it could never be invaded. Twenty thousand soldiers and as many auxiliaries kept the marauders at bay for nearly four centuries (Breeze, 2002: 14).

The Roman government of Britannia was no different from that installed in other regions of the Roman Empire, as can be seen in the way they were organized to rule the country, and in their scrupulous care. The government was headed by a governor, who had broad discretionary power to appoint his advisers and staff, in spite of imperial restrictions. However, he was normally prohibited from appointing legionary legates and judges (iuridices). The prefect of the fleet was directly subordinate to the orders of the governor as commander in chief of the army. He had authority over the legionary legates, and occasionally also over the judge, as well as other officials responsible for imparting justice and the government of the province in general, although it did not extend to fiscal matters, these being reserved to the procurator augusti. The governor was supported by an “office” (officium); that is, a staff of military and civilian officials, which was headed by the cornicularius, who served as adjutant (Birley, 2005: 10–11). There were three further officials, holding military positions, the commentariensis, as well as civil officials; the secretaries, speculatores; military police, beneficiarii, structores, officials with permanent positions, equisiones, singulares, and infantry and mounted guards, who served in a supporting role as auxiliary regiments in the provinces. We must not forget that two great figures, Agricola and Frontino, were governors of Britannia.

As in their other provinces, in Britannia the Romans did not spare effort or resources to make the island government viable, setting up what can be called government infrastructure; that is, the public mails (cursus publicus). As famous as their aqueduct water system was, the cursus publicus was one of the public services on an imperial scale most sought for its cascading effects, since it involved not only the top-level government information system but a complex network of public works that in Britannia meant not only constructing roads, but also the “mansiones” (night quarters) and “mutationes” (relay stations) (Black 1995: 13). Thanks to the cursus publicus, a carriage could comfortably cover 25 kilometers or more in a day and its occupants enjoy suitable lodging. The mansiones often became the seeds that gave birth to small towns that multiplied throughout the island.

The unique development of Britannia in the Roman Empire is not trivial; as recent research on the civilization left behind has shown, it is more than mere military presence.
Germanic migration

Prior to their migration to Britannia, the Angles and the Saxons lived along parts of the coast of what today are Denmark and Germany, and on both sides of the mouth of the Elbe River. The differences in language and customs between the two peoples were slight. Some historians think that the Anglo-Saxons were, in essence, a single people, while others maintain a distinction between them (Breeze, 2002: 31). Both peoples settled in most parts of Britannia, from the Forth to the far reaches of Cornwall, while the Jutes settled in Kent and the Isle of Wight. The latter were a smaller tribe, related to the Angles and Saxons, but more diverse. They came to Britannia directly from Jutland, in northern Denmark, or perhaps from their more recent settlements in Frisia and the lower Rhine.

Many of the invaders were farmers who sought soil richer than that of the dunes, marshes and forests of the northern coast of Europe where they lived. Others were fishermen, experienced in surviving sea storms and pirates – both frequently encountered in the North Sea, although they, too, were raiders and buccaneers. These peoples were accustomed to loyally following their leaders in marauding forays along the coasts between Norway and Frisia. But once their conquests had been consolidated, the Anglo-Saxon women and children migrated with their menfolk. The flow of population was so copious that their lands of origin were virtually emptied. Even the royal family emigrated from the Angle kingdom in Schleswig. It was then that the Danes spread from what is today Swedish territory into modern Denmark which had been depopulated following the emigration of its former inhabitants who crossed the sea to found a new Engle-land.

In its time, this crossing made by thousands of families from southern Denmark to England was unique for being the farthest such migration undertaken by a people. It was this colonizing energy, combined with a damaging destructiveness, that changed the civilization and racial stock of the island more than any other Nordic invasion of the era. Neither the Goths nor the Lombards in Italy nor the Franks in Gaul destroyed the urban life, the Christian religion, nor the Latinized language of peoples they conquered. In contrast, in Saxon Britannia, urban life, Christianity and the Latin-Celtic language disappeared, along with the native settlements and the Roman administrative boundaries (Trevelyan, 1976: 45). Urban life was profoundly changed by the new locations of cities and towns, as well as their names, of which nine of every ten now bore Saxon names. The Vandals were famous for destroying artworks, hence the term “vandalism.” The word comes from their destructive action in Rome, when they defaced the city’s works of art in particular, some years after the Goths sacked the ancient imperial capital (Caldecot, 1959: 36). In this, they were much less selective than the Anglo-Saxons, who destroyed equally the beautifully and the ugly, the useful and the useless.
Destruction of the Roman Civilization

The pillage and destruction wreaked by the Anglo-Saxons was especially visible in urban areas, as they destroyed cities and villages on a wide scale and almost wholly. They did not live in cities nor did they have an inclination to commerce—except for selling slaves abroad— but they lost their traditional seafaring ways when they acquired land suitable for farming in the interior of the island. The loss of their knowledge of sailing was so complete that when Alfred the Great wanted to build ships for a navy, he applied to mercenaries in Frisia. Their most civilized urge was to draw together into vast townships to farm in an open field system of village agriculture. They built wooden houses clustered around the lord’s manor house, also of wood, following the pattern they had brought from across the sea (Trevelyan, 1976: 45–46). Even long after the migration, they had developed no urban life, except for some urban growth in London. The only economic service they rendered for Britannia was their work as laborers and woodcutters who lived in large isolated houses or caves close to the forests, with little care for anything happening outside their properties. Their life did not vary from the time when Tacitus observed in Germany in the year 98 that its inhabitants did not live in cities, nor did they tolerate their houses being clustered together, for they preferred to live apart and isolated. Nor did they produce materials to construct their houses, but built rude, unornamented dwellings of natural materials (Tacitus, 1942: 716.).

What is more, it is not known whether any Anglo-Saxons moved into any abandoned Roman country villas. They found the idea of anyone living within stone walls repugnant, except in places that were so strategically important that they could not be permanently abandoned. This was the case in Chester, Bath and Canterbury, which were again occupied, but it is not known whether Lincoln or York were also resettled. What is known is that it was not until the Roman roads and fords were joined that London and Cambridge began to recover their status and civilization began to re-emerge; the rule of barbarism and the passage of time could not wipe out all that Rome had built (Trevelyan, 1976: 45–46). Nevertheless, society had ground to a permanent halt in Silchester, Wroxeter, Verulamium and many other cities. Modern excavations often unearth Roman villas and cities under fields, meadows and marshes.

As one author explained, “an approximate estimate of the total mileage in Britain would be about 10,000 miles (16,000 km), based on 7,400 miles (11,900 km) of known roads and perhaps another 2,000 miles (3,000 km) still to be found. This was achieved during the first century of the occupation and one mile of road produced on average in about three to four days constantly for one hundred years is a superb record by any standards” (Bagshawe, 1990: 7). The English mile was inherited from the Romans—the milia passum, or one thousand steps. The Roman road network criss-crossing all of Britannia, which included two distinct environments; the civil (domini), and the military (militiae), where there were no towns or villages, and Romanization was declining. The extension of the system to commerce and agriculture brought the unit of measurement into general use. Northward, Romanization of the civil zone spread 50 miles beyond the present-day city of York; westward to the Welsh border at Wroxeter, southward to Exeter, and eastward to Colchester.
The destruction of the roads was deliberate and complete, as was the elimination of the Roman names. Gradually, the paving stones of the unmaintained roads sunk, and later the roads were dismantled to quarry the materials when the Medieval English, having used up much of their lumber, began to build houses of stone. Having degenerated into bridle paths, the highways eventually disappeared under marshes and fields. Recently some sections have been repaired and modernized, and "the motor car now shoots along the path of the legions" (Trevelyan, 1976: 52). Other vestiges of the Roman roads are still walked by English trekkers, although these paths set out from nowhere and end up nowhere, "walking miles and miles" through the English countryside. Many of these roads are not identified so much by their visibility as by exploration of the ground and by air, enabling them to be rediscovered.

One of the most grievous consequences of the Anglo-Saxon conquest was that it shattered the peace and unity of ancient Roman Britain. During the fifth and sixth century, Britannia became a chaotic panorama of warring tribes and kingdoms that fought each other and within their own families. Public and private warfare was more the rule than the exception (Trevelyan, 1976: 48).

Romano-British civilization suffered heavy damage as it disintegrated under pressure from two barbarian fronts; the Anglo-Saxon conquest and the return of the Britons. The regions where Roman culture had blossomed were destroyed by the waves of invaders. The civilized Britons took refuge in the Welsh mountains and the Cornish marshes, but deprived of their cities and their governments, they were surrounded by their less civilized Celtic brothers, and it was not long before they lost the arts and customs that had enabled them to stand above the crude Saxons (Trevelyan, 1976: 49). The first product of the conquest was that the arts, science and knowledge Rome had lavished on Britannia were forgotten. At the same time, in spite of the flow of migration from Germany, the population and farmland on the island were decreasing sharply. This meant that due to demographic movements, the Anglo-Saxons, who lived in the lowlands, began to develop a civilization superior to that of the Welsh highlanders. With the passage of time, this produced a separation between the barbarian Celt and the civilized Saxon. The shift of the island's center of wealth was partly due to the character of the Britons, for if they had bowed in submission to the Romans, it was because of the superiority of that civilization, but they found the Saxons unacceptable as lords. Hence, their decision to either die fighting or escape across the sea to the new Britannia in Armorica in Gaul, or take refuge among the wild peaks of Wales.

With their work of destruction, the Anglo-Saxons mortgaged their present and erased their future. Once the Roman civilization, which could have driven progress, was devastated, the Anglo-Saxons lagged behind while other nations advanced. With the passage of time, while their collective strength dissipated, the Anglo-Saxons were unable to develop new strengths that would drive them forward. This fact, one of the most surprising in history, shaped one of the most poignant eras of retrograde progress.
Halting National Unity

Their predatory behavior worked against the Anglo-Saxons themselves, since their isolated, rural way of life did not contribute to the development of a sense of nationhood. It was the kings and bishops who made an effort to inspire them with national, or at least provincial patriotism, but they met with little success. The dominance of a leader depended on the prestige he won on the battlefield, but it soon dissipated after victory because the necessary organization to permanently subdue distant provinces was absent (Trevelyan, 1976: 70). Temporary winners did not have the fortresses and garrisons to do so, nor did they have permanent armies stationed in the subjugated territories. This was the reason why the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms endemically lacked a system to carry out government and administration: Northumbria, distant, in decline and detached by local disputes, was easy prey for the Danish invaders. Mercia, which dominated from 757 to 796, was subdued by Wessex. When struck by a concerted foreign invasion, the Anglo-Saxon kings were unable to set aside their internal quarrels and ally themselves with the Nordics. They fell one after another, having failed to make a consistent plan for national defense.

When Edward The Confessor died in 1066, the Anglo-Saxon people were still poorly organized and lacking a sense of nationhood. The Norman invaders, in contrast, had a well-trained and equipped army of more than twelve thousand men. When England was divided among the conquerors, many of whom came after Hastings, the total number of feudal knights was no more than five thousand. That a country of a million and a half could be subjugated by such a small contingent confirms the political and military backwardness of the Anglo-Saxon system compared to the Norman regime. As a consequence, England’s geopolitical focus changed forever after the conquest. Moreover, it was the dramatic culmination of a long contest between Scandinavia and Latin Europe for England (Trevelyan, 1976: 133–104). From then on, England looked to the continent, but without ever considering itself fully European.

War, invasion and bloodshed, normal in the England of the time, left a long-lasting stamp on Anglo-Saxon life. But no more is known about the era, because the Anglo-Saxon period disappeared from the landscape; their wooden houses left no traces nor lasting traditions. Today, it is traces of the Romans, more distant in time, that are more visible than those of the people who destroyed a considerable part of their work. In the absence of written records, the history of the Anglo-Saxon world was woven into a cloth more mythological than historical, for the silence of the past is unrelenting. Certainly there are no authentic accounts of the Anglo-Saxon conquest; the most important page of our national annals is blank, George Trevelyan has concluded (Trevelyan, 1976: 83–84). Thus the leading figures of this lost period of English history – such as Arthur – could be real or fictional.

To date, archaeology and history have only revealed the general outlines of the struggle that destroyed Roman Britannia and eventually delivered the island to the modern English.
The delay in developing national unity is, in spite of everything, a paradox because the first mention of the idea of a people that was starting to shape itself came very early. Of particular note is Bede (circa 673-735), a Benedictine monk who was the first to use the term “our people.” Although in his time there was no single Anglo-Saxon domain, but rather a land where division and discord reigned, he observed an English people as a social entity and conceived it as the historical configuration of his most important work (Forbids, 1999: IX, XX). So it was that if first he distinguished between the Angles and the Saxons and the two together, later he tended to group them under a single name; Anglos. In any case, his work has the enormous merit of being the first attempt to write a national history, covering the fifth century to the first half of the eighth, even though that was not his goal.
Chapter 2

THE CHARACTER OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE

A proper understanding of the British people within their history should start by understanding the place of their country in the world. The country occupies a relatively small island and part of another. The United Kingdom (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) measures 313 thousand km². But as Great Britain (without Northern Ireland), it is smaller, only 230 thousand; that is, 42% of the total area of France. In short, it covers 0.2% of the Earth’s land area.

Insularity and Territoriality

However, this perspective gives only a partial view, for we should not forget the Commonwealth of Nations, the British-influenced territory that occupies more than a quarter of the world. Thus, from the geographical point of view, it is not only from its metropolitan territory properly speaking from which England obtains its greatness; other sources must also be considered (Siegfried, 1950: 79–80). Some time ago, André Siegfried masterfully characterized the influence the English people have had on the world: the 45 million men living in the rock have had a decisive effect on the world; they have contributed more than any other people to the development of Western civilization. Siegfried points out clearly what is so splendid about the construction of a great power seated on such a narrow territorial base. But at the same time as we see its greatness, we also see its fragility. For this nation to construct its Empire and to maintain it for centuries, the existence of a truly exceptional set of qualities can be inferred.

As noted by another author, the confusing origins of the British nation sprung from an isolated, cold, rainy riverine island, freed of its ice cap, gradually populated by migratory waves of people from the continent with a colonizing spirit, some as pioneers and others as refugees from oppression (Nicholson, 1967: 5). These migrations brought with them four elements that dominate the subsequent history of the island: commerce with the continent, budding ideologies, inclusive religions, and conflicts triggered by the island’s need to protect itself from new invasions. Thus the fact of its island home had a determining influence on the destiny and spirit of the English people: reduced to their essence, they were condensed by a swifter and more complete fusion of their elements, resulting in a unique, homogenous character. But at the same time, the isolation of the island hindered communication with the outside which would have resulted in more social exchange, although the English did voyage to the continent to try to conquer territory or to trade (Fouillee, 1903: 194–197). However, something of the ancient Britons’ strong fraternal instinct and fondness for society and organizations was inherited by the English. Moreover, the island environment that confined the English also promoted their unity and
persistence; it forced them to resolve their quarrels by themselves and swiftly achieve a balanced society. As he explains, with their destiny enclosed inside much more solid limits, how could their character not more promptly have become unified and homogeneous?

The conclusion that can be drawn is that the destiny of the British nation has been shaped essentially by isolation as a result of insularity. But separation did not protect the island from repeated invasions. It is just a little more than a thousand years that the North Sea and the English Channel have been able to preserve England from new incursions; ethnic contact between the English people and the nations of the continent ceased after 1066. A number of French, German and Jewish refugees emigrated to the island from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, but as individuals, not as population migrations. The British thus have always had trouble considering themselves as Europeans (Siegfried, 1950: 83–84, 87). We should not fail to note their ethnic youth in contrast, for example, with the French, because the Latins have been a societal group for more than two thousand years. There is however a contradiction between insularity and the internationalism of British trade as its true destiny, a contradiction that represents its personality. As England by its very temperament is the most insular country in the world, its interests and relationships have forced it to make its living from international trade, which means that every English person embodies this contradiction.

In fact, it is thought that globalization, a process that has encountered strong national resistance, has come up against one of the most solid defenses in Great Britain. We must not forget that England led a crusade well into the 1950s whose thesis was that the European Common Market would fail because it was believed at the time that markets were resistant to the European temperament and its nationalisms. This led to the United Kingdom’s refusal to join the Continent in signing the Common Market Treaty. It was the cultural English insularity that brought about this decision; as one author noted, the English have not been considered part of Europe because of the separation between the British Isles and the continent. The English Channel separates the islands sufficiently from Europe, while a more distant continent has offered it a sense of North Atlantic community in spite of the thousands of kilometers that separate them (Rose, 1964: 7). The United States and Canada make a sort of North Atlantic community, fuzzily and imprecisely defined, with England,

One of the particularly English features that characterize the nation is its historical relationship with the French, and vice versa. André Siegfried said that when he crossed the English Channel and came to London, he had the impression of having landed on another planet. Later, having become accustomed to the English environment, he no longer understood his own country. While Siegfried eventually came to be able to understand both the English and the French points of view, he never managed to do both simultaneously. From this, he was able to conclude that he knew no peoples more mutually impenetrable. The English Channel, dividing the port of Dover from the French coast, is metaphorically as deep and wide as an ocean. Siegfried claims the right to make such judgments, having known the island of Great Britain since 1882, when he visited as a child, and because he returned to it many times (Siegfried, 1932: 8).
Even to this day, many nations owe the fact of their existence mainly to their antagonism against other countries. Indeed, Anglican England was conceived by its hostility to Catholic France, as observed by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who explained that since ancient times, the belief has reigned that a state consisting of an island (especially when other empires still did not have natural borders separating them, nor could one speak of a balance of powers between them) does not properly constitute an independent whole. Every such independent state must have a foot firmly planted on the continent; islands can only be considered an annex—by this logic, the British Isles belong to the terra firma of France. Thus it was argued whether the lord of the mainland should extend his domain to the islands or should the more powerful ruler of the islands extend his sovereignty over the mainland. Both were attempted in turn. The French princes took over England, the English kings seized France; the latter maintain their claims even today, at least by means of their titles (Fichte, 1991: 124). To this was added, in the modern era, another not entirely natural aspiration to supremacy in world trade and the colonial systems of both empires, neither very natural. From this sprang the succession of wars that raged from ancient times to today. And from this sprang the national hatred that both peoples proffer so generously towards each other, all the more violent by the fact that the two peoples were destined to be one.

This is because an identity with a strong cultural and political profile implies few political and cultural limits, meaning that the number of social adhesions are limited (McLuhan and Powers, 1989: 164). So if a country holds one nationality and a plurality of cultures, there must be a balance between them to avoid fragmentation and consequent dissolution. This is because the unity afforded by the nation arises from a secular adaptation with historical roots, which stimulated and consolidated a type of culture (Siegfried, 1950: 50–52). The nation, therefore, more social than political, because it is built on a base more of family and individuals than on a state foundation.

But the English isolation and insularity could have been more radical. Since France and England could have been a single country, because of the Norman Conquest, it forever determined the direction of England’s politics and culture. Geopolitically belonging to the Scandinavian countries, the land adjacent to Europe during the Anglo-Saxon era, the British Isles were threatened with remaining in isolation and apart from the great movements of European life; that is, at risk of drowning in a countercurrent to the flow of history. The union with Normandy turned England’s sights toward the continent and plunged England into Europe’s politics, religious turmoil and cultural influences. England, specifically, became a part of France and, thus entered wholly into the world to which France belonged. As Charles Haskins points out, England received from France its language, its literature and its art; its laws became largely Frenchified; its institutions, almost completely feudal. This connection with France was effected through Normandy, and the French influence took a Norman form. All this was true especially in the particular features that characterized the Norman government: English feudalism was a Norman feudalism in which the barons were weak and the central government strong, since it was the iron fist of the Norman reign that converted a weak, straggling Anglo-Saxon state into the English nation. Being Normandized was the price England paid for being Europeanized (Haskins, 1915: 82).
explains why, both by its immediate result and the eventual outcome, the conquest of England was the crowning event of Norman history.
The British

The island of Great Britain being a neighbor of Europe, this proximity has shaped its ethnic composition through successive waves of immigration. A series of invasions from the continent superimposed the Britons, Romans, Anglo-Saxons and Normans onto the indigenous Iberians who were the original inhabitants. Four main waves stand out; the first is the Britons, from the sixth century B.C.E. to the arrival of Julius Caesar. These are a people who brought a language and civilization to the island. The Roman conquest took place in 43 B.C.E., and lasted until the year 410 when the last legions left the island. It must be emphasized that the effect of the Romans on Britain was not only the small military occupation, but the seeds of Roman culture that were sown during those four centuries, and whose traces, in spite of the Anglo-Saxon predation, remained more visible than might have been expected.

While the Gaels of Scotland were never invaded by the Roman legions, the south lived under the Roman order, and its effects can still be felt. The next movement was the Germanic wave, which lasted from the fifth to the eleventh century. Displacing the Britons westward, Anglo-Saxons and Scandinavians occupied the eastern coast as far as the North Sea and penetrated into the interior of the island. They would be the dominant element of the British population, and thus the factor that would leave the deepest imprint (Siegfried, 1950: 81–82). From this arises the claim that the Englishman of today is essentially an Anglo-Saxon. The last wave came with the Norman Conquest, which in a certain way was a repeat of the Roman conquest because it too consisted of a military occupation and political domination by a landed aristocracy superimposed on the pre-existing population. The Normans brought their French language, their political order, and a civilization, which, while it was not Roman, was at least Romanized because these formerly barbarian “detached Scandinavians” had evolved during their two-century sojourn in France.

Many peoples successively invaded this small island land. The last invasion, in 1066, was preceded by successive Nordic incursions. The Normans, Flemish, Picards and Armorican Bretons, led by William the Conqueror, were preceded by other northern invaders who renewed the Germanization of the country. These were the Danes, Norwegians and Swedes, whose incursions began in the eighth century. Scandinavians even colonized the North and East of England (ceded by Alfred the Great with the Peace of Wedmore in 878). Meanwhile, France colonized Normandy after it was abandoned by Charles the Simple. The Danes eventually conquered and annexed the whole of England in the early eleventh century (Petit-Dutaillis 1961: 128).

England owes its historical configuration to these successive invasions; moreover two of them were massive intrusions that delivered the new contingents of Britons and Anglo-Saxons to the island. The other two, carried out by the Romans and Normans, were military conquests that brought England mainly government, and the seeds sown in those remote times configured today’s government. It should be noted that these waves were not mixed and...
mingled; being successive, they occurred as a concatenated chain; they overlapped or were rejected, but they did not blend, or at least not at first. They resemble, rather, visible geological layers in which that which is Briton still can be distinguished from the Anglo-Saxon. This has given rise in particular to an idea the English have about themselves that is derived directly from this history, still visible half a century ago in their social divisions, although the distinctions may have blurred somewhat. But deep down, when the British mentality is probed, there is a tendency to specify whether one is dealing with Britons, Saxons or Normans. André Siegfried notes that the Briton is regarded as eccentric and a little erratic, but as an individual, the most brilliant (Siegfried, 1950: 83). The Anglo-Saxon, the backbone of English society, seems to be the most authentic and national representative of that Germanic facet of the British character which we must consider. The Norman, the evolved and Romanized Scandinavian, is the most aristocratic and most elegant; as Siegfried says, to have Harcourt, Talbot or Courtney as a surname conveys a distinct advantage. Long ago the country was ruled by the Saxons and Normans, but more recently the democratic tide has “Britainized” it.

It must be noted that the affinity between individualism and the love of social subordination was stronger in the Anglo-Saxon than in the German of his time. This is because of the Norman Conquest, an event that altered the individualism of the Anglo-Saxons and gave them a political spirit and a sense of social solidarity with its own stamp. Because the Normans were few in number, their collective action was mainly political; that is, it was an expropriation on a grand scale through which the conquered lands were distributed. The Anglo-Saxons and Normans were originally two superimposed nations, one granted the upper hand, the other pressed into servitude (Fouillee, 1903: 196. This explains how the English aristocracy originated with the Norman families, and was sustained and propagated with the recruitment of distinguished men from administrative, military and cultural streams. It was this aristocracy that created the political practices and engendered the country that we know today.

The Normans were endowed with a spirit of domination and talent for organization that did not weaken the bonds of subordination. The Anglo-Saxons rallied together to stand up for their rights and try to resist the invader. This was what gave rise to the English nation’s spirit of partnership that distinguished it from the German people. Here, the solid, open organization blocked individualism from forging a sense of isolation, dispersion or disassociation, with the result that German unity progressed so slowly as to be only recently accomplished. When the Normans imposed their practical, utilitarian concerns on the Anglo-Saxons, the climate and geography of the island favored them.

The role of the Normans in England has, however, been a source of controversy for some time. Edward Freeman and John Round, two great historians of the Norman conquest—both of them Englishmen—held the two opposing poles of the argument over its significance and meaning to the present day. Freeman, who produced his great work between 1867 and 1879, formed a theory in which Germanic tribes and traditions played the main role. To him, the origin of the English nation, which culminated in the reign of Edward the Confessor shortly before the Norman Conquest, lay in the Germanic tribes.
and traditions that had populated the island since the fifth century (Warren Hollister, 1969: 28–30). Indeed, by the time the Normans arrived in England, the nation and its political system had consolidated on the base laid by the Germanic peoples. So, from his point of view, the conquest is not important whether as the beginning or the culmination of these events, but simply a major point in their course; an illustrious chapter but not the first. At best, it represents a shift in the process, but not one that changed its direction. It was such decided opinions that prompted Haskins to say, as Freeman repeated countless times, that the English of ancient times were as English the English of today. (Haskins, 1915: 101). Round, in contrast, dismissed Freeman’s version of the conquest as genealogical and antiquated, mainly because he considered it unacceptable to credit the origin of the English nation to its ancestral Germanic labyrinths. Rather, the conquest was a break interrupting the line of history, which not only moved it from its previous route, but closed off that path forever. In fact, most British institutions have their immediate origin in the conquest, since its medium-term cause lies in the societies of Normandy and France, not in the ancient Anglo-Saxon kingdoms. The history of the conquest is not a continuous evolutionary thread, but the vision of an event he judges as revolutionary.

To understand the direction and development of the British character, we must remember that the Germanic race, of which the Anglo-Saxons are a branch, is characterized by a contrast between realism and idealism, and in their social relationships by individualism and a fondness for hierarchical subordination (Fouillee, 1903: 197–207). The Anglo-Saxons had the same tendencies as all the other Germanic peoples, but they were modified by the Briton and Norman influences, as well as the conditions under which the nation developed. Although prone to mysticism and idealism, the Britons were never inclined to intellectual intensity to the point where it detracted from practical life. The Norman influence, however, resulted in intelligent, firm minds grounded in reason, little given to illusions and fancies, and a persevering, enterprising spirit with an eye to “winning.” It is true that the realist inclination stood out, but not to the extent that the idealist inclination should disappear altogether. Rather, their domains were distributed; in practical matters and in the realm of pure intelligence, the island has remained positivist. All these influences together produced the final result of the British character, as it appears today in its originality.

This succession of eras has produced a variety of opinions about the importance and significance of each. Carlyle, for example, stressed the importance of the Normans, ignoring the old Anglo-Saxon lineage. Tennyson, considering the various Teutonic immigrations that followed the Roman occupation, stated that his people were the Normans, Saxons and Danes, ignoring the Britons who inhabited the island before them, but who make up a considerable part of the composition of the country. It is true that many of the Britons left, and remained separate in Wales and northern Scotland, and in Ireland, but many more stayed and intermarried with the Germanic settlers (Barker, 1944: 11).

The element carried by the Britons was not extinguished, unlike the Celts in France, and was able to maintain a fundamental importance in the social and
political history of the country. Particularly important was the organization of their rural communities, even in Anglo-Saxon times, but which persisted as an important factor, and as the remote ancestor of the country’s political system (Petit-Dutaillis 1961: 29–30). Even the Roman concept of civitas did not wipe out the Briton spirit of rural cooperation, inhibiting the development of individual property. The Anglo-Saxon invasions were demographically destructive to the Britons, as a large number of them were displaced to Wales, Cornwall and Armorica. However, given that many Britons remained in England, their fusion with the conquerors assured the persistence of the Celtic element in village communities.

Ernest Barker wondered whether the nation is an ethnicity. If he meant physical races, distinguishing the races by physical differences – the shape of the skull, of the face, color, height and appearance – then Barker accepts that it can be claimed that a nation is not an ethnicity and that all nations (or most of them) are ethnically mixed because of successive invasions and the intermingling that followed them. Thus the British nation is an amalgam of the various races or ethnic groups that swept across the island (Barker, 1944: 12–13). Unlike the Germans and Scandinavians, the English in particular form a nation that arose from what was ultimately an ethnic mix, with the Nordic portion predominating, whatever its proportion may be (Trevelyan, 1976: 50). This accounts for the noticeable difference between the modern Englishman and the modern German or Scandinavian; the explanation for which lies in many centuries of island life, as well as the social and political security that has reigned since 1066, when the island began to defend itself effectively from any and all invasions.

Thus the concept of nation means more than only England. There is an English nation whose home is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for the South and West of Ireland (Eire) became a separate independent domain in 1922, although still within the British Commonwealth. It is a nation which also includes Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (Ulster). The British nation is a “multinational nation” containing three different nationalities: English, Scottish and Welsh (Barker, 1944: 13–13). Some of the national languages other than English are spoken as a second language, but in some cases as the only or first language, such as Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in the Highlands of Scotland. Separate political institutions are preserved in some of the nations; Northern Ireland has had its Parliament in Belfast since 1922, but also continues to send its members to the House of Parliament in London. Scotland, moreover, has its own courts and its own national Presbyterian Church.
Politics

When it comes to English political life, individualism and the binding force of association produced a reign of freedom that is one of the country’s main claims to fame. But the regard in which freedom was held was not reverence for the idea, but rather the fact that safeguarding individual and corporate interests were personified equally. It was thus the barrier posed by the sea that made the liberal regime possible, fully consistent with national interests. Next to its constitutional freedoms and parliamentary system, the most significant development in English history has been its colonial expansion as a result of advances in industry and trade, which enabled the British to expand their dominion to the point that the national spirit, which overran the limits of Great Britain, made the English in particular give birth to the idea that men can build a homeland anywhere in the world (Fouillee, 1903: 210–211). Finally, the third main event is the triumph of Protestantism. This took place due to a number of reasons, but the main factor is political, which explains why the Irish Celts rejected the Reformation while the Welsh Celts embraced it. However, the overall correspondence between Anglo-Saxon individualism and a religion based mainly on the individual conscience must be acknowledged.

In the sphere of politics, Britain has solved problems that other nations could not overcome. It has taught by example that freedom and authority are not incompatible, and that the law can be obeyed without sacrificing personal dignity. That is, freedom implies neither chaos nor tyranny (Siegfried, 1950: 92). This is a different conception of what on the continent is called power in the sense of Roman imperium. The government is not a supreme authority whose orders are imposed on its citizens, but the expression of their common interest; that is, a delegation of the community. It seeks to administer with the same simplicity with which an individual or a corporation of individuals would exercise its administrative functions. Hence, the administration of public affairs does not imply any mystery, whether stately or evil, and its container does not hold the mandate of the governed, but rather the reason of state.

Political culture is in a constant state of change, since, as can be seen from a historical perspective, many different factors influence its development: the pattern of traditional norms, new historical processes, the behavior of political leaders, international events, chance happenings, and the coming together of circumstances. This explains why, in the development of the political culture of modern Britain, many standards have been preserved from generation to generation, although in some cases in a modified or tempered form (Rose, 1964: 37).

The development of the state in Great Britain—supporting Round’s thesis—stands in significant contrast with that of its counterparts on the continent, where the absence of proportion and scope in Charlemagne’s imperial ambitions, under nonviable historical conditions and using primitive methods of domination, ran in parallel to his lack of rational means of administration. The reigning historical conditions, which were characterized by a natural economy, a lack of communication, the absence of a rational financial system and bureaucracy, in addition to worn-out institutions poorly adopted
from the Roman experience, precluded the development of a great empire. The location of European countries within or outside the Carolingian Empire was instrumental in the degree of feudalization they each developed.

This uniquely exemplifies England, where the feudalization imported by the Normans was shaped by governmental technologies brought from the East and by the absence of the imperial factor that played such a determining role on the continent. The country occupies a land area of some 150,000 km²; that is, providing eleventh-century political force and the means of domination. England evolved directly from a tribal system to a state, reinforced by the Normans and their sense of statehood. As Otto Hintze noted, since the island, situated at the edge of the empire, was feudalized from the outside, the feudal waters never become very deep and soon withdrew without infecting the country with the childhood disease of imperialism (Hintze, 1968a: 55, 58). The Normans suppressed the Anglo-Saxon political order by means of large-scale expropriation and by proclaiming the monarch as the universal owner of the land. England, an exception in Europe’s feudalization history, confirms the rule that the state is formed out of the tribe. Its territory was occupied by independent shire regimes that gradually aggregated until they made up a broader state characterized by compatibility between its means of domination and the territory. In fact, the rudiments of state order were implemented by William the Conqueror and developed by his successors, primarily to centralize a solvent financial system. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon regime, which never became a feudal state although it contained some feudal elements, William organized an absolutist bureaucratic regime; a centralized state, which was the first in Europe. Two centuries later, the stratified constitution had replaced the feudal configuration, the monarchy was strong, and a monetary economy had developed.

The typical, emblematic development of the state described above might be supposed to have inspired a fountain of illustrious theories of the state, but such was not the case. Except for Thomas Hobbes, the country did not produce any scholars of theories of the state as did the continent. It was Germany and Italy, where state unity was precarious during the sixteenth century, that produced a distinguished group of theorists of the state. What is more, the concept of the national interest did not flourish in England either. A thesis suggested by the Hellenist Ernest Barker regarding Byzantium could also be applied to England. In Byzantium there was no deep political thought because the institutions of the state were not called into question. Thus, in the absence of controversy, ideas did not blossom. Something perhaps similar occurred in England: it was presumably the success of the state that inhibited any development of theories of state.

Without studies on the state there was little scope for the development of a theory of public administration, with the exception of purely practical writing. Without “crisis,” which is the raw material for ideas on public administration, there was no place for writing on the subject.

Carlyle tells us that the English in particular are “a nation of mutes.” But their silence puts them in a relationship and harmony with that which language does not express (Fouillee, 1903: 207, 208). However, although less sociable
insofar as his temperament is concerned, the Englishman is superior to other peoples in the art of association, since he is able to keep his individualism within the associations of which he forms part. But his sociability is not equal to that of the Frenchman, for example, because it does not stem from sentiment, but from reason and action. Thus it is not out of necessity nor by innate liking of the company that they associate, but because they appreciate the need for working together to achieve the goal that they judge as useful. In fact, the English became aware very early on of the power of association, because since the Middle Ages they began to cluster into associations based in the main cities of the kingdom, building ongoing business, trade, and industrial ties. Indeed, when they create an organization, it is always with a positive, restrictive goal. This custom of joining together to achieve a common purpose, whether for utilitarian or charitable purposes—which are considered to have a higher usefulness—has been preserved through the centuries.

Paradoxically, this rational quality of organizing for utilitarian purposes, which the British have mastered as a high art, never caught the attention of either practical or theoretical writers. Moreover, for many years they bore the stigma of being laymen in administration. Otto Hintze noted many years ago that during the nineteenth century the enthusiasm for an independent administration and its overvaluation against the maligned but necessary bureaucracy produced an administrative romanticism that should not blind us to the fact that the administration was a lazy, amateurish administration, already backward since the eighteenth century (Hintze, 1968b: 98). By the 1970s it was clear that Britain had similar or equivalent administrative institutions to those on the European continent, and many of them even had a common origin. But it is a failing of the British not to have developed in the least ideas relating to these institutions, unlike the continent. Hence F.F. Ridley claimed that in the theory of public administration, it is an underdeveloped country (Ridley, 1972: 65). For many years Great Britain stood apart from the upper reaches of administrative development, remaining on the margins of any advancement in the study of public administration.
The Language

From every angle by which Great Britain might be examined, one always finds a mixture, of which its language is an emblematic case. So, although it is taken for granted that English is a Germanic language, the reality is that more than half of its everyday words in the current vocabulary are of Latin origin. It is a bridge language, a stopcock in the gulf between the Germanic and the Romance families: it is a language that combines simple and familiar Germanic words with magnificent Latinisms, capable of including a broad range of fine nuances of expression in its dual vocabulary (Barker, 1944: 13). The English language has been under a powerful Franco-Roman influence; its vocabulary contains twice as many words of French origin as of Germanic origin. For example, in the nineteenth-century etymological dictionary, Latin etymologies take up the most space (Fouillee, 1903: 193). This leads Ernest Barker to propose that his language, thanks to its widespread use in the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations, was suited since ancient times to be a language of international trade and the second language of the world, as indeed is the case today.

This is important in itself in any case, because, as Burckhardt stated, languages are at the head of their cultures, because they are what gives birth to the soul of their people. Language is the image of the nation and the material that manifests the substance of its life, especially when the words emanate from the great poets and thinkers (Burckhardt, 1961: 103–104).

A crucial consequence of the Norman Conquest was the creation of the English language (Trevelyan, 1976: 117). After the Battle of Hastings, the ancient Anglo-Saxon language spoken by Alfred the Great was banished from the salon, the office, the royal court, the court of justice and the cloister; and even disdained as an argot spoken by peasants and serfs. In fact, it almost disappeared completely as a written language. Scholars and learned persons naturally lost interest in Anglo-Saxon, since the clergy spoke Latin and the middle class spoke French. When a phenomenon like this occurs, namely, that a language is rarely written, and scholars lose interest in it, it is among the ordinary people that it is swiftly adapted in its oral form to the needs and uses of daily life. This is what happened, for during the three centuries that the native language remained a rural dialect, it lost the difficult inflections and complicated genders that had characterized it, while gaining a flexibility and adaptability that illuminated its merits. At the same time, it was undergoing a parallel process of enrichment by a multitude of French words and concepts. Thus English is dominated by words of French origin in the vocabulary of politics, justice, religion, hunting, cooking and art. George Trevelyan notes that this was how the native language of England returned in an enhanced form to educated English society as reflected in Chaucer’s tales and Wycliff’s Bible, and was enriched in the works of Shakespeare and Milton. Nothing could be more ironic than that this language that managed to survive underground and unconsciously should rise to such heights that today it is spoken around the world (Trevelyan, 1976: 117).
During the period when English was formed in Anglo-Saxon times, the language had many regional variations; the main dialects were the versions spoken in Wessex, Northumbria, and the East and West Midlands. The language of Wessex was that spoken in Alfred’s court, but the Norman conquest relegated it forever to the farmhouse and the field (Trevelyan, 1976: 117). It was another dialect, that spoken in the eastern Midlands, which became the predecessor of modern English, persisting over other dialects mainly because it was spoken in London, Oxford and Cambridge. It was this language, in part, that Chaucer used and enriched with many French words, while Wycliffe expanded it with many words from Vulgar Latin. They founded a school that also used this same dialect, since their writings and translations circulated widely in manuscript form. In the late fifteenth century, Caxton’s printing press was installed at Westminster, which led to the popularization of Chaucer and the distribution of translations into English of various works.

It was during the reign of Elizabeth I that nationalist sentiments emerged which furthered the development of the English language. From the loss of Normandy and the end of the Angevin Empire, the French-speaking upper class was separated from its possessions and relationships on the other side of the Channel. Its culture, uprooted from France, became exotic on the island. Trevelyan notes that a hundred years before the publication of Chaucer’s “The Prioress’s Tale,” the French used to smile at the strange hybrid language that was then beginning to be the language spoken by educated Englishmen. But this was the usual language up to the reign of Edward III (1321–1377), and it came to be regarded as the hallmark of a gentleman (Trevelyan, 1976: 189). Shortly after Poitiers (1356), Parliament approved a law decreeing that because French was a foreign language in the kingdom, all judicial processes would be spoken in the English language and recorded in Latin. Thus it was that the first Englishmen to consider English their native language were the jurists. Although the law was initially observed only relatively, it soon received greater acceptance even though lawyers, with their professional conservatism, continued for much longer to write their documents in the Law French language in which their predecessors had addressed the courts.

A more fundamental revolution occurred in the language used in schools, furthering the process by which English became the language of the educated class. It was modest schoolmasters who prepared the way for Chaucer and Wycliffe in their century, later followed by Shakespeare and Milton. This represented much more than a northern offshoot of the French culture; some thinkers saw it as even more important than the Magna Carta. The Old English language had its literature before any of the continental languages did; King Alfred is considered as the father of prose of his country. There were even writers of high culture who did not necessarily have to recur to including Latin vocabulary in their works (Bradley, 1947: 382). But this process was slowed by the Norman Conquest, which derailed what had until then been the usual language, mainly because the young people stopped learning English, as French was taught in its place. By the time English was reborn, the traditional spellings of the ancestral language had almost disappeared, and the language was transcribed in a phonetic system based on French.
Latin is one of the main bases of the British administrative language, not only through the long-ago Roman history, but through the set of medieval administrative institutions that conserved their Latin names, such as the desk (scriptorium), where secretaries and scribes do their work, which dates from the Norman Conquest (Chromes, 1952: 26). Another is clerc, from “clericus,” referring to an educated person, which later transformed into a synonym of “official.” As found in many letters written before 1066, these writings were often written in Old English before it was replaced by Latin, although sometimes they were written bilingually, and increasingly so as French gradually came to be the official administrative language (Bradley, 1947: 378, 380). This is what caused Old English to survive as an administrative language, although in a secondary position, as it continued to conform to the writing style and standards of ministry officials. Similarly, many of the Latin words adopted by Old English are from the language spoken by the clergy; that is, not copied from books, since they were transmitted to German soil by priests from England who went there to evangelize, and they are still visible in Modern German.

Literary English was dead, and had to be created from the ground up, while the spoken English which survived lost many of its words to French synonyms. It was natural, then, that when they wished to express an idea foreign to the spoken language of the masses, writers found it easier to adopt a term that already existed in familiar literary languages than to coin a new term, compound or term derived from native elements (Bradley, 1947: 383). In this way, a plethora of Latin words entered the English language, first through terms adopted via the educated French, and later directly, while word endings were eliminated as in French words. Later, in the Elizabethan era, the formation of new words from Latin was even more common, and while many of the neologisms of this period soon disappeared, not a few remained. The heritage left to the English language by the language of the Romans is undeniable.

This complex process of the formation of the language of the island explains the gap between English and German, wider and deeper than the separation from French. This was brought into sharp relief in the nineteenth century with the translation into English of the most important book on the theory of the state by Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (Allgemeinines Staatsrecht), by three teachers. The task required the key terms of the book to be harmonized and made consistent with the Shakespeare’s language, a difficult challenge. For example, the translators acknowledged that they “unfortunately” found no appropriate word to translate Recht, (although they occasionally rendered it as “Right”). The case was similar for other terms, such as Rechtsstaat, Volk, Staat, Staatsrecht and others. Fortunately for the afflicted translators, they had the French version of Bluntschli’s book (Le droit public général and La politique), with whose help they were able to translate these terms more accurately (Bluntschli, 1885: VI–VII). The same difficulty was encountered by A.H. Keane, translator of a book by Rudolf Gneist that was very important for England, in which he traced the history of Parliament (Gneist, 1892: V).

The English language, as can be observed, is assembled largely from materials of the Latin culture, and to some extent, seems to harmonize more with French (and other Latin languages), than with German.
From the preceding pages, it is clear that a unique English administrative culture exists today that was forged within British culture in general. It is also clear that the Anglo-Saxon heritage has been fading over the centuries, and that its legacy is mainly demographic and linguistic rather than social and cultural. We see in Great Britain a mixed people consisting of Briton, Norse, Anglo-Saxon, Frenchified Norman, and perhaps also Roman elements in the depths of the British DNA. To continue referring to an “Anglo-Saxon administrative culture” seems inappropriate for there exists no real thing that corresponds to such a term, unless for convenience we allow it as a polite euphemism.
Chapter 3

THE FORMATION OF THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
INTERNAL FACTORS

When the administrative development of Great Britain is examined, it is generally claimed that the country was spared the bureaucracy and centralization that afflicted the continental nations. This singular fact springs from an innate individualism that obstinately resists government intervention, while its ability to create social well-being through private enterprise is praised. These words, however, hide more than they reveal because the cause must rather be sought in social indifferentism and avidity for material goods (Finer, 1934:911). Thus the only way to confirm the hypothesis is to examine what is historically known and well founded. The first peculiar feature that stands out in the historical development of the British public administration is the scarcity of conscious reflections on the subject, at least up to the late eighteenth century. Following the reign of Henry III (1216–1272) and his immediate successors, there was no one in Britain with the mental caliber or strength of character displayed by Richelieu, Colbert or Pombal on the continent as they laid the basis for a societal initiative and the corresponding administrative system. The reforming work of Richelieu and Colbert is famous, but equally outstanding is that of Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, Marquis of Pombal, who effectively governed Portugal from 1750 to 1777 when Joseph I was king. He was also distinguished for his statesmanship, a decisive element of his administrative reform that pulled the country out of its ancestral backwardness. Thomas Cromwell, Francis Walsingham, and William and Robert Cecil were held back by powerful landowners reluctant to implement reforms and by the obstinacy of the House of Commons. As a result, everything that was new and inventive in administration flowed from the organization of the Treasury and the Foreign Ministry and the Royal Council, and only secondarily from the Secretary of State.

Causes of the Uniqueness of the British Administration

Contributing to this scenario was the fact that the country’s needs did not require the centralization or the hierarchy that had been established on the continent. By the end of the fifteenth century, the modern state had barely emerged from its inherited feudalism. Most official positions were held by people from corporations, unions and guilds, as well as by clerks, priests and lawyers. Significant positions such as that of the chancellor and treasurer, as well as royal staff, would not become important until later, for at the beginning their tasks were light and their power did not publicly trouble the parties. When in the sixteenth century the nation awakened to a consciousness of its internal and external identity and the House of Tudor raised the power of the Crown to great heights, the monarchy and its ministers faced a powerful Parliament with
a prime seat in the administration, as well as two thousand justices of the peace and thousands of rural parishes that governed around their perimeter. As a result, plans and aspirations in the center were under effective external control, something which did not exist in Germany or France at the time. In fact, this divergence had been in place for a century and a half. It limited the size, the aspirations and the quality of the central administration at the origin. However, there was an administrative apparatus available that was already operating in the towns at little or no cost, which was very convenient for the royal treasury (Finer, 1934:912). When the state proposed projects intended to expand industry and commerce, the government trusted this local system. But—as Finer says—what costs nothing, generally yields nothing when the original momentum has faded. When the parliamentary drive disappeared, more harm was produced than good, because the administrative instruments necessary for the state’s activities had not been planned consciously for their application according to the law. The desired ends had been duly formulated, but not the means for obtaining them. Herman Finer explains that the government even tried to step up enforcement of the Poor Law in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but their lack of success exposed the structural weakness of the administration. What is surprising is that despite this failure, administrative thinkers on the continent expressed their admiration of Great Britain’s local freedom, although paradoxically their enthusiasm was stimulated mainly by the work of German author Rudolf Gneist on local administration.

By now there was sufficient awareness among the British of the uniqueness of their public administration, centered around the concept of local “self-government,” as pointed out by Joshua Toulmin Smith, whose book was perhaps among the first to systematically address the topic of self-government (Smith, 1851:17).

The ancient motives that had given birth to British local administration - bureaucracy- avoiding and prone to recruiting “amateurs” and bailiffs, operating since the times of Richard The Lionheart – evolved into a dense swamp that obstructed the road to industrialization and consolidation of the modern state. It is both curious and astonishing at the same time how Great Britain opted for self-government and how this status quo was preserved for centuries.
Judicial Administration as Public Administration

However, as the society at the time was a conglomerate in which the habit of self-government was nonexistent, the new system had to be cultivated among landowners and the emerging middle classes to produce, after a long process of maturation, the legendary right of local government. This administration was not bureaucratic, deliberately discarding that mode in favor of officials trained specifically to work in a department of the state with techniques acquired from their professions (Finer, 1934: 913–914). Another of its prominent features was that it was a judicial method of administration exercised by justices of the peace in their districts, who supervised and corrected post facto, rather than before the fact; that is, their involvement took place before and after the fact. Finer explains that while legal action comes after the fact, and corrects and redresses wrongs, administrative action involves the appointment of officials who anticipate the future and monitor that administrative acts are carried out correctly. This, provided they are equipped with the responsibility needed to lay down rules intended to guide action and avoid error, and supported by staff endowed with an ongoing sense of responsibility to enable them to ensure that the standards stipulated for the work are applied.

Although it is a general rule that the courts should be confined mainly to ruling on disputes between individuals, it was at the time considered fitting to also entrust them with administrative or quasi-administrative functions as needed by the government. This has happened in all states, but especially in nations that failed to establish a clear distinction between judicial and administrative functions by statutory law (Goodnow, 1897: I, 162). The best example is Great Britain where, given the multitude of exceptions to the adoption of the principle of separation of powers, judicial officials have been exercising administrative functions from time immemorial. This confusion has reigned even in the United States: for a long time, due to the British heritage, there was no attempt to separate the judicial and administrative authorities. Thus, justices of the peace being important judicial and administrative officials, almost all important local positions have their origin in them.

Justices of the peace received most of their powers from the sheriffs. They were also given the task of overseeing the parish administration established over the Church in the Tudor era, since its courts, which held sessions every quarter, acted as the authority in the county. Over time, they became the most important local officials in administrative and judicial affairs. This system was much more decentralized than the prefecture organization of sheriffs, as all officers were chosen from the towns where they served (Goodnow, 1897: I, 33–34). Moreover, if initially most officials were appointed directly or indirectly by the central government and could be removed from office, the fact that they did not receive compensation—since they belonged to the upper classes—and that the service they provided was obligatory and arduous, meant that over time they increased in independence. Nor did the threat of removal from office matter much to a justice of the peace, because it meant relief from a difficult task, not a loss of livelihood. The system ensured a high degree of local self-government, given that the independence of the
justices deprived the central administration of the ability to intervene in their
activities. This fact, entrenched by the passage of time, ultimately resulted in a
confused belief that self-government was the opposite of public administration.

Rudolf Gneist explained in 1866 that the true essence of self-government
is that it constitutes a system of state administration whose consistent nature
lies in its being a political committee to the commons. Also, like any self-
government, it rests on the political principle of the right of royal appointment,
which includes sheriffs, magistrates, military commissioners and military
officers. This right of the king and obligation of the state was instituted in the
time of the Normans, and never subsequently took on the nature of the rights of
the political estates or elective positions termed Wahlamt (Gumplowicz,
undated: 310–311). That is, Gneist shows that self-government is part of the
British public administration, just as the prefecture is part of the public
administration of France, with all the peculiarities that it entails. Its organization
and the effects it had on British history do not negate the fact that it is another
part of the British public administration system by means of delegation, not of
cession.

One of the traditional British institutions, the justice of the peace, was
transplanted to America, where Tocqueville portrayed him as a compromise
between the common man and the judge; imparting justice and administering at
the same time, without necessarily being versed in law (Tocqueville, 1981: I,
139). He is, in Tocqueville’s view, the policeman of society whose role demands
honesty and good sense rather than the domain of science.

These institutions originated during the reign of Richard I (1189–1199)
who, as sovereign, reveled in his absence and neglect of his kingdom, although
he enjoyed enormous popularity. He was, strictly speaking, a knight whose
exploits began in the Third Crusade. In his absence he appointed Hubert Walter
as Archbishop of Canterbury, and at the same time as Justiciar (chief minister)
of the crown. Walter ruled England better than Richard would have, for he not
only consolidated peace in the kingdom, but began supporting the middle
classes in the cities and counties, a strategy that prepared the country for the
major constitutional changes that would be made during the following two
reigns (Trevelyan, 1976:143). His reform program began by granting privileges
to certain cities, including autonomy by means of governance by elected
officials. At this point two institutions converged; the alderman (an Old English
word), and the mayor, a word imported from France. It was the people of
London who secured the right to elect their mayor before any other of their
countrymen, and the mayor of London was the first official to hold an office of
that name. Moreover, middle class support was leveraged by the government
as an important factor in county affairs. In particular, the rural middle class and
knights in their manors overseeing their interests on their farms were
increasingly engaged in addressing county issues.

The middle class was one of the important factors in shaping the
peculiarly English system of government, as the crown deliberately entrusted
local administration to the middle class and the justices of the peace, rather
than the sheriff. The middle class did not yet carry out its role under the name of
gentry (patricians) but it had already been entrusted the post of coroner (judge)
to defend the judicial and financial rights of the monarch in the county. An important fact to keep in mind is that the services entrusted them were delegated by the central government, not on the initiative of representatives. This measure was personified in the "public charge," by which the monarch persuaded or forced his subjects to acquire a custom of self-government (Trevelyan, 1976:144). Walter also ordered that applicants before the county court; that is, the local middle class themselves, should choose four of their number to serve as coroner. By extension, he also ordered jurors, until then chosen by the sheriff, to be selected by a committee of four knights chosen by the county court. This was the origin of the autonomy of the county, which was not effected by the barons, but by the middle class, by which at the same time the seeds for the principle of representation were sown. The result of this process was that in the late twelfth century a rural middle class emerged that became accustomed to carrying out public business and to electing representatives. As Trevelyan says, when this political mode reached up as far the national parliament, there were significant consequences for "England and for the world."

As can be observed, self-government did not emerge spontaneously, nor was it planned by the local areas themselves, but rather as a central policy; yet this is a paradox. What the crown did, to put it plainly, was to delegate administrative functions and responsibilities away from the Treasury and onto the middle class and well-to-do farmers who lived in the towns. It was essentially the large-scale recruitment of a large portion of the rural population compelled to take charge, without payment, of their common affairs, largely abandoned by the crown. Local administration was entrusted to the locals, but they were not taught the art of managing the affairs of their community. In short, it was a onerous “public burden” laid on the rural middle class on an unparalleled scale, but whose eventual result was an autonomous government in which the British still take pride. This unique and important fact was not overlooked by the knowledgeable eyes of Otto Hinze, who observed the crown’s successful effort in the counties to prevent feudalization in exchange for turning them into public service corporations to which the duties and responsibilities of state power were delegated (Hintze, 1968c: 149). This abnegation was worth it, for parliamentarism emerged here from the administrative responsibilities delegated by the central power of the crown; its origin lies in the combination of the principle of authority and the corporative principle.

The magnitude of Walter’s administrative work must not be forgotten; an outstanding statist, he reformed the central offices of the government during the reigns of King Richard and King John. He served as Baron of the Exchequer beginning in 1184, then as justiciar of the Curia Regis and finally as the chancellor of this important institution. It deservedly contributed to his education as a public administrator, for he performed his duties in an exemplary fashion in financial, legal and management matters (Poole, 1912: 186–189). He held the eminent post of Chancellor of the Exchequer until his death, and thanks to the documentation procedures he carried out, the Chancellery achieved a remarkable level of efficiency. He has rightly has been recognized as having established the British civil service in his time, and of being the greatest justiciar
in the history of the country (Chrimes, 1952: 42–43). He was, indeed, the great builder and reformer of British administrative institutions.
The Insular Influence

Prussia and France flourished thanks to internal colonization; they refined their national governments and all matters relating to citizenship by the work of professional staff. The British, in contrast, turned their eyes toward the seas and undertook a program of foreign colonization. Great Britain’s non-centralized, non-bureaucratic government emerged from a series of accidents caused by its geographical condition and historical destiny. In principle, the supremacy of a single political authority occurred through the Norman conquest five centuries prior to Prussia’s and France’s achievement of that objective, not to mention a further 200 to 300 years of consolidating what in 1066 was the first European resurgence of a centralizing authority. Because of its geographical situation, Britain had the advantage of being insular and isolated, which sterilized it from invasions while it built its navy. Prussia and France, as countries with powerful neighbors, were forced to constitute themselves as single, indivisible nations. In contrast, in Great Britain it was not necessary to keep the country united under the coercive power of a central authority.

As Finer observed, it was the sea in particular that saved Great Britain from despotic administrative centralization imposed by the continental states for the raison d’État (Finer, 1934: 758–759). Nor did its legal structure suffer the papal influence of Rome, either in spirit or in religion, unlike the continent. Free and liberal in its local administration (“anarchic although efficient, fair or charitable”), and likewise rejecting excessive activity by the central state, it was able to enter the industrial age to begin the revolutionary changes that would enable it to reform the administrative structure and the methods to address new opportunities and obligations. Also contributing to this was the loss of the American colonies due to a team that was equally incompetent in its internal roles and its colonial responsibilities.

England enjoys a deserved reputation for being the first administrative state, thanks to the establishment of the Norman monarchy that politically centralized the island: the original character of local administration is due to the Norman sovereigns, because their absolutism made the monarch wholly subject to the entire population. To ensure domination over the Saxons, the crown established a program to maintain peace by dividing the kingdom into districts based on the old divisions into shires, and appointing a trusted official to head each one. These districts were not public corporations, because they did not have their own business to carry out; due to centralization, the sheriffs, also called viscounts by the Normans, dealt with all administrative affairs. One of the consequences of the administration being so highly centralized was the fusion of the English population into a nation, which occurred long before it did on the continent (Goodnow, 1897: I, 71–72). It was this centralization that inhibited the development of independent regions, and although the administrative system was later completely decentralized, its general principles were left standing; that is, the local districts themselves remained in existence although lacking legal status or their own affairs to manage: they were districts in which all administrative matters were the responsibility of royal officials.

Nevertheless, the territorial administration configured in accordance with political absolutism was not only deliberately diverted from its course for
reasons of state, but reversed. Indeed, as we noted, the prefectural administration of the sheriffs remained until the reign of Richard I, when changes were made only to the executive officers of the itinerant royal courts, to hold elections and monitor public safety. This turned Great Britain aside from the path followed on the continent and sapped the energy that would have contributed to the continuity of a professional civil service, which the country had to recover much later. A reasonable date to pinpoint the origin of the British civil service, based on its unique cultural configuration, might be when the crown found itself unable to hold onto its authority over Parliament in the seventeenth century, an event which consolidated the trend of a government lacking centralized public services such as those prevailing in Europe (Mackenzie and Grove, 1957: 3).

From that point on, the history of the administrative development of France and Britain followed different routes. In Great Britain, development of the public services has been supported in the society itself, and its configuration based on an active political community, a dominant patrician class in the rural counties, and a citizenship organized into village and merchant corporations (such as the old East India Company); all playing an essential part in the common political life. This has endowed Parliament with its unique characteristics, formed on the basis of the country gentry, and a public service that has traditionally been composed of “intelligent amateurs.” To this we must add the uniqueness of British absolutism, in which the autocracy of the king exists side by side with the omnipotence of Parliament (Barker, 1945: 30–33). During the eighteenth century, the character of the English state in particular was properly a “state of legislators” and thus of “amateurs.” “The British public administration, in contrast to that of France and Prussia, was not staffed by professional administrators, but by persons of independent means who had assumed their positions as private property. At the same time, councils and similar collegial bodies flourished in place of centralized departments, as what can be called an administration of councils arose across Great Britain. These bodies operated in a mode of deliberation rather than swift action, which was eventually lost. Thus, these councils functioned, rather than agencies of action, as guarantees of action, or bodies which instructed that action be taken. As noted by Ernest Barker, the Napoleonic principle of “active administration” was unknown in Great Britain. Clearly, there was no longer a body to exercise central control over the local administrations, and there was no Ministry of the Interior as on the continent, for it was not until 1782 that the Home Office was created.
The Industrial Revolution

In the evolution of the British administration, it can be observed that almost all government departments were created relatively recently, mainly because of the state’s assumption of new duties and staff increases since 1870. The civil service, which dates back to 1855, is in fact younger than the British Indian Civil Service.

Another fundamental factor of change is the Industrial Revolution, which forced society to equip itself to meet new material obligations on a large scale. Indeed, wealth, poverty, education, communication, commerce, agriculture, colonies and manufacturing were all emerging factors that demanded large-scale obligations. Many of these provisions arose from the utilitarian political philosophy of humanists who researched these factors to find measures to tackle social problems. It began when the environment was altered through land drainage, buildings, factories and roads, which then impinged on the domain of public wealth when awareness was reached that man is as important as the elements of his environment. Accordingly, the activity of the state broadened and deepened, expenses increased, and the number and efficiency of administrative staff increased (Finer, 1934: 759–760). But it was not until 1832 that their number grew rapidly, and there has not been any notable cutback since with the exception of the Thatcher Era. But this expansion did not proceed at a constant rate; rather it experienced a sudden surge corresponding to the idea of new legislative and administrative duties of the state as well as the expansion of existing public services. In the 1930s, the administrative organization of Great Britain was transformed over the course of a few years from a system based on simple improvisation to an orderly, powerful system sensitive to meeting modern needs.

This transformation took place essentially because the old judicial administration and the administration run by amateurs embodied in self-government, which had been functional until then, was totally inadequate for the country’s new social circumstances. This was evident in 1830, when the importance of local finances grew as taxes were increased as a result of the increase in poverty. That is, the change in administration was due mainly to social changes and technological innovation that followed the application of steam to manufacturing processes and machinery in general, which produced a revolution in industrial methods (Goodnow, 1897: I, 243–244). Meanwhile, the large cities were increasing in population, and owners of movable property—the commercial and industrial classes—were becoming increasingly important. Hence the shift in parliamentary representation, introduced by the Reform Act 1832, which also gave them political supremacy at the expense of the nobility and the gentry. Given that the local administration was a part of the power held by these classes, the new political masters adopted an administrative plan to manage these issues to increase their local influence.

Another incentive for change was rooted in the demand for radical social reforms. As the poor rate rose dramatically in the years prior to 1832, the authorities of each locality competed strenuously to shift the burden of supporting the poor onto neighboring towns. This led to a complicated
domiciliary law that conflicted altogether with the needs of an industrial society.
The reforms could therefore take place only if a uniform administration was
established, since their enactment would imply a central intervention that had
not existed up to that point. The new Parliament agreed to conduct a thorough
investigation into the administration of subsistence for the poor and the
municipal government. This task began in 1833 with the work of the Royal
Commission into the operation of the Poor Laws (Goodnow, 1897: I, 44–
46). The result, published in 1834, gave the document the reputation of being
the most notable in the entire history of English society, and perhaps of all
social history. The reform plans, enacted in the 1834 Poor Law Amendment
Act, called for a representative local administration for taxpayers, as well as
increased involvement by the central administration. The parishes, which under
the previous system had borne the burden of supporting the poor, were
grouped into unions under the leadership of locally elected boards of guardians,
who administered poor relief. The detailed implementation of administrative
tasks, formerly the responsibility of unremunerated officials—inspectors of the
poor and justices of the peace—was now entrusted to paid, full-time officials.

At that time the idea of a central administration equipped with offices was
new. During the Middle Ages, decentralized forms of government emerged
under a variety of conditions, which largely vanished or changed their nature
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the first half of the
nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill could still claim that what could be done by
the central authorities should be only a small part of national public affairs (Mill,
1958: 212). It was a maxim of English local self-government, which contrasted
sharply with the administrative centralization on the continent. Since there was
no local elected agency to carry out emerging services, new collegial bodies
were created, such as the boards of guardians, local health boards, and school
boards. But from the second half of the nineteenth century on, local self-
government had ceased to mean local autonomy; bodies such as the Poor Law
Board had broad powers to set regulations designed to directly manage a
service and subject it to inspection (Mackenzie and Grove, 1957: 263). Moreover,
these powers were augmented when the central government began
to allocate grants on a large scale to level economic conditions between poor
and wealthy areas. The centralization process that had begun due to economic
and political pressure was underscored by principles of efficiency. English
administrative history is full of examples of services started by local
corporations but subsequently taken over by central officials. The New Poor
Law was stigmatized by Joshua Toulmin Smith as one of the leading causes of
the country’s centralization and consequently of loss of freedom (Smith, 1851:
374–375). Furthermore, he held that the law not only concentrated the vices of
centralization, but that bringing back practices from the times of the Roman
Empire would pave the way to the ruin of morality and the greatness of the
state.

Processes gestated centuries earlier gave rise to a vicious administration
in which titles turned into classes, for they became the property of those who
already held them hereditarily for life when the crown decreased the frequency
by which it made and revoked them. Positions could even be held by a
substitute and be sold, since the monarch could not abolish them without
compensation to their owners (Mackenzie and Grove, 1957: 3–4). When it was
essential to appoint competent candidates, a way to do so could be found, but without there necessarily being a relationship between merit and remuneration. Despite the reluctance to accept this type of administration, the nineteenth century was not all inefficiency. In some areas, there were figures who maintained well-administered offices, and although there was no general structure of public administration, such offices contributed to the progress of society.

But under the new social conditions, this patronage system was strongly criticized, although in principle more for political than administrative reasons. Edmond Burke’s speeches in 1780 heralded the current of reform, which lasted from Gladstone until the 1850s. Its theme was the economy of the public service; its epitome a substantial pamphlet on administrative reform signed by The Liverpool Financial Reform Administration, which aimed not only to define the reform, but also to show how it should be orchestrated. The association’s purpose was to use all legal and constitutional means to induce stricter economy in government spending in order to introduce efficiency into the departments in charge of public services (The Liverpool Financial Reform Administration, 1855).

It was at this point that Great Britain entered modernity, the foundations were laid for the future creation of the civil service, and the principles of its administration were developed: first, that the compensation for a position should be related to the work, which meant the abolition of sinecures, of the selling of offices, and the employment of surrogates. The new system was consolidated in the 1830s. Secondly, although the crown retained its longstanding right to dismiss officials at any time without prior notice, without compensation and without having to provide justification, it had not exercised this right for a long time. The reform revived this right, but also established the principle of stability of employment; namely that that officials were not replaced when a new political party rose to power, because permanence was an old established principle (Mackenzie and Grove, 1957: 4–5). Third, it was necessary to exercise the right to dismiss a public servant when justified, causing faithful officials who might become incapable of working for reasons beyond their control to be left jobless and without compensation. This motivated the pension system overseen by Parliament that emerged from the retirement laws which were enacted beginning in 1810. Fourth, as parliamentary control was limited to finance, the number and salaries of officials of the crown was submitted annually and subject to approval within departmental budgets. Lastly, parliamentary oversight is only exercised by the House of Commons, while also moderated by the cabinet. Internally, the ultimate responsibility for budget issues fell to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his department, the Treasury, which rose to a prominent position in the central administration. These five principles, established in the mid-nineteenth century, reflect the successful path of progress in public administration for the good of the economy. Their essential data are the 1856 report of the Select Committee on Public Monies, the creation of the Public Accounts Committee of the House in 1861, and the 1866 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act. This move coincides with the movement towards centralization to make the public administration more efficient.
At the same time, the utilitarian school demanded that the continental type of rational organization be introduced into the public service, a plan which failed because of the existing antipathy to heavy state intervention. Although Benthamite principles were successful in some fields, public opinion leaned towards government action, not through centralization, but through local autonomy.

Over time, the British public administration began to resemble its continental counterparts more and more, especially in the proliferation of ministries. For many years the only government departments were the Admiralty (created in the fifteenth century) and the Treasury (1572), separated from the famous old post of Exchequer. In the eighteenth century, the ministries of the Post Office (1782), the Home Office (1782), Commerce (1784) and War (1794), were added, similarly to what was occurring in Europe. Departments created in the following century were the Colonial Office (1801), the Ministry of Public Works (1851), the Scottish Office (1885), the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1889) and the Ministry of Education (1899), again parallel to developments in Europe (Mackenzie and Grove, 1957: 176). Ministries created in the twentieth century were the Ministries of Labor (1916), Air (1917), Pensions (1917) and National Insurance (1946), as well as those of Health (1919), Transportation (1919), and Civil Aviation in 1945), Commonwealth Relations (1925), Food (1939), Energy and Fuel (1942), and Defense (1946). Lastly, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government was created in 1950.

By the mid-nineteenth century, Britain retained some of its old administrative culture, with the exception of local self-government—much changed—its anti-bureaucratic bent, and its sermons in favor of laissez faire, and its praise for administrative practice, among others. Gradually, Great Britain’s public administration came to be more like that of Germany and France than that of its own long-ago past.
Chapter 4

THE FORMATION OF THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: EXTERNAL FACTORS

Centralized administration emerged in Europe to ensure that the will of the state would be carried out effectively. Although forms of bureaucratic organization were well known before the French Revolution, they reached their peak with Napoleon’s successful administration in France, and the administration established in Prussia by Frederick II and his predecessors. Great Britain, meanwhile, freed itself from the patronage system when it adopted an open system of skill-based examinations for entry to the civil service. But the source of the idea was external; it was the reform of the English administration in India established by the 1833 Charter Act. For a short time (1800–1802), the College of Fort William even operated in Calcutta; its work was carried on and improved in Britain when the East India College in Haileybury opened its doors in 1806 to train civil servants for India. The college continued its fruitful work until 1857 (Stephen, 1900: 270–271). The school enjoyed such a fine reputation that it counted Robert Malthus among its professors. In fact, the term “civil service” was introduced into the country from India, where first the East Indian Company and later the British government, “carried out a gigantic experiment in centralised administration of the European type” (Mackenzie and Grove, 1957: 5–6). The company’s offices were a bastion of utilitarianism under both Mills, father and son: James and John Stuart. But Charles Trevelyan, permanent secretary of the Treasury (1840–1859) uniquely stands out: he made his name in India, and together with T.B. Macaulay carried the experiment back to Great Britain.

The Role of India in the Modernization of the British Administration

The first British who arrived in India as members of the East India Company were merchants, and the name originally given to them was “factors” because they were agents working in commercial establishments called “factories” (trading posts). This occurred during the year 1601. It must be emphasized that these “factories” were not manufacturing facilities, but rather commercial trading establishments which by 1675 were systematized and consolidated. British men who were going to follow a commercial career thus began as factors, later becoming merchants and eventually senior merchants (O’Malley, 1931: 3–4). At the front of each factory toiled an agent, since all the main locations were under the purview of a president, assisted by the Council of Senior Merchants. It is worth noting that the organization of these factories followed the model established years earlier by the Dutch.

It is important to note that, in addition to the commercial tasks carried out by the company’s servants, for reasons inherent to the nature of the country where they worked, they were obliged to operate the municipal government and
administration of justice in the three regions under the company’s influence; Madras, Calcutta and Bombay, where the Company had acquired land rights. Thus courts and corporations were established in these three cities. Reverence for English institutions even prompted British municipal emblems of the time to be adopted in Madras; the offices of lord mayor and alderman were installed as in London, copying their ceremonial robes (O’Malley, 1931: 3–4). In Calcutta, the company management entrusted servants with matters relating to administration and land use, including jurisdiction over the inhabitants and tax collection. The courts, in turn, addressed civil and criminal matters, while the tax offices were responsible for collecting land taxes. Similar offices were established in Madras, mainly those concerned with taxes on vehicles, customs, markets, and housing.

When the career in Indian administration was created, the duties of civil servants had grown to such an extent that, as O’Malley observed, hardly any matter remained outside their purview except those relating to the navy, defense and health. The civil servant was an administrator, tax expert, judge, secretary and diplomat. His tasks in his assigned district also included construction of roads and canals, bridges and walls, administration of prisons, and health inspection. He further served as a police officer, postal worker, supervisor, customs official, educator, comptroller, salt agent, lottery official, superintendent, auditor, army paymaster, and banker. In India, civil servants carried out all the tasks which the magistrates and the gentry carried out in the British Isles, as well as many others. But this process did not consist only in proliferation of the tasks as in a Weberian bureaucracy; that is, the ability to take on a diverse variety of tasks, but also an upward technological progression that led to the establishment of specialized departments staffed by experts. These new organizations were specifically devoted to customs, audit, administration of salt, telegraph and postal services, and agriculture, industry, records, and credit unions, among others. Other departments were devoted to censuses, emergency services and further matters (Blunt, 1937: 2–3, 5). Sometimes civil servants also had to read Sunday prayers, carry out military commissions, or serve on juries. If they were at one time mostly traders, eventually they came to master the art of government in all its aspects, albeit on a small scale.

This explains clearly why Great Britain owes the very term “civil service” to its Indian experience, for since the era of the East India Company, civil service was distinguished from military service, as well as from services of a marine or ecclesiastical type (Blunt, 1937: 2–3, 5). We should not forget that civil servants were originally commercial officers, and that once the Company began to acquire territory, it began to transform from a trading corporation into government, while its commercial agents evolved into public administrators. By 1765, the term “civil servant” was established, as could be observed recorded not only in legislation but also in everyday correspondence and bulletins issued by the Indian administration.

The British experience in India represents an enormous paradox, principally because in that country, company officials performed tasks that in Europe—in France and Prussia, for example—were carried out by public officials. And while it is true that their tasks were primarily commercial, necessity
turned East India Company servants into *de facto* public administrators. This trend was clearly paving the way to a transformation that would lead to the formation of an authentic civil service whose members’ primary task was not so much trade as public administration (O’Malley, 1931: 4–5). This began in 1772, when Warren Hastings and Lord Cornwallis established the civil service in its modern form. The former can be credited with reorganizing the financial administration, reshaping the judicial system, and freeing trade from damaging impositions. Hastings also instituted a fundamental transformation in 1781 when he initiated the separation between administration and justice, which, nevertheless, Great Britain has not yet entirely achieved.

We do not know to what extent Great Britain owes its modern public administration to the Indian experience, but there is no doubt that the civil servants who long worked there, besides setting the standard for the British civil service, were receiving intensive administrative training in a country where they were required to work in a hyperactive, centralized organization that did not exist in their homeland. It was there that they could practice that which would later show them how to modernize the metropolitan administration using the experience gained in the colonial periphery. John Stuart Mill proposed a way to interpret this contribution when he noted in 1861 that his country needed to tap into deeper political ideas, but not those from Europe; rather from the unique experience of its rule in India—an idea that was already being considered in British politics (Mill, 1958: 270). It is, in fact, undeniable that the Indian experience led directly to administrative modernization of Great Britain not only because the civil service existed there before it did in the metropolitan state, but also from the experience and wisdom that returning public administrators brought back to their native soil.

Among these, the experienced officials L.S.S. O’Malley and Edward Blunt are notable for the wisdom they bequeathed to their countrymen. The former served as executive officer in several districts in Bengal, and later in the British secretary of state for India. Blunt, like O’Malley, also spent a long term as a civil servant in India, where his outstanding career included service as a secretary, census official, and official of the provincial council. But a uniquely eminent figure was W.H. Moreland, the founder of the science of British public administration, of whom more later. Moreland attributed the British lag in this science to the fact that its greatest achievements did not take place on the home island, but many thousands of miles distant. While the administration of British towns was staffed by amateurs, India had a professionalized civil service. Young men were trained specifically to manage public affairs, taking courses in English composition and the history and literature of England, and all spoke Greek, Latin, French, German, Sanskrit or Arabic, (Boutmy, 1895: 73, 85); moreover they were also educated in mathematics and science, philosophy, morals, ethics, political science, English law, political economy, and ancient and modern history. Before taking office, they had to prove their knowledge of Indian criminal and civil law, the language of the province where they were to serve, and the history of British India. The college at Haileybury was the first of its kind in Europe, with the exception of the German schools, since it was founded expressly to train not appointed officials or judges, but career public administrators, in which capacity they governed India. Not a few Anglo-Indian families even saw the civil service as a career prospect for their
Indian-born sons, many of whom aspired to return to their native country to enter the public service because India was their home (Stephen, 1900: 333–334). They were inspired by a spirit of solidarity which gave rise to what has been aptly called a “band of brothers.” Herman Finer called attention to the fact that Great Britain lost its American colonies because of the incompetence of the team of officials responsible for addressing internal problems and colonial affairs (Finer, 1934: 759). No such thing happened in India.

In addition, in seventeenth-century India, the British found a public administration whose principles of action adjusted better to the administrative regimes that would soon established in France and Prussia; that is, regimes of highly efficient, bureaucratic administrations. The Mughal Empire had already established a centralized administration based on the ancient Muslim tradition, which the Hindus subsequently conserved.

The British turned the wheel of India’s history: the ascent of the diwan in Bengal in 1765 marked a turning point in the history of public administration in India, and by extension that of Great Britain, for it represented a significant change whereby the administrative tasks performed by the Company’s agents became more important than their commercial tasks. The original business purpose of the East India Company moved into the background as the company effectively and officially became a government organization delegated by the British crown. In 1813, when its charter was reformed, its trade monopoly was abolished. The process continued in 1833, when it ceased to be a trading company and began to focus solely on its political and administrative responsibilities. This historic process culminated in 1858, when the company’s powers were fully transferred to the crown. So it was that a trading company chartered in 1601 was transformed into the Secretary of State for India, and the posts originally termed factories eventually became the offices of the Indian civil service (Blunt, 1937: 10–11). This enormously important occurrence, by which the former traders changed into public administrators, took place in three stages. The first phase was from 1601 to 1740, when the Company, whose business in this period was primarily related to trade, carried out only minor administrative tasks. The second period incorporates the years from 1741 to 1833, when its commercial tasks gradually decreased while administrative work and its importance increased. The final period, lasting from 1834 to 1858, saw the final transformation of a commercial corporation to a public service organization. What was once the “privatization” of the state’s mission in a distant land now encompassed the complete “publicization” of the government’s commission which, by reason of state, passed into the hands of the crown. By publicization, we refer to the process by which private companies become public corporations through the coordination of public administration, such as by acquisition of shares or by the authority of the state (Ruiz Massieu, 1980: 237). Privatization further implies recruiting private resources to improve the performance of tasks that, in a certain sense, will continue being public (Donahue, 1989: 7).

Such publicization was a necessary consequence of a prior privatization, in which, according to British tradition, the first steps were not colonization but expansion of trade. The way they proceeded was therefore by means of a commercial enterprise under the direction of commercial companies whose
brand was the East India Company, starting with the monopoly on tea and the control of all trade from China to Europe (Marx, 1968: I, 639–640). This strategy led to such extremes that the director of the company was given a share in private trade and favored trading partners benefited from lucrative contracts (Marx, undated, A: 352–359, B: 361–367). We will pass over the abuses inherent in this system, amply discussed by Karl Marx in two articles about British rule in India, in which he concluded that England had to fulfill the dual mission of both destroying and building; that is, to annihilate the ancient Asian society and in its place lay the foundations of Western society.

How right O’Malley was when he expressed his regret that the civil service of India, then being part of the British administration, was unknown in his country. Being, along with his country’s civil service, one of the great British institutions, he wrote his book to inform his fellow British of the Indo-British legacy of their nation. This was not only a superb public service operating in a far-flung foreign land, but one of the most important elite civil service organizations of the world. In 1930, 1,014 civil servants labored in the Indian administration for the benefit of the metropole.
The Administrative Revolution

The final phase in the development of British public administration took place during the first half of the twentieth century, with the emergence of the administrative revolution, whose effects were felt around the world. In the previous century, Britain had begun to draw away from its unique and distinctive system of administration, which contrasted completely, as already noted, with that of France. At that time the British public service was run by amateurs recruited through patronage, while France’s public service had been staffed by professionals since the Revolution. Also, while British public agencies enjoyed administrative autonomy, the French administration was organized under a legal hierarchy and worked within formalized patterns. In Britain the entire emerging public service was incorporated into already existing councils, while in France, in addition to the Minister of the Interior, the proliferation of organizations was evident in education and justice, and the Church was controlled by, or at least managed by the state. While in Britain it was the local authorities that instituted new public services, in France new organizations had a national scope. The result was that the autonomous British government entities were freer, but the French ministries were more powerful because they were part of an administration that was professional, hierarchical, statist, and centralized. The “shape” of the British administration — “if shape it could be called which shape had none, distinguishable in member, form or limb” — was shapeless and differentiated neither members or structures, for it was accidental inasmuch as it was amateur (Finer, S.E., 1950: 9–10). There was obviously no pyramidal structure of control because the government was small, and the local and volunteer corps were multifunctional.

It is true that no state can be very concerned by itself with economic problems. Paradoxically, Great Britain was the first country to inspect its factories, which it began to do in 1833. Although in 1900, economic activity was regarded as private administration under the concept of Adam Smith’s invisible hand of commerce, not of the state, this must be taken with reservations because at that time the state was considered only to be a machine that produces security and justice and receives funds. From the 1950s on, the British tradition was being revolutionized still further. However, the direction of this change was not, as commonly believed, towards the American system, with its federalism, its spoils system and its passion for the private sector, but on the path toward the traditional French pattern. This process, by which new characteristics of the British administration were emerging from change, was caricatured by the United States. By this time, the purview of the state in Britain and France had broadened considerably, not only in local councils and private associations, but also in government agencies. These trends were reflected in the growth of their civil services and increased revenues raised by their governments (Finer, S.E., 1950: 10). S.E. Finer notes that the size of the French civil service increased from 90,000 in 1841 to over one million in 1946; eleven times more than the growth of the country’s population. In Britain it grew from 17,000 public servants in 1842 to 711,000 in 1949. Even in the U.S., the civil service grew 100 times faster than the population, which increased only eightfold. These surprising developments took place with a change in the pattern of public administration. In all three countries, the administration was
becoming increasingly professional, organized into a pyramid of authority and of hierarchy, and the dominant pattern was centralization, leaving autonomy as a legacy to volunteer or private associations. State enterprises now handled a wide range of services, and departments were configured to provide consistency to management supported by a unique unified structure. This was the revolution, and of course the fact that it happened leads to the question of why it occurred and what problems it incurred.

It might be regretted that the administrative revolution led to individuals doing less and the state doing more, but in fact this perspective ignores the essential issues. We must not forget that during the nineteenth century, in Britain and indeed in Europe in general, the businessman was victorious and pulled down the mercantilist barriers raised two centuries earlier; but also that today, social processes are taking the opposite course. The best way to understand the optional courses of social evolution can be found in the “administrative revolution,” which offers a real insight into the problems of public administration. The term administrative revolution seems to have originated with S.E. Finer in the mid-twentieth century, well before it was popularized by Bertram Gross (Gross, 1964). The revolution was caused by large scale factors, beginning in the mid-twentieth century with the rise of organized labor, to which the distributive doctrine of socialism and social reforms made a large contribution. These changes involved not only state control over working hours, conditions and wages, but also effective state operation of industry (Finer, S.E., 1950: 11–13). They were the evident result of a decrease in laissez faire and increased government intervention. The increased subdivision in labor, which specialized and diversified jobs, must also be taken into account. Finally, a particular centralized form of intervention must be noted, which itself generates an increase in the scope of administration.

The growth of government activity and its trend toward centralization have not been the result of legislators’ whims or an unhealthy growth of bureaucracy, but of current economic conditions; this is why it is inappropriate to speak of a “new despotism” or a “road to serfdom”. With this, S.E. Finer is making direct reference to a book by Friedrich Hayek (The Road to Serfdom), which had been severely criticized by his brother Herman in a book entitled Road to Reaction. These problems stem from two main sources: the impact of the magnitude of state activity, and its direction. This causes problems beyond the expression of the public will and the machinery that carries it out; that is, the public administration (Finer, S.E., 1950: 14–15). The British central government absorbed activities from three main sources: it carried out some volunteer activities, it assumed many functions formerly carried out by local authorities, and it appropriated tasks formerly performed by individuals either directly or by putting them under its control. All this makes up the decentralized sector of public administration.

In this way, the direction of state activity affected the nature and expression of the public will, institutionalized as parties, parliaments and the civil service. The influence of the magnitude of the modern state and the direction of the activity it carries out in the implementation of policy deserves some consideration, which can be summed as the problem that the departmentalization of public administration creates a large number of
specialized professions. This gives rise to problems inherent to the study of public administration, which guide the agenda of scientific research in this area: the machinery of coordination, the principles of departmentalization, accountability of the executive to the courts and parliament, provision of expert knowledge, and the recruitment and retention of qualified personnel in the public service. But the government does not operate in a vacuum, for it is instrumental; it is the agent of the public will (Finer, S.E., 1950: 17–18). The prominent feature was the decline of the legislature as a focus of public will; its implementation shifted to the executive. Indeed, initiation of policy seems to be ceaselessly shifted onto the executive, inverting the master–servant relationship between the public will and the public administration.

As we noted a few pages earlier, in the 1950s the British public administration was growing to increasingly resemble its counterparts in Germany and France, a trend that was reinforced in subsequent years, to the point where its ancient heritage was almost lost. Only at the village level have strong traces of local autonomy remained, since common law had to give way to administrative law. In the end, the Roman and Norman heritage emerged vigorously, to such a degree that the era of privatization and neoliberalism in the late twentieth century was vanquished by a public administration whose features show the strength of its organizational and operational muscle.

The events described here give a faithful account of the refinement of the British administrative state, which still allows glimpses of features of ancient origin, together with those more recently conceived that yet have similarities with the ancestral traits, and which come together in perfect harmony. Thus an unambiguous way to observe the characteristics of an administrative culture in its maturation from a basic pattern to a progressive development is based on the administrative state. Indeed, its idea successfully contributes to delineating when and how a country gives prominence to its public administration. This is because of certain features that occur only under specific historical conditions. The time of their appearance and the way they are combined directly and immediately determine at what point in time a country needs to be publicly administered.
Chapter 5

THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE

The decisive moment following which Britain needed to be publicly administered occurred at a point in its recent history when discretion, administrative law, civil service and public enterprise converged; these were, at the same time, the elements that formed the basis of its administrative culture. This convergence had a revolutionary impact on the essence of the previous administrative life, whose creation was rooted in local administration. Once this existential focus of British administration had shifted in such a radical way, a new administrative culture emerged in place of the previous culture; an updated version that had inherited compatible elements. When all these elements are present and are combined, an administrative, or, rather organizational or managerial revolution results, as observed respectively by Bertram Gross, Kenneth Boulding and James Burnham (Gross, 1964; Boulding, 1953; Burnham, 1941). In Britain, it was prominent thinkers such as Laski, Robson, Finer and O'Malley, among other equally notable figures, who identified and developed the main concepts of the British administrative culture of today, which also produced decisive effects on the administrative life of the country.

Administrative Discretion

One of the first noticeable signs of the consolidation of the administrative state in Great Britain was when discretion shifted the process of policy-making from the area of legislative design to the area of implementation of the law. In the mid-nineteenth century, Henry Taylor advanced the idea that the erudite perceive that the essence of political measures lie in their execution (Taylor, 1927). Indeed, those who carefully examine the functioning of the political machine will not find it difficult to believe, nor will they be amazed at the changes in its operation since Taylor made his claim. The changes transformed a state constructed under laissez-faire into a “positive state" when in the 1920s broad aspects of society came under legislation, the inevitable result of a corresponding increase in executive power. Since no legislative body can expect other than to follow the rhythm of the pressures of public business, every year hundreds of acts of Parliament are issued, which are regarded with meticulous accuracy insofar as the details of their application. The result stems precisely from the transfer of much of the control from Parliament to the hands of the executive departments. Legislation by reference and by delegation has taken the place of the old order in which each step was regulated with zealous precision. Indeed, administrative discretion is the essence of the modern state (Laski, 1923: 92).

Examples of powers transferred to the executive can be seen from 1839 on, when a variety of matters, including both social and industrial issues, passed into the purview of the executive for implementation. This was a direct transfer of legislative powers. Everyone connected to public administration began to be aware of executive control in all matters related to housing,
education and national health (Laski, 1923: 93–94). But this was not all, for once the last word against this evolution in public administration was spoken, the clear and incontrovertible fact was that Parliament could continue to legislate, but no longer governed. Parliament enabled the work of government, but the actual execution of orders in their daily application was outside its scope. Laski said plainly that the House of Commons was essentially a body of more or less benevolent amateurs, mainly because the majority of the administrative work was clearly a question of technical expertise. In addition, there were times when Parliament was not in session and an overriding decision was needed, and other times when it was meeting and there was no emergency. In the event of an epidemic, the problem was not one of calling Parliament into session but of having the power to issue specific orders to the Ministry of Health. When there is an emergency, it is clear that the executive must have sufficient liberty to act, because an emergency calls for action, this being nothing else than the exercise of administrative discretion. It is particularly clear that in times of industrial war, when essential public services might be disrupted, the executive’s obligation to intervene should imply the use of much broader discretion than in any prior era.

This fact, however, had decisive effects on the political life of the nation that are not always positive. Thus a critical attitude on the part of the administrator was essential to the success of the democratic enterprise. He held in his hands, more thoroughly than in times past, the entire substance of the state. Every growing suppression of public scrutiny was thus a serious infringement of its freedoms. And so, while democracy means that the electorate has immediate and continuous contact with the policy process, this should imply that the process be simple enough to be intelligible to those who are interested in learning how it operates (Laski, 1923: 100). The test of institutional health, in fact, lies in its simplicity; but the growth of administrative discretion came with a complexity that was generally unnecessary and not infrequently dangerous.

In summary, discretionary processes tend to be legally personified by the directives of the executive, aimed at the implementation of its mandates, giving life to administrative law. In Great Britain this particular point has, to date, caused heated discussion.
Administrative Law

Until recently it was usual to claim definitively that Great Britain was fertile soil for the rule of law, not the administrative law (French droit administratif) well rooted on the continent, an important point that contributes to an understanding of its current administrative culture.

Indeed, the latter was a taboo subject, mainly because of the devastating criticism that A.V. Dicey directed at it in his famous book on the British Constitution (1886). Since then, administrative law was neglected as part of the legal framework of the country. Government by the rule of law is a singular and influential approach that runs counter to the political current in Europe. It deserves a careful examination that begins with the emergence of the rule of law. Indeed, the rule of law developed in all countries marked by Western culture, especially Germany, France, Italy and Spain (Train Cuesta, 1961: 19–20). In contrast, Great Britain developed a variant similar to the meaning of the continental expression, but with different characteristics, termed the Rule of Supremacy of Law. Dicey defined it at its origin as follows: this is a system unique to Great Britain where there is no person who is above the law; that is, every human being regardless of his social rank is subject to the ordinary law of the Kingdom and to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts (Dicey, 1915: 189).

In fact, there has been a tendency on both sides of the Channel to give priority to the differences between the two legal systems. The prevailing idea is that as the rule of law developed, two different paths emerged; the first in Great Britain, where the law governing public administration is the same law that holds over individuals; while in France the administration is subject to administrative law (Entrena Cuesta, 1961: 20–21). As a result, given the uniqueness of each of the two peoples, as well as their historical evolution, the former system reduced its scope to the English-speaking countries, while the latter, developed mainly in France, was implemented in continental Europe. This led to two ways of submitting the public administration to the law; the rule of law in Britain and administrative law on the continent.

As the administrative system is characterized by the fact that public administration is subject to administrative law, while the rule of law is subject to the same law as individuals, the relationship between this administration and the citizen is different: in the former, administrative courts were established where disputes between officials and citizens (court of administrative litigation) are resolved, and public servants enjoy great prominence and respect, and enjoy their own legal regime as such. In the latter, civil servants are subject to the same courts as individuals, enjoy the same reputation as any other worker, and do not receive any legal privileges deriving from their official role. Despite these differences, it should be noted that there is a similarity between the two legal systems, beginning with their abrupt birth and swift growth in France and Great Britain alike, where the end of absolutism facilitated the rapid development of the rule of law in two variants. Great Britain was the scene of the Glorious Revolution in 1689, a century prior to France’s revolution in 1789 (Entrena Cuesta, 1961: 19–20). The result of the two events can be traced to the same fact; that is, that public administration was subject to the law. This
calls for a search for a different focus than the usual approach which contrasts the two legal systems.

As we noted some pages earlier, by the time the eighth edition of Dicey’s book was published (1925), Britain had changed substantially. The first half of the twentieth century was marked by development of the judicial power within administrative departments, and by the creation of administrative courts outside the judicial bodies involved in civil, judicial and labor matters (Robson, 1951: XIII–XIV). What is more, the new courts were not only unrelated to any of these judicial bodies, but also operated outside their control. This substantiates the fact that the constitution of Great Britain has a body of administrative law, or administrative justice, as it could be more properly termed. This body of law reveals a rupture that goes beyond the rule of law formulated by Dicey a long time ago, since the new phenomenon represents a substantial change in the pattern of the constitutional system which existed at the time and extended forward into our time. It also involves a matter of great importance for the country’s government, since it concerns both constitutional law and political science.

Until recently, Great Britain did not classify law according to the relationships it governed, with the result that the term administrative law had little meaning. However, although since the late nineteenth century one could properly speak of “administration” as a function of government, and of the executive, there were hardly any British jurists that recognized the existence of a branch of law called administrative law. This would explain why Dicey claimed that in Great Britain and the countries whose civilization is derived from its origins, the system of administrative law is unknown. But he was mistaken, for he attempted rather to deny the existence of administrative law in its true continental sense, by wrongly disqualifying what he understood as the French droit administratif. Thus, what was lacking in Great Britain was not administrative law but a comprehensive classification of the law, because administrative law in the genuine continental sense of the word has not only has always existed in both countries, but had perhaps more influence on Anglo-Saxon political development than did any other branch of English law (Goodnow, 1897: I, 6–8).

This is the reason why since the late nineteenth century, thanks to a growing interest in administrative issues in Europe, the term administrative law (a French expression) has been gradually infiltrating the British legal vocabulary. Thus, administrative law is that part of the law governing the relations between the executive and administrative government authorities (Goodnow, 1897: I, 8). Hence it is a part of public law, its subject being the rules of law concerning the administrative function. Also, since the fulfillment of this task depends on the existence of administrative authorities who are collectively called the “administration,” administrative law refers not only to relations among the administrative authorities themselves but also to their organization. Finally, administrative law prescribes the positions that make up the administration and the relations of those who occupy them.

Dicey took the term droit administratif from France and gave it a wrong, even deliberately harmful meaning. To this end, he adopted the definition of
administratif droit from Léon Aucoc. In this sense, it meant the constitution and
the relations between the societal bodies responsible for safeguarding collective
interests which are the object of public administration; and the relationship of
the administrative authorities with respect to citizens and the state (Finer, 1949:
923–924). Although it provides a clear definition of the object it is meant to
define, in Dicey’s work the aim to find a detrimental meaning of droit
administratif can be observed when he claims that definitions of this type
require precision, while despite its vagueness, it is not unimportant (Dicey,
1915: 328).

Dicey next proceeds to reject any comparison between France and
Britain in 1905, the year his book was published, and then insists on distorting
the definition until he has turned droit administratif into a body of rules for the
protection of officials who commit abuses of power against citizens. His
opinions are astonishing: the fourth most despotic characteristic of droit
administratif stems from its tendency to protect from the supervision or control
of the lower court any servant of the state guilty of a potentially illegal act as
long as he was acting in good faith and obeying his superiors, at least in
intention, in the execution of his official duties (Dicey, 1915: 341). At the end of
his discourse, the droit administratif appears only as generalizations of the
judgments laid down in special courts –the tribunaux administratifs– for officials
in their relations with the public.

But obviously this is not the true meaning of administrative law (droit
administratif, derecho administrativo or Verwaltungsrecht). When H. Berthélemy
refers to droit administratif, he attributes the correct meaning to it: administrative
services are all services (except justice itself) that contribute to the execution of
the law, and administrative law is the set of principles by which this activity is
carried out. Administrative law analyzes the mechanism of the governmental
machine; constitutional law shows how the apparatus is constructed. The
subject of administrative law is how the machinery operates; how each of its
parts function (Berthélemy, 1926: 1–2). It can be concluded that this definition
implies no threat whatsoever, and that administrative law is nothing mysterious
or sinister, but merely the law related to public administration.

Since this legal body exists in Great Britain, it can be deduced that where
there are administration and law, there is administrative law, which implies
statutes, conventions, and legal cases of the ordinary and special courts. Like
the German term Verwaltungsrecht, administrative law is the legal order of
relations between the administrative state and its subjects. Taking the
legitimacy of the term from its country of origin as a basis, the meaning of the
term “administrative law” in Great Britain is also consistent with Port’s concept:
administrative law consists of all legal standards –whether expressed formally in
legislation or implied in prerogative– whose ultimate purpose is the enforcement
of public law. It is chiefly Parliament that is responsible for formally expressed
standards; they are generally decreed by that body. The judiciary is then
responsible for the standards (statutes and prerogatives) that govern judicial
acts, which may be in favor of or against the administration, and matters
relating to administrative bodies which sometimes can exercise judicial power.
Thirdly, it is directly related to the practical application of the law (Finer, 1949:
924).
This topic has been treated in detail to make it clear that Great Britain does have administrative law, because this is not only a clear manifestation of public administration as such, but also shows that what it accomplishes is subject to statutory law as the basis of its discretionary powers.
The Civil Service

By reason of its peculiar constitutional development, for many years different from that of continental Europe, for centuries Great Britain was resistant to a professionally trained bureaucracy, in fact, until mid-1853. Despite the establishment of the civil service, the processes of centralization, and the broadening of government activity, the expansion of bureaucracy remained a subject of heated controversy, even among the nation’s most enlightened minds, such as Mill and Bagehot. This central theme is one of the largest observable changes in the British administrative culture, under the weight of historical circumstances.

It would not be unreasonable to credit John Stuart Mill as being the British liberal thinker most devoted to the study of public administration, as readily seen in some of his works; one of which was, in fact, devoted to the study of government (Mill, 1958). Nor should we be surprised that the nineteenth-century liberal thinker tackled the subject of bureaucracy. Mill made a systematic study of the subject in a meticulous review in his famous essay on liberty. In it, he displays knowledge on state intervention, placing the problem of public administration at its core. It is also important to note that Mill served for 35 years (1823–1858) as an official of the East India Company, where he worked his way upwards. His administrative career ended when the Company was dissolved. This fact is particularly significant, because at the time, the Company had grown into a type of quasi-governmental organization, in which Mill acted as a genuine civil servant, since the administrative career had been established in 1853. But he later left administration forever, to dedicate himself fully to his academic work.

His bitter attack on the civil service in his book on freedom (Mill, 1975), was radically reconsidered two years later, when he changed his mind to view the British civil service positively (Mill, 1958). He highlighted tenure as one of its particular advantages, since one of the virtues of popular government lies in the fact that public officials are not appointed or elected by the voters. Appointments must be entrusted to people who have the skills required of the candidates, since it is a question of their professional skills and experience. The rule, therefore, is that civil servants are appointed by means of public competitions and those who are not, are freely appointed by government ministers. The dividends of this system are that these officials are immune to the virus of political change, remaining in their positions and serving as a memory and a link to administrative matters for new ministers after a change of government. The fact that they rise according to their own merits motivates their performance, and makes it harmful for them to be removed from office, except for serious cause. Mill explained that it is better to base candidate selection on merit and open competition than to rely on partiality and self-interest.

Unlike Mill, Walter Bagehot professes a strict and unwavering faith in liberal thought, noting that there is a tendency towards bureaucracy in his country, an idea that could thrive even though the people do not consent easily to shedding their ingrained beliefs. Thus, like any major event in Europe that temporarily turns it towards other ideas, the success of the Prussian
administration of the day invoked great admiration for its bureaucracy, something previously unthinkable in Great Britain. In spite of the fact that Prussia was “the bureaucratic nation par excellence,” Bagehot did not set out to criticize it, although he believed that its administration was not only disagreeable to foreigners, but also an object of complete satisfaction to the liberal Prussians who observed its operation at home (Bagehot, 1867: 138). He leans towards subscribing to an administration based on a liberal system embracing all the details of the administration, in order to avoid the development of a corps of rude, routine-bound officials, that tends to neutralize individual initiative by improper means.

Many British thinkers long boasted that their country had freed itself of bureaucracy. But as the years ran their course, up to the present, a bureaucracy as typical and representative as any on the continent was conceived and developed in Britain. This was the British civil service; the institution and mandate offered by Great Britain to the entire world. So the proliferation of books devoted specifically to explaining the principal problems and development of public administration from the bureaucratic angle is not surprising, because these consider the civil service as the emergence of a distinct profession regarded as the classic profession; that is, with self-recruitment, self-discipline, self-government, and substantial efforts to prevent outsiders from intervening in its affairs (Chapman, 1970: 43). An emblematic text that invokes the “portrait of a profession” rings unequalled adulation of what in Great Britain eventually came to be one of the most prestigious occupations and whose gifts enable the conception of its own administrative philosophy. In its pages, Norman Bridges set out to paint a picture of senior Whitehall officials; that is, those who handle administration issues in general and formulate policy, simultaneously portraying the most faithful portrait of British administrative culture (Bridges, 1971: 50).

The role of the civil service in the modern state consists mainly in improving government, because without the civil service, government itself would be impossible. The civil service is a professional body of permanent officials and employees, created expressly to properly and competently carry out the function of administration. Their numerical strength is determined by the activities of the state because it is a sign of its nature and development. Since the early twentieth century, the number of public employees—including both the central and local government as well as public corporations—was one in ten professionals in the United States, and one in five in Britain, France and Germany. In fact, institutions are neither more nor less than the men themselves, and no institution can be better than the quality of its personnel (Finer, 1949: 709, 712). The civil service is, more than other political institutions, a product of the intellectual factors of Western civilization. This was confirmed in the nineteenth century, when a massive body of public servants had already been established, who gradually replaced the untrained, barely literate unpaid employees. State activities grew enormously, along with a “managerial class” needed to perform them, although Finer claims to have coined a similar term some ten years before James Burnham did so (Burnham, 1946).

The public administration of a society varies according to its degree of complexity; that is, according to the division of labor and organization, requiring
the use of experts fully dedicated to public administration. These are mainly civil servants, a corps of experts granted the authority to implement policy for the benefit of society. The existence of the civil service, inherent in the modern state, can be explained simply by the need for gifted people who have the knowledge that ministers lack, because the latter, whose natural *locus* is parliamentary activity, do not have the ability or cognizance of the functioning of the administrative machinery (Finer, 1927: 14–15). The civil service is a substantial part of the “gigantic ministrant state,” primarily because the great quantity of secondary legislation demands timely, daily and immediate implementation, impossible without a stable professional corporation. The “night watchman state”, as conceived by Ferdinand Lassalle, has no resemblance to the ministrant state, which not only guarantees order and imparts justice, but also takes every sort of measure to provide both social and individual welfare.

Civil service is the most important topic in British administrative thought. Just as in France there is no respectable professor of public administration who has not written a text on administrative law, in Great Britain there is no noted professor of the subject who has not published a book on the civil service. Even treatises on bureaucracy tend to treat it within the field of service. Bureaucracy is clearly indispensable in modern government. This is due not only to methods of working and administration, but also in order to improve recruitment of administrative personnel through merit and not nepotism, and because it stimulates the rational carrying out of public administration. Bureaucracy, in short, brings great advantages to modern public fulfillment. It has received no shortage of severe criticism, but it is certainly important. There is generally assumed to be a natural opposition between democracy and bureaucracy, but this has been clearly disproved by Charles Hyneman. In his book, he claims that an examination of bureaucracy should not necessarily start with its size or cost, as there are more important issues, such as topics relating to government control over bureaucrats (Robson, 1956: 3–4). If public administration is irresponsible, it is not because of its size, but for other types of reasons. Neither its size nor its great size are, therefore, as important as thought by some. Moreover, bureaucracy has often been quantified by observing the proliferation of government department administrative units or the number of their employees, but neither does this confer a good understanding of it, nor does analyzing bureaucracy by comparing its numbers with percentages of the total population. In fact, the results are different for each of these criteria.

When bureaucracy is analyzed by its size, according to the different measures noted, this is often a reaction to proposals by opponents of the modern state such as those in charge of large-scale social programs. Their assessments are based on mistaken claims about bureaucratic activities, which they observe through distorted lenses. With respect to its relationship to democracy, it must be borne in mind that the bureaucracy is not necessarily opposed to democratic development when this is embodied in parliamentary regimes. For example, Germany had established a powerful administrative system before it developed its parliamentary system, and although it had great difficulty controlling ministers and their colleagues, this does not mean that it was impossible for democracy to develop (Robson, 1956: 3–4). The relationship between democracy and bureaucracy can be substantially improved when the civil service is prevented from developing privileged castes. For example, in
Britain the London School of Economics has opened its doors to a multitude of students from a variety of social classes, a strategy also followed by the Administrative Staff College. Preference is given to merit and ability, not to the social status of the student. It is also necessary to improve the lines of communication between the governors and the governed in order that they can participate in exercising control over the bureaucracy. Lastly, it is important to provide entry to the civil service to people who are not professional politicians or civil servants, but lay people who can infuse it with qualities and experiences other than those found in political and public administration circles, particularly in the administrative departments that oversee education, health, labor and social security. This is the best way to make the civil service increase its competence, responsiveness and accountability.

Such ideas were unthinkable a century ago, when Britain was experiencing the end of its administrative childhood, and the subject of bureaucracy was taboo. The study of administrative personnel, whether called civil service or bureaucracy, has not only dominated in Great Britain, but Great Britain has been the country that has contributed the most to its study around the world in the past century. Great Britain's isolation was dissolved forever, mainly because European modernization gradually assimilated the administrative cultures of the continental nations. Just as Brian Chapman observed that the Napoleonic public administration was as strong, cohesive and connected as the Roman model (Chapman, 1970: 26), today we can say that the British administration is as strong, cohesive and connected as that of its neighbors.
The Public Corporation

Great Britain is a country of entrepreneurship, of the “invisible hand of the market,” of the industrial revolution and of *laisser faire, laissez passer*. A land that resists state intervention and administrative interference, Great Britain is the European nation that established or nationalized the largest number of productive and service public companies in the shortest time and on an unparalleled scale.

British authors in the early twentieth century were among the first to publish scientific studies of an emerging administrative entity; the public company. The reasons must be sought in the economic boom stimulated by the industrial revolution. Its impact on local administration was felt immediately, since these types of corporations assumed the provision of modern public services. A corporation was created particularly to deliver emerging public services of gas, water, electricity and transport to Great Britain. As with other types of companies, original studies were soon made of the public company as a modern organization distinct from a private company.

Municipal utility companies are unique in themselves, unlike private or other companies, mainly because they were born in an era in which consumer control over privately provided services provided by individuals had diminished or been removed entirely, replaced by government regulation (Finer, 1941: 18, 31–32). In the new environment, the concept of “success” – which can be “efficiency” – is not comparable between the private sector and the municipal corporation, because in the former success is measured against the competition and determined by prices, costs and earnings. The efficient corporation is the corporation that meets demand. In contrast, since the municipal corporation is a monopoly, there is no point to applying these measures because it does not operate in a market or competitive system, but is an instrument of policy.

It is paradoxical that one of the most powerful forces of nationalization in Britain emerged at the local level, so well-regarded for self-government and citizen participation, for it was there that the seeds of the first public companies were planted and grew copiously between 1882 and 1894 (Grove, 1962: 25). It was a time aptly termed “municipal socialism” by the Webb Society, a great promoter of the movement for nationalization of the gas and water supply. By the late nineteenth century, 170 towns throughout Britain had formed municipal enterprises. Most were in the north, and expanded their business to electricity and coal, setting the pattern for a new type of municipal management.

One of the characteristic features of British public administration, local autonomy, was so deeply impacted by the establishment of municipal corporations that, aided by a process of mutual imitation of continental nations, this feature in its purest form was fading away by the early twentieth century. The fact was clearly observed by Georg Jellinek, who noted that this mutual assimilation was culminating in a blend of union and two-way penetration (Jellinek, 2000). The European administrative culture is largely a product of that fact.
State intervention did not remain anchored in the provision of important local public services, but expanded into the ownership, operation or control of services and industries, becoming a global movement by the mid-1960s (Robson, 1960: 17). The trend is evident not only in highly developed Western countries, but also in the underdeveloped regions of Asia and Africa. It was even the dominant feature of communist regimes as well as a prominent characteristic of democracies, although they claimed to be based on private enterprise or a mixed economy. The scale of this movement was extraordinary, its diversity astonishing, and its political, economic and social importance undeniable.

At the time, the new phenomenon had not yet been satisfactorily defined, since the industries or services considered to be “public utilities” varied from country to country. The concept includes two conditions; the first, that the service should be regarded as so essential as to require public intervention, ownership or management; the second that the service must be monopolistic. The first condition requires that it be essential, a judgment that depends on circumstances inherent in time and space, the degree of economic and technical development, social habits, and popular psychology (Robson, 1960: 17–18). The luxuries of one era can become the essential needs of the next, while services unanimously considered as public can later become the luxuries of the wealthy. There is no question that water, gas, electricity and ports are undoubtedly public services. Public transport and telecommunications, while not as essential as these, could be added to the list.

It must be noted that the public company is not an entirely new institution. Even long ago there were numerous official bodies that carried out government functions with varying degrees of independence from the executive and various state departments under the direct control of ministers of the crown. These include the Public Trustee, the Charity Commission, and Trinity House. There are also agencies carrying out specialized technical functions, such as the Tithe Redemption Commission, the Air Registration Board and the Medical Research Council. There are organizations devoted to cultural activities, such as the Arts Council, the British Council, the great national museums and scientific collections, and the Public Record Office. Finally, there are agencies which appear dependent on and are almost integrated into the departments of state, such as the Prison Commissioners, the General Register Office, the Commissioners for Crown Lands, and the State Management Districts for Liquor Control in Carlisle. An essential feature of these bodies is that they were created to carry out specialized missions free of direct executive control by the ministers, though often subject to their influence or their decisions on policy issues. All these institutions, however, are a phenomenon completely different from that of emerging public companies, which were aimed at managing large nationalized industries and services.

The reason these modern public companies was created lies in the need of the administration of industrial and business firms to display a high degree of freedom, initiative and entrepreneurial spirit, liberating them from the inherent restraint on government departments. Moreover, they were also a large-scale experiment in the country’s economic and social reform. This consisted of nationalization of industries and basic services to promote progress in a rapidly
modernizing country. Their nature is singular, since they are created to fulfill two aims; to meet the public interest, and to operate efficiently—two often opposed goals, which government ministers must reconcile (Robson, 1970: 80).

It is useful to examine this significant process, because the names of the companies point clearly to which industries were nationalized. It took place in two stages, the first of which was preceded in 1908 by the creation of the Port of London Authority, which up to that point was the only case prior to World War I. The following year saw the creation of the Electricity Commission and the Forestry Commission (Robson, 1960: 48–50). The British Broadcasting Corporation and the Central Electricity Board were founded in 1926, and two years later the Racecourse Betting Control Board was created. In 1933 the London Passenger Transport Board was created, and in 1939 the British Overseas Airways Corporation.

The second stage was launched with the return of a Labour government to power in 1945. With the 1946 Bank of England Act, the capital of the Bank of England became public property and fell under government control. The same year, the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act nationalized public ownership and management of the coal industry. To this end, the act established the National Coal Board to manage coal mining and processing in Britain (Robson, 1960: 50–55). The 1946 Civil Aviation Act established three airlines (in place of the BOAC) with exclusive rights to cover air passenger services within the UK and on international routes. It also gave the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation authority over civilian airports and over building new ones when needed. The 1947 Transport Act nationalized the railways and inland waterways, including the network of hotels and restaurants owned by the railroads. All passenger transport in London was placed under ownership and management of the Transport Commission by the 1933 London Passenger Transport Act. In 1946, the Commission acquired the long-distance goods transport companies. The 1947 Electricity Act completed the nationalization of electricity (begun in 1926), through the creation of the Central Electricity Board to oversee the construction and management of the power system known as the “grid.” The 1948 Gas Act put the entire gas industry under public ownership, although about a third of it had already been in the hands of the municipalities and two thirds controlled by public utility companies. The nationalized industry was placed under the National Gas Council. The 1946 New Towns Act authorized the Minister of Housing and local governments to build new urban developments both in undeveloped areas and in places where there were already small towns or villages. Fourteen development companies were created under the act. Lastly, the 1949 Iron and Steel Act restored the Iron and Steel Corporation of Great Britain, and transferred 96 designated iron and steel companies to the corporation. The Forestry Commission is a special case; having been created in 1919 it should belong to the first stage, but it is considered under the second stage because it was in 1945 that it became a public company of the type of the companies listed above.

The nationalizations even transcended ideological differences between Labour and the Conservatives, for the latter created the Central Electricity Generating Board (1926) and established a government airline (1939) (Aharoni, 1992: 36–37).
Since then, Great Britain has moved away from the group of nations characterized by the purity of their market economy to join those who have established a powerful state capitalism.

The development of the British public corporation took place in a context of worldwide development of governments, especially visible from 1930 to 1945. Nationalization in Great Britain touched gasoline, energy and transport, as well as banking, steel and the metal industry. Indeed, the public corporation has arrived in Britain; its merits are recognized by all parties, despite the differences of opinion between labour, liberals and conservatives (Robson, 1947: 161–162). But the effect was extensive, since nationalization involved the central public administration, which saw the emergence of new ministries of gas and energy civil administration, food, housing and urban planning. Nationalization consisted not only of the existence and usefulness of a new administrative institution, but the effect of a considered policy because all parties contributed to the evolution of the public corporation. The new entity stirred the enthusiasm of the British people, for it was conceived as an essential government function. Performance evaluations were highly satisfactory in terms of technical and economic capacity, since the benefits extended to a large number of users at affordable prices under a self-financing scheme.

In the face of such significant increases in the central administration, there was no shortage of proposals that a ministry of nationalized industries be established to guide their activities, choose their executives, give opinions on their price systems, and introduce necessary managerial reforms, but these proposals were not implemented (Robson, 1970: 86), unlike Italy and Mexico. In fact, the worldwide scope of these developments aroused the interest of many men of science, to the extent that that for theorists and practitioners of public administration, Great Britain is still a “theater of operations” of intense interest.

Discretion, administrative law, civil service and the British public corporation are features of an administrative state as genuine as that in Germany or France, and, therefore, of the peculiar character of the administrative culture of this island people.
Local Administration and Centralization

The extent of the transformation undergone by the former administration is more visible in the local administration than in any other aspect of public administration, primarily because it enables us to look into both the perpetuation and transformation of the administrative culture. In this regard, a notable book points out the decisive weight that administrative culture has in each country, as can be seen in its pages, and even more in its long title. It discusses the dangers of disunity between the central and local administration in Great Britain, with particular regard to the cities. Hence the idea of what Edwin Chadwick calls a “new centralization for the people,” together with improved legislation and codification procedures (Chadwick, 2009: 77).

The author was an experienced public administrator who served on the Royal Commission of Enquiry on the Poor Laws, and on the Factories Inquiry Commission and the inquiry on Metropolitan Health. He was also the first commissioner of the General Board of Health. We should not forget that he was also a corresponding member of the Institut de France, as this attests to his substantial knowledge on administrative problems and his constant references to administrative science. In a preface to his book, he expressed the hope that the unhappy experiences of local government in Great Britain would avoided by the statesmen who governed the colonies.

Like many other authors, Edwin Chadwick made frequent reference to the 1833 Poor Law, which represented a watershed in the history of British administration, because from that point on the administration perceptively decreased its involvement at the local level and substantially increased centralization. An interesting fact worth emphasizing is that while in Ireland the law achieved greater success in combating poverty, the rest of the UK fell woefully behind in this respect. This was because Ireland was under central supervision from London, while the principle of local government remained in force in the rest of the kingdom (Chadwick, 2009: 9). The advantages of centralization were also perceptible in the administration of roads, the police service, prevention of begging and vagrancy, and other areas of administrative action related to the meeting of social needs.

This reform reached such heights that by the last third of the nineteenth century the word “local self-government” had lost its essence, and one thinker declared his profound disenchantment with the regime (Chadwick, 2009: 27–28). It had reached the point where the term local self-government meant direct individual local knowledge of the affairs of the neighborhood administrative unit and taxpayer participation in the spending of their own money. From its vital principle emerged a set of agencies whose basic organization was often the board, whose foundation is the neighborhood which, in its role of paying taxes for local spending, delegated it the exercise of expenditure. However, this apparently simple issue ignores the basic principles of economy and the meaning of administration as provider of public services, as was evident in Ireland (but not in the rest of the UK) where the establishment of a central management institution for the administration was successful. However, the
board system; that is, a network of unrelated collegial agencies, rendered ineffective a proper evaluation that would always require uniformity.

Self-government led to increasingly frequent meetings of town residents, to the point of neglecting their private affairs to attend to public matters, but in the end they also gradually abandoned these. To remedy this problem, they resorted to people who were incompetent in administrative matters. Over time, their shortcomings could only lead to increased deficiencies; since these people had a complete lack of knowledge of the science of administration.

What the United Kingdom then required was unity, which is only possible when the same thing is done the same way throughout the country. This was precisely what was done in Ireland but not in England, Wales or Scotland. Hence this successful experience would mean abolishing the position of Lord Lieutenant—who transmitted royal authority by appointing local officials—due to the undesirability of the position in a centralized system. Its persistence would mean the continuation of the old systems of useless legislation, as evidenced by the opinion of a former commissioner responsible for the implementation of the Poor Law in England, and who later served as a commissioner of the Local Government Board for Ireland (Chadwick, 2009: 28, 29–30). The Lord Lieutenant represented the purest medieval conception of the rule of law, while centralized direction would have the advantage of being constituted as a “national government,” since specialized branches based on unity can be organized, eliminating the disadvantages of the disunity evident in the kingdom. Such an arrangement could cover the entire United Kingdom, could also be set up at the local level, where cities would be administered based on that unity, as well as the county, the medieval administration being abolished forever. An administrative organization based on boards or commissions implies unsystematic, chaotic provision of services. It should be replaced by a body of scientifically competent officials, whose centralized organization operates synchronously and uniformly.

According to Chadwick, the term “centralization” was misinterpreted, being considered as inherent only to government when in fact it could be applied beneficially to the population’s affairs in general. Hence, for example, while a deficient centralization might be observed in France, the same could be said of the United Kingdom’s decentralization. In the France of Napoleon Bonaparte, centralization did not operate in the people’s favor, but against them, having been established to ensure military power, conscription and tax collection. An interesting quote cited by Chadwick is from a famous French work on centralization by M. Odilon Barrot, to which the former dedicated a few lines and a direct quote. Clearly Chadwick’s attention was drawn to Odilon Barrot’s work because of the deep meaning that the latter gave to centralization, which he considered inherent in any society and part of human harmony, together with sociability and liberty (Barrot, 1861: 31). Chadwick also observed poor decentralization in the United States of America, to which he devoted several pages to extend his criticisms to the self-government established there (Chadwick, 2009: 77, 80–81, 83–84). In this country, too, knowledge was excluded from local government, and replaced by interests and concern for private affairs. Centralization for the people arose from pressure by the impoverished classes, who cry for the need for more centralization; that is, more
inspection and regulation of the workplace, more supervision of health inspections in their humble homes to examine their of sewage and water supply conditions. But Parliament was adverse to such measures, as were local administrators, many of them being shopkeepers and business owners also obviously opposed to them.

The new age was opposed not only to local self-government, but also to *laisser faire, laissez passer*, an axiom emanating from economic policy that had been extended to public administration, whose negative effect was particularly noticeable in the administration of local services, such as those relating to the water supply and health. Some of his axioms were declared against centralization, arguing that public services based on administrative unity violate natural liberty. However, Chadwick did not find any precise definition of natural liberty. It is true that this liberal axiom was invoked when it comes to aspects of the economy, such as those relating to trade and the navy, but the author considered it inapplicable to public services because it was not a question of obstructions to the free market nor to trade. In fact, *laisser faire, laissez passer* was magnified towards aspects of society that had little or nothing to do with its assumptions (Chadwick, 2009: 95, 99).

Centralization, since then, became the subject of a failed reform, despite the existence of a long-standing need for local administration to be transformed, certainly since the beginning of the twentieth century. Although it was a hoped-for process, the reform fell into a state of stagnation. A typical process can be observed at the time, that moved from a period of intense decentralization to a new path that led in the opposite direction to centralization (Robson, 1966: 13–25). It was a question of “devolution” of a group of matters from the local level that were raised to the national level. It can be seen, thus, how functions long ago put under local administration were transferred to the national government, due to the incompetence of the former and their inability to carry them out efficiently and consistently. This was the case of transportation services, roads, hospitals and public assistance. The devolution process also included the transfer of local companies traditionally responsible for passenger transportation services and roads; and extended to water, electricity and gas.

The processes of returning functions to the central government are notable, and what is perceptible is the need for stable and efficient public services, but mostly overall coverage that includes the entire network of communities, whether it is their hospitals or their roads. But what singularly stands out is the issue of public assistance, which again takes us back to the Poor Law of 1833. Centralization was normally preceded by a parliamentary decree; for example, the Transport Act 1947. By 1960, that set of activities formerly performed by the local government had almost completely reverted back to the national government. The same year, the Electricity Council and the Central Electricity Generating Board were established to centralize service.

Reversion in Great Britain was so extensive that the supply of drinking water, for example, formerly 80% controlled by local governments, was transferred to the central government, as it had become a general public service. Also, the devolution of functions and public companies came to mean a change in the concept of the local area as a locus for the provision of public...
services in Great Britain, which most people, among them the socialists, regarded as a substantial part of the country’s identity.

Unthinkable before the 1960, from that time on centralization began to be defined as a topic of public administration. In fact, Robson notes that there are two types of centralization in Great Britain. The first is the transfer of functions from local authorities to central government departments or similar bodies, as was the case of roads, hospitals and public assistance. The second type involves transferring services and companies to ad hoc administrative bodies with a variable degree of central control (Robson, 1966: 47). Thus control, monitoring, supervision and inspection are new vocabulary entering the lexicon of British administrative studies.

Local administration, which Robson seldom calls “self-government,” was already so far from being the vital principle of public administration in Britain, that at the end of his book he outlines a set of principles by which the local governments should adjust themselves according to the central government. The central government should thus ensure that the local government organization is able to perform the role expected of it, the organization being defined as the status, areas, resources, powers, and relationships of local government authorities. This being the conception of the local organization, the central government expropriates its independent power to construct itself as it had done since ancient times, to now mandate the design from London. Moreover, along with Parliament, the central government should set the broad lines of policy that the local government must follow to ensure that it properly provides adequate services. The most important public services provided by the local administration would be supervised by central departments to ensure a minimum standard of quality. The central government would also contribute to the development of improved administration of local agencies, especially those dedicated to administrative research and information services. Local administration would retain tax functions, leaving the Exchequer a subsidiary role of supplementing income, which would never exceed subsidies raised by local government. While the local government would contribute 60% of income, the Exchequer would provide only 40% (Robson, 1966: 149–150). Lastly, local authorities would retain a large degree of freedom to search for new directions based on the current situation at the time.

However, a strong, vigorous essence of “self-government” still remained, especially since few people in the 1960s did not understand the new role of local government in the welfare state; the neighborhood meeting not only brought people together for civic activities, but continued to be the community’s arena for executive decision-making. Self-government restricted the exercise of citizens’ rights and responsibilities, which is significant, but as its administrative function decreased, this was gradually entrusted more and more to the central government and professional administrators.

It appears that the British will never relinquish self-government, however diluted it becomes. William Robson himself, who portrays its ghostly expression, observed, quite rightly, that a body that can be reanimated if it keeps the spirit from which the need for a broad separation of powers sprang, along a
democratic line. He viewed local life as the polity of the British nation, and considered that it would remain so forever.

Chapter 6

BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE AND THE NEOMANAGERIAL MENACE

Over the past three decades, a powerful privatization movement emerged in Great Britain, which affected not only the country but the entire world, persisting and culminating in what was called the “new public management.” Many of the changes that the British government underwent after 1945, particularly relating to the loss of independent military capacity, the dismantling of its empire, the transfer of power to the European Union, and successive outflows of power to local government, led to the transformation of various roles in what was once a united national political system. The British state sought new tasks to replace those of the past, functions characteristic of the imperium concept that made the old decision-makers into litigators or policy implementers while the central government took over the provision of public services previously performed by local authorities.

So matters stood when the “age of privatization” emerged in Great Britain with the coming to power of the Conservative Party under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher.

The Privatization of Public Administration

Between 1945 and 1951, Great Britain was fertile ground for publicization on a large scale, through the wave of Labour nationalizations that did not recede until it crested in 1979, as its platform made evident (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). However, the Conservative victory in that year initiated a tsunami in the opposite direction, which constituted a decisive turning point in the history of British public administration.

The 1980s were considered the age of privatization; or so proclaimed the enthusiasts of these measures that effectively reduced state activity. And particularly the figure who designed and led Great Britain’s privatization program, which he called a “new world”. This was Madsen Pirie, professor of philosophy and president of Adam Smith Institute, chief architect of the program which the Prime Minister commissioned to an expert. His approach is revealed in the title of one of his books; “Dismantling the State” (Pirie, 1985: 24–25). In one part of his book, Pirie defines privatization as the total or partial transfer of public activities to the private sector arising from an acknowledgment of the government’s inherent shortcomings as a public provider; this change from a public to a private economy transfers the focus from supply to demand. It was then that the British government took that path, implementing 22 specific privatization measures which in the Thatcher era meant the largest transfer of property since Henry VIII expropriated the Catholic monasteries. However,
considering the overall process, privatization is not a method but an approach by which things that the state used to carry out are done in the market (Pirie, 1988: 3, 11–12), and which we consider as a neoliberal ideological framework.

The Conservative party platform did not originally use the term “privatization” and proposed only the sale of the shipyards, the aerospace industry and the National Freight Corporation. The process started with a dozen sections of public companies of which the government successfully divested itself. Privatization and its techniques, thus, emanate from principles of practice rather than an ideological victory taken from the “world of ideas” (Pirie, 1988: 10, 14, 255–256). The infant born in Great Britain soon spread throughout the world to countries at all degrees of development and with all types of regimes. British privatization left a lesson for the whole world: that there is no corner of the public sector that can not be invaded, which in Great Britain included health, education, national defense, and the ports, among others.

The atmosphere of privatization spread to such a degree that commissions and ministries of privatization were created within the public administration. There was no country that was not privatizing or aspiring to do so as fast as it could. Experts on the subject offered themselves as advisors, lecturers and writers, as well as others whose skills were focused on consulting. The privatization business was so prosperous that banks were founded on the principle. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank headed a worldwide privatization crusade, while the Chicago School provided a monetarist intellectuals scaffolding. A further academic trend, termed “public choice,” added to the individualistic current reinforcing the ideological framework of privatization (Dunleavy, 1986: 13–34). In sum, privatization was not only topical, but fashionable.

The hurricane of privatization had its origin in Great Britain. Great Britain had led the world in nationalized companies, and now this national sector formed by Labour governments over almost 50 years was dismantled and 600 thousand workers were transferred to the private sector. So successful was the policy that even the workers apparently benefited from a generous "people's capitalism" which included not only the acquisition of entire companies (notably the National Freight Corporation (a transportation company for which each worker contributed 500 dollars), but also shares in other companies and the acquisition of rented dwellings. The sale of British Telecom (BT) enabled 96% of its employees to acquire shares, but these were probably much less than those bought by big capitalists, of which there were, however, few, for the involvement of Japanese capital was required. "Popular capitalism" was one of the most publicized mottoes in support of privatization and it was not unusual to see it proclaimed in large headlines that the British government was no longer the largest landlord in the country, for it had previously owned one out of every three homes.

The privatization business was so large that the sale of British Telecom was the largest transaction in history, even though it was at the time only the sixth largest in the world and no more than a little over half its shares were sold. But this record did not last; in 1986 British Gas (BG) sold for even more, being offered at 8 billion dollars. With privatizations like these, the market for the sale
of public companies was rapidly becoming saturated. The stock market of Great Britain, the leader in the process, was the world’s third largest. However, doubts arose that the BT purchase could be completed. Other markets were resorted to, among them Japan, whose investors bought most of the shares and became the majority owners (Quek Peck Lim, 1986: 24–27). The sale of BT was the largest of its day, as mentioned above, but still smaller than Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT). Its sale was forced by a de-merger and its market capitalization value was ranked as equivalent to that of General Motors; 21 billion dollars. In 1986 the sale of 10% of the company would produce 2.1 million dollars, about half that of BT when its shares were floated on the global market two years earlier.

As a practical party platform, privatization was developed primarily as a set of techniques for disposing of British government assets. The doctrine was developed after the fact, but neoliberalism, the Conservative Party ideology, served as the initial momentum through the mantra of “public choice” (Pirie, 1988: 58–60, 65, 331). However, the act of privatization itself led to a scaling up of doctrine to reach beyond that school of thought—concentrated on explaining why groups act as they do and what effect it has on public programs and policy— to develop the concept of “micropolitics” to mean the use of policy to overcome the objections of groups whose interests are threatened. That is, this strategy improves on the public option which can be summed up as identifying groups benefiting from government social programs. Micropolitics, in turn, is involved in the circumstances under which individuals may be motivated to choose and embrace the alternative of private provision of public goods, in which people can decide individually and voluntarily about the cumulative effects of the state of affairs they desire (Pirie, 1985: 28–29). Finally, advancing the idea of the new public management, Pirie notes that privatization provides a process by which entrepreneurial talent can work in the political system, providing it with creative input to deal with public problems.

The above description summarizes the first step of a two-step process of privatization of public concerns. This step entails the exoprivatization of the state, consisting of the procedure by which public administration transfers the production of goods and services to private administration, moving the state out of the market. The second stage, which we will shortly examine, is the endoprivatization of the state; that is, the substitution of public administration of national affairs by the ideas, methodology and techniques of private management, moving the market into the state. In exoprivatization, public management functions as the subject of the transaction of things onto the market; in endoprivatization, the management itself becomes the object of the commercial transaction. In the first stage, public management is the merchant, in the second phase it is the merchandise. While exoprivatization acts on the “what” of public administration, endoprivatization affects the “how.”
The Neomanagerial Reform

When Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, she established the Efficiency Unit in order to lay out the terms of the Conservative government’s managerial reform (Dunleavy and Hood, 1995: 112). The core of the reformist ideology was made up of methods, concepts, models and values imported from the experience of private business. Without giving thought to the idea that any changes made as part of the “managerial revolution” could be reversible, it was proclaimed that the administrative reform would be successful in and of itself and have a lasting influence on the United Kingdom (Metcalfe, 1993: 351–352).

The reform began following the emergence of three factors that determined the course of events: the first was the financial failure of the public treasury, as the government’s financial yields showed declining figures. Second, public spending was floundering in a sea of extraordinarily specific formal stipulations (Metcalfe, 1993: 353). Third, the civil service was perceived as unable to provide services efficiently and effectively in terms of public spending. In summary, public administration showed large deficiencies in its ability to manage funds, and a new public management was seen as the right formula to put the national administration in order, control public spending, and reduce the civil service, due to the scarcity of funds. In fact, the formula was simple: better government means business management.

This idea translated into a plan that proclaimed the arrival of a government that would do less of what it had been doing, and do it better and more economically, using the managerial methodology of private business. As mentioned above, the public choice competition was invoked in support of the reform to put an intellectual face on the concept of reducing the purview of the state and orienting it toward market formulas. These measures were based on the thesis that public problems could be solved with private instruments. The reform, despite its purely technical prospectus, was carried out in an environment of hostility mainly from the civil service, which ultimately determined its course and outcome. An equally important factor that must be considered was the market orientation philosophy, which led to a cumulative shift toward micro-managed reform, rather than a large-scale change based on an overall design.

The managerial reform went through four relatively different but distinctly overlapping stages; scrutiny, “final reforms,” “next steps” and structural reorganization. The first phase consisted of many small scrutiny projects carried out by civil servants under the Efficiency Unit, which involved examining the work process in particular areas of government departments, locating deficiencies in managerial performance and recommending improvements, and obtaining positive results in terms of cost and human effort. The “final reforms” were objectives for management to fulfill; that is, the institutionalization of performance values in terms of time and cost. They were aimed at establishing a basis for British public management into the future, by means of the Financial Management Initiative launched in May 1982, which consisted of a comprehensive financial reform program designed to improve control of public spending (Metcalfe, 1993: 356–360). The third phase of the managerial reforms
began with the 1988 publication of the Efficiency Unit report entitled *Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps*, which evaluated the state of reform from 1979 up to publication of the report. The fourth stage of the reform represented a qualitative change from the previous changes, for it called for large-scale transformations in the main public services delivered at the local level, as well as in the National Health Service and the education system. The changes were to be implemented in a scheme of organizational networks rather than a comprehensive administrative unit.

In fact the reform, particularly the public choice as an ideological network of neomanagerial reform, attacked the limits of government and proposed reducing what government did to the least possible. Among its programs, the privatization of public services was particularly notable, encouraging government operations to be delivered through market mechanisms in order to become more competitive and efficient. To put it simply, it was a question of establishing what Peter Self defined as “government by the market” (Self, 1993: IX, 167, 176), whose premise consists of a regime considered inherently superior for meeting human needs and aspirations, since it judges that the political process inherently contains numerous distortions and imperfections. The public choice served as a model of neomanagerial reform, being based on competition, contracts, performance incentives and decentralized management.

There is no doubt that the public choice was one of the most powerful forces within neomanagerial trends directed towards the achievement of two objectives: the first is the decreased range of the state’s activity through privatization, deregulation and liberalization. The second objective was to instill market concepts in the government (Self, 1993: 59, 61–62). At the same time, these forces developed a set of essential elements of this superior virtual government that emulated the marketplace. Firstly, it comprises a transparent system of accounting and accountability. Secondly, an important feature is the introduction of competition, where customer opinion is central to the provision of goods and services. Third, it establishes a system of performance incentives for civil servants based on standards for evaluating their performance. Lastly, it proposes to fully introduce market mechanisms to government operations, based on the cost and benefit criteria.

Finally, the British neomanagerial reform meant a conceptual translation of “effectiveness” to “efficiency:” that is, a shift from seeking positive effects toward an accent on costs, as was clear in the ideology of the Conservative Party whose platform was based on the reduction of public spending and the role of government, and on reducing the waste caused by “bureaucracy.” The reform is also notable for its commitment to introducing managerial skills imported from the private sector into the civil service and to reduce the number of civil servants. The 732,000 civil servants in 1979 would be cut to 590,000 by 1988 (Drewry and Butcher, 1988: 198–199). By 1986, the number of civil servants had been reduced to 594, fewer than the number during World War II.

Inasmuch as the goal of efficiency was not achieved either, especially because it was more a “revolution” process, the new managerial reform was only one more step of the of British public administration “evolution.” It was, rather, part of a long-standing, ongoing movement, and its changes were no
more than successive episodes of the steps that preceded the changes of the reform by at least twenty years (Drewry and Butcher, 1988: 211–212). The result was simply that a world in which officials were called managers “in charge” and the public was called “clients” returned to how it had been before. Some countries shared elements of the British reform package, but others did not, and followed their own path. There were even reform programs that had profoundly different characteristics from the British model. There are evident differences in the pace of reform between the “delirium” of the British program and the punctuated or cautious movement in the majority of European countries. The Italians made an apprehensive and uncertain approach to reform, opting to pursue a strategy capable of navigating their huge, labyrinthine, chaotic government (Wright, 1997: 35–36). Many of the pressures for reform were common to numerous countries, but others were of different intensity and in different phases. Great Britain in particular was under budget pressure earlier than most of its European neighbors, while the administrative adjustment in the European Union in the 1980s fell much harder on the new member countries, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, than on the founding nations.

Once the neoliberal wave had washed over Great Britain and receded, affairs returned to normal, and once again the British demonstrated their ability to return to the onward path after a detour. In fact, not only did it abandon the new managerial paths that privatized its public administration from the inside, but public services and corporations were renationalized. Let us take a look, starting with the railway infrastructure, formerly privatized into one hundred independent companies, which collapsed in 2005. It was then rescued by the government and restructured as a private nonprofit organization, and its debts were underwritten by the British government. The privatized energy service, too, collapsed in 2002 and was rescued by the government, which then sold its shares to the private sector. A similar case is the National Air Traffic Services, a public–private partnership, rescued by the government, which also sold its shares. Lastly, the London Underground, another public–private partnership, collapsed and was returned to the city government.
Part Two

ADMINISTRATIVE THOUGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN
Chapter 7
THE ORIGIN OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE THOUGHT

Due to both its geographic island condition and its inhabitants’ sense of independence and uniqueness, Great Britain was the birthplace of a unique strain of administrative thought consistent with its national culture. British administrative institutions are famous for their self-government, corresponding to the intense sense of citizen political participation of the English, Scottish and Welsh. The fact that Britain contains England, Scotland and Wales, united and independent at the same time, speaks of the British spirit of self-governing.

Kaspar Bluntschli noted many years ago the enormous contrast between centralized France and decentralized Great Britain (Bluntschli, 1876: II, 253–254). However, it does not follow from this that the omnipresence of the administration in the former is in contrast to its virtual “absence” in the latter. A first impression would wrongly suggest that there are great theorists of administration in France, such as Charles-Jean Bonnin, Louis Marie de Cormenin, Alexandre Vivien and Alexis de Tocqueville, while Britain has not produced scholars of such stature because the British administration was not very important. But what occurred, rather, was that the island did not require a public administration until the mid-twentieth century: until then, it had not faced the problem of administration. That is, historical conditions will produce the necessary human minds and talents to study and solve the major problems of public administration in a country endowed with an administrative organization that is strategic and decisive for the nation’s development. Marx’s saying that a problem does not exist until there are means to solve it should not be forgotten. In France it was in the nineteenth century that the great minds mentioned above emerged. Their ideas offered solutions to the problems of their time; neither earlier nor later.

In Great Britain the situation was different: since public administration served only the needs dictated by historical conditions; that is, it achieved what could not be done privately, its role was subsidiary. Therefore, in the absence of major administrative problems, minds that could solve them were also absent. As The country’s public administration was simple, its administrative thought was likewise elementary. But it must not be thought that for this reason it was not important. Tocqueville, in his De la démocratie en Amérique, sufficiently stressed the virtues inherent in the simple Anglo-American public administration of his times, contrasting it with the vices of the complex French administration of the era.

The Briton, a Practical Man

The British people flatter themselves that they are a nation of practical men, and that this is the reason for their success as a community. This still holds, it is true, but the practice of administration been undergoing systematization through general principles for a considerable time. The
historical reluctance to adopt a method constitutes “their” method of “I’ll muddle through.” This means that confronted with a given problem, they will pull through somehow (Siegfried, 1950: 91). Hence, over time, their continued success made them believe that triumphed not only because of their qualities, but also because of their flaws, which is why they took pride in not their changing for a long time. But while this system worked, and tolerated many faults and aberrations as long the country was prosperous, it was a different story when its fortunes changed.

It is true that practice tends to lead the way over roads where science later follows; this explains how the British acquired a wealth of experience in administrative practice primarily in their colonial domains, rather than on the home island. Their colonial experience served to develop administrative talent in a variety of nations and different conditions. To this was added the effects of the industrial revolution with the growth of cities and increased population mobility, which gave rise to previously unknown administrative problems and prompted the development of administrative institutions that generated new relationships between the government and the governed (Merson, 1923: 220–227). All this meant that Great Britain would have to deal not only with unprecedented problems but to do so on an unprecedented scale. In the 1920s, however, problems were still tackled empirically. There had not been sufficient thought about the need to create a reliable guide for the public administrator, like that of architect or the physicist, who have available a scientifically systematized body of facts and principles that govern their actions. The same is true of lawyers and other professionals whose activities if formerly less scientific, later were rigorously guided by systematized knowledge. Public administration continued to be anchored in the method of trial and error, because administrative problems still did not demand momentous solutions: while the administration was not as efficient as a rational model would require, it continued to function for British society. But with the years, these types of problems would soon mount up.

Practice is an element of all public administrations; thus the distinctive feature must be sought not in the fact itself, but in the way that its inherent knowledge is transmitted. If it occurs vis a vis during the commission of normal affairs, the process will be extremely successful for its educational nature, but socially restricted and limited in time. But when practical knowledge is systematized for transmission, then the range of learning is considerably broadened, and can be organized into principles not only of actions, but of knowledge.

Towards the end of the 1950s, when the future of the public administration was addressed, everything seemed to indicate that it was the end of the practical British man in the sense of the person who can do anything and everything. This was due to his rarity, socially speaking, because he was increasingly difficult to find. Also, the advance of science and technology, along with the progress of administrative knowledge, demands not only the skill of this type of person, but of all people who tackle administrative tasks (Gladden, 1952: 158–159). Nor were practitioners able to develop new methods and procedures to deal with the emerging situations of the times that had begun to demand people trained expressly for administration. To the extent that
administrative skills and knowledge were distributed among different groups of people, a "universal school of administrative studies" was required that would offer educational programs where young people who were candidates for the public service could acquire the appropriate education.

However, despite the clarity with which the new era showed a need for the scientific development of public administration, there was not enough awareness to give unqualified support to the ongoing efforts, such as the Institute of Public Administration in 1921, which two decades later was already being subsidized by the Treasury. Nor was the journal Public Administration, one of the oldest in the world, the appropriate forum for the discussion of administrative problems. What is more, there was no lack of practitioners who tended to favor the idea of public administration as an art rather than a science (Gladden, 1952: 159–161). In fact, one author points out that paradoxically the private sector was making faster progress in scientific management principles through the Institute of Industrial Administration and the British Institute of Management; while the government was still not able to materialize its plan of creating an Administrative Staff College.

Government officials working in public administration perform a set of tasks which include reading and writing correspondence, minutes and memoranda; making telephone calls; attending meetings and interviews; and holding informal discussions with colleagues. They look for information they need, calculate, and draw up tables. This is their daily work. If we described the work of the politician in the same way, surely he himself would seek to provide a written interpretation of his tasks; that is, of his practice. This is precisely what Machiavelli did (Dunsire, 1973: 76). Obviously there are practitioners of public administration who have transmitted their experiences, although this is not usual or common. The first textbook on public administration in Britain was in the form of a discourse: the dialogue of the Exchequer, dated 1179, which is a manual of court proceedings of that body. The work consists of a dialogue between the author, Richard Fitz Neal, Archbishop of London, and one of the barons of the Exchequer (Richard Fitz Neal, 1950). Since then, Great Britain has clearly been the leader in Western Europe on the many topics arising from administrative processes. These types of texts, and many more that have followed them, show the great value of the books written about the practice of public administration, although few civil servants have produced them, most notably C.H. Sisson and Max Nicholson, but above all we must mention W.H. Moreland and E.N. Gladden. The very fact that there have been many books written by retired public servants, some who became academics, has shone a light on the important fact of the innovation of British administrative culture within outlines similar to those of the continental countries.

It is clear that administrative culture separates and distinguishes different peoples; but it is also clear that there is a more general framework of administrative culture that identifies the similarities between administrations of different countries, a similarity primarily lying in the aspects common to the mind of the public administrator regardless of his country. In principle, the mentality of the administrator is different everywhere, for example, than that of the artist, because the administrator is a person whose reasoning is diametrically different from that of other professions. It is important to note that while artists arbitrarily
shape “their” world; that is, modeling and inventing it, administrators are subject to a real world that conditions and determines their behavior. In fact, while the artist is endowed with a singular mind, the administrator’s mindset is universal. The public administrator may discard some elements of his world, but not many of them and not those that affect his work, because his existential world is determined by the principle of effectiveness of his activities. His work operates in a universe that must be observed comprehensively, taking into account that ignoring key elements would detract from the quality of his work. This is because the mind of the official is always searching for what is important and relevant, for it is the criterion of relevance that primarily defines the nature of his work (Sisson, 1965: 121–122). For example, the French public administrator must simultaneously manage his relationship with the minister and the Council of State, because an essential determinant of his work consists in calculating the potential effects of his labors; that is, to ensure the smooth operation of the policy he advocates and the changes in government that might be announced. The work of the British official, in contrast, is based on the criterion of relevance, clearly and strongly committed to determining what is necessary and timely to help the minister navigate the changeable waters of the parliamentary process and administrative environment.

Great Britain celebrated practice when reality demanded a scientific treatment of the public administration; that is not only describing it, but understanding it. As explained by one scholar, who was a public servant before he was a scientist, it is necessary that practical men be the authors of manuals and guides as well as books on the fundamental issues that turn their experiences into theoretical principles. His experience was played out on soil well known to the British; namely India, where he recommended that public administration be open to knowledge and progress in the subject from around the world, since its progress and the state of the art had been shaped there. But most important was Paul Appleby’s insistence on the need to comprehend the administrative situation of the country, not only by describing it, but by understanding it. For this, it is necessary to generate theory because the object of public administration in a democratic environment is the welfare of the people. Theory is not only the vehicle of this method of understanding, but of its construction (Appleby, 1953: 65–69). His Report on India faithfully reflects the falseness of the dichotomy between practice and theory, because the former can only be socialized systematically when it is transmitted, that is, when it can be taught. To this end, it is necessary to convert personal (and social) experience into communicable principles to serve as a guide to other practitioners, as many active and retired British civil servants did in works of theoretical influence.

There is a sterile approach in which practice and theory are viewed as antagonistic, which has been the cause of much of the scientific barrenness of public administration. This contradiction has led to a division of labor between practical and theoretical, sending them on two separated, parallel paths; each to their own values, isolated from the other. Harold Laski, a man of abstract thought and a theorist of public administration and political science, was so concerned with “practical” problems that he did not mind coming down from his pedestal when he wrote the foreword to a small handbook on civil service, whose members said they had little incentive and few stimuli, and whose task
was often monotonous and difficult (Laski, 1945: 3–4). Moreover, democracy does not necessarily mean that the civil service is open to superior talent nor that “senior” civil servants are “top” public officials. Permanent secretaries take very little care to equip the work of the minister, the head of his department, with energy and imagination.

Thus the axial epistemological problem in public administration is its “self-consciousness;” that is, knowing itself to be an independent entity, a discipline defined as an area of knowledge with principles of its own (Waldo, 1948: 26–27). If we believe that a science consists of the production of systematic explanations based on empirical data logically linked in regular patterns (Nagel, 1961: 5), then public administration has a scientific aspect.
The Founders of British Administrative Thought

Self-consciousness tends to surface in accounts aimed at solving specific, immediate, imperative problems, usually taking a preceptist form or simply appearing as an advisory bulletin or an operating manual for officials. Most of the volume of administrative literature that poured out between the eighth and seventeenth centuries was dominated by pieces of this type. Although they were rare, some other more abstract examples did appear, such as the treatise on the Exchequer by Richard Fitz Neal.

On this point, Great Britain followed this tradition by taking the path of administrative teaching. Thus the history of British administrative thinking begins with Henry Taylor’s famous book on the statesman (Taylor, 1927). In its pages, knowledge about British public administration is systematized for what is apparently the first time. With the passage of time, the idea of the simplicity of the British civil service began to change; the usual focus on complexity by the degree of organization; that is, differentiation and specialization, gave way to new perspectives. That is, the emphasis on “impersonal” assessments of the organization, was not the only one, as the “personal” approach shown by the civil service was also considered. This perspective, typical of Great Britain, is due to the elevation of professional public servants and the emblematic book on the topic, The Statesman, by Taylor.

Henry Taylor (1800–1886) was a well-educated man, including self-taught languages such as Greek and Latin, which reinforced his literary skills and his relationship with those who fostered them, such as his friend Alfred Tennyson. But no less important was his administrative career, as shown by his long career in the Colonial Office, where he served until 1872. This unique book sets Taylor apart: while the genre was not unknown in Great Britain, it was more typical of the Latin nations of the continent. However, by this very fact, his work was regarded as a defense of Machiavelli, the most important exponent of the genre of guides on the art of government. These books were part of the body of works of political education typified by Baltasar de Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier, referring to high officials, that is, “statists” in Taylor’s terminology (Laski, 1927: XXI–XXV). However, the abundant texts published in the eighteenth century slowed down after the French Revolution, while in Germany the cameralist studies were in the majority. Great Britain was not immune to the influence of this genre, as can be observed in James I’s Basilikon (1599) and a work by Francis Bacon titled De Augmentis to which Taylor pays tribute to the beginning of his book. The fact that Italian thinkers such as Machiavelli and Guicciardini were translated into English shows that British people were interested in the subject. A Spanish text of the same era was also published in France, Italy and Germany, but its English version is notable for its long title; A very briefe and profitable Treatise declaring howe many counsells, and what manner of Counselers a Prince that will governe well ought to have (W. Seres, London 1570). The book was by Fadrique Furió Ceriol (1549), El Concejo y Consejeros del Príncipe (Furió Ceriol, 1952).

Thomas Elyot merits special mention as the author of Boke of the Governour written in 1531, which is the most representative of this genre of
political literature (Elyot, 1880). We must add his *The Doctrinal of Princes* published in 1533, which contained translations of two speeches by Isocrates from the fourth century BCE. The two works are titled *To Nicocles (Ad Nicoclem)* and *Nicocles or the Cyprians (Nicocles vel Cyprius)* and were addressed to the king of Cyprus. The reputation of both speeches has grown, mainly because they are considered as the original examples of the current of thought known as the *mirror of princes*. Also notable is his short treatise *The Image of Governance* based on *Reloj de Principes* by Antonio de Guevara, which was written by Elyot in 1541 (Elyot, 1967a, 1967b).

Taylor wrote a treatise on the teaching of administration, taking inspiration from the thought of Francis Bacon, who proposed that the education of statesmen be based on a study of history, policy speeches and languages. Taylor dwells on the theme of history, for in it he observes the unique character of each epoch, the condition of society and the causes of revolutions (Taylor, 1927, 3–5, 11, 47). His statement that the essence of statesmanship lies in the implementation of policy measures is famous. The ability to carry this out comes from a study of history, but also from a review of administrative records and mastery of the art of debate. He is characterized by his mental discipline, and his ability to solve problems and appraise the qualities of others. This is summarized in the concept of “conscientiousness;” that is, the ability to adjust one’s degree of responsibility in public affairs. In other words, to avoid neglecting major duties to attend to the minutiae, and to prevent the loss of a vital sense of responsibility towards action, not inaction. Conscientiousness is thus the ability to anticipate the views of others. Finally, the character of the statesman lies in the most important of his qualities; namely, that in the service of the state he acts through others.

We can not forget a nineteenth-century text, very representative of Great Britain, anchored in the ancient dogmas of decentralization. At the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, Joshua Toulmin Smith condemned centralization and lauded British self-government. Most notable is his radical effort to distinguish between the systems, leaving no doubt as to their deep differences. Centralization evokes the idea of measures taken from a metropolitan center, while local self-government refers to the management of the affairs of some or a few, that is, the local district. Local self-government is the regime under which many minds learned most of the affairs they tended, and had the opportunity to learn even more; managing or supervising these matters, they had a great interest in doing so properly (Smith, 2005: 17). In contrast, centralization is the vast system of government under which a small number of minds know little about the affairs they tend, and have little opportunity to learn more; managing or supervising these manners, they have only limited interest in doing so properly.

Both positions, one that strives to do credit an ancestral government, the other envisioning a new era in which public administration plays a major role, are the precursors of the administrative thought that modestly but decidedly put Great Britain on the administrative world map.
Chapter 8

THE SCIENCE OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Self-consciousness came late to public administration in Great Britain, for up to half a century ago, the industrial revolution, government modernization, expansion of social programs and government intervention in the economy had provided sufficient material for potential scholars. The science of the British public administration was born at the start of the twentieth century. A core of its representatives forged what, with British peculiarity, Rosamund Thomas called “the British philosophy of administration.” However, this group, whose members were active mainly between 1900 and 1939, did not include the most important British administrative thinker of the time, W.H. Moreland, after whom the other most prominent authors in the first half of the twentieth and the present century were F. Merson, Richard Warner, E.N. Gladden, S.N. Finer, R.J.S. Baker, A. Dunsire, Peter Self and F.F. Ridley, as well as Harold Laski, Herman Finer and William Robson.

It should be noted that Great Britain has similar and equivalent administrative institutions to those on the European continent, and that many of them even have a common origin. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the uniqueness of the development of the ideas corresponding those institutions, which contrasts with how they arose on the continent. Questions such as these led F.F. Ridley to say that Great Britain was academically underdeveloped with respect to the theory of public administration. This, then, explains the paradox of British administrative thought between its correspondence with reality and its unexplored relationship with advances in the science of European administration.

These considerations contribute towards an understanding of the unique features of British administrative thinking. Perhaps most striking is that having developed within the continental tradition of administrative science, it could perhaps be considered marginal in its evolution. The seeds of administrative ideas initially planted in Great Britain yielded very different fruits than their intellectual products in continental countries, where specific national characteristics were tempered by geographical contact, while across the Channel, isolation led to a wealth of ideas nuanced by adaptation of concepts from abroad. At the same time, this singularity was reinforced by the insularity of British administrative thought, which mixed science and ethics to give rise to a set of ideas that was called “philosophy of administration.”

The London Circle

This concept is not a school of thought, but a set of administrative ideas with deliberately constructed affinities. The circle was a group of diverse academics; Richard Haldane, Graham Wallas, William Henry Beveridge, Oliver
Sheldon, Lyndall Urwick and Charles Stamp. It did not include Harold Laski or Sidney and Beatrice Webb, whose contributions similar to those of the members could have enriched the group. In itself, this combination of persons inherently implies the impossibility of forming a school and an *esprit de corps*, inevitably resulting in a fragmented assortment of administrative ideas not collected into one discipline, but in a variety of fields of knowledge such as economics, history, engineering, sociology and philosophy. They were a set of prominent public administration activists whose concepts, besides coming out of strong academic backgrounds, stemmed from practical exercise. There is, perhaps, in most of their writing a reluctance to use any theoretical formulation, but rather an evident practical bent. This lends a certain simplicity to their writings, which include more description and subjective attitudes than would a rigorous systematic analysis (Thomas, 1970: 22–23, 27–28). In them, their activism was expressed in a variety of institutions such as the Civil Servants Society, British Association for the Advancement of Science and the Institute of Public Administration; and in the fruitful activism that they carried out in industrial companies and the Institute of Industrial Administration where the work of Urwick and Sheldon was particularly notable. In our opinion, it is, rather, all of them who made up the London Circle.

For all these reasons it is necessary to know something of their administrative biographies. Haldane was an outstanding public servant whose most notable position was Secretary of State for War. He presided over the administrative reform commission that bears his name (1918). Wallas was a professor of political science and in 1923 acquired the distinction of Professor Emeritus. He was part of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service. Beveridge, a former civil servant, also excelled in academic posts; he served the director of the London School of Economics and taught at Oxford, and designed the British welfare state. Stamp’s activities were mainly academic; he was president of the London campus of the school, and like Haldane, he also headed the Institute of Public Administration. Lyndall Urwick was a student of privatemanagement, as well as Director of the International Management Institute and vice president of the British Institute of Management. Sheldon also studied private management, about which he wrote his most famous work, *The Philosophy of Management*, published in 1930.

His activism launched such major institutions as the London School of Economics, where Wallas, Haldane and Beveridge participated in the Fabian Society, in which Sidney and Beatrice Webb were active. Wallas was a professor there and Stamp a student while Beveridge served as its director (Thomas, 1970: 29–30). Urwick, too, began an extramural doctorate there, which he had to interrupt in 1914 because he had enlisted in the army. These thinkers followed a different course than their American counterparts, such as W.F. Willoughby, Herbert Simon and Dwight Waldo, who were full time professors.

However, their meeting point was the University of London, where many of them had professorships. It was from this school that the first texts treating public administration with the principles of a new discipline were published. Particularly notable was the work of George Thomas Reid, a graduate of the University (1906–1908), whose 1916 book on the history of the English public
administration was perhaps the first in the twentieth century (Reid, 1913). A degree thesis on public administration in ancient India also stands out among the new work on public administration; its excellent quality resulted in its publication in 1916. Its author, Pramathanath Banerjea, was a professor in India and a member of the Royal Economic Society of Great Britain (Banerjea, 1916).

Among the members of the London Circle, Oliver Sheldon and Lyndal Urwick are notable for having produced a more extensive and complete body of work on administration. Although it did not specifically address public administration, but business management, is nevertheless important, since it provided significant input to others.

It was Sheldon who systematized the use of the word “management” in Great Britain and, as mentioned above, wrote the first book on the subject, The Philosophy of Management, published in 1923 (Sheldon, 1965). Inspired by this work, from which he took an apt phrase referring to the recent development of management as a profession, the American administrative thinker Leonard White coined his famous definition of public administration as “the management of men and materials in the accomplishment of the purposes of the state” (White, 1926: 2). White, who in doing so set the path that would be followed by the American public administration for four decades, said he had deliberately minimized the legal aspects of public administration, emphasizing the managerial aspect. Sheldon was a pioneer in understanding a phenomenon inherent to the industrial revolution, along with Henri Fayol and Frederick Taylor, and deserves to be recognized alongside them as one of the founders of the managerial disciplines. His uniqueness and his important contribution was his observation that industry is not restricted to its mechanical aspect; that is, that it is not merely a machine, but a complex association of human life. It is thus accurately represented by the thought, objectives and ideals of the human being, not by machinery (Sheldon, 1965: 28–29).

Industry was created to meet the needs of human life in its physical, mental and moral aspects, so the purpose of management is in effect to make the industry human and to personify a type of joint effort among men towards a common goal, since they are driven by a common impulse. To achieve this goal, a motive and an ideal are necessary, as well as direction and coordination, and human effort and cooperation. Management is therefore not an end or motive in itself; if the motive of industry is primarily profit as a service to society, management is enshrined and legitimized by this, and the future of industry rests in its hands. Management, conceived as a social fact with an economic nature because it operates in and from industrial processes, influences human life from its locus.

Lyndall Urwick is notable as a prominent follower of Fayol, who was the main inspiration for his most famous book, Elements of Administration, published in 1942 (Urwick, 1942: 16). In this work, his most important contribution lies in its successful effort to scale Fayol’s ideas. Based on the distinction between the two different activities encompassed by Fayol’s term prévoyance, Urwick finds a difference between forecasting and planning. On the basis of this distinction, he notes that forecasting leads to planning; moreover that the organization has control as its object, and management leads...
to control. Employing these ideas, Urwick went beyond Fayol’s cyclical concept of the administrative process to develop a relational movement of logically linked paired concepts in which the first element is the cause, and the second element is the consequence. Forecasting is done in order to plan, organizing to coordinate, and command to control; in which the plan assumes forecasting, coordinating assumes organization control assumes command.

No less celebrated was an earlier article based on a talk given in 1933, which is one of the cornerstones of a 1930 biblical text that carried Urwick’s influence three decades further. His essay “Organization as a Technical Problem” is one of the most significant works on organizations from the era when this field was in its infancy (Urwick, 1937: 75, 83–84). In it, the formulation of conceptual pairs is formulated in a preliminary, but clear way. Its pages hold some astute comments on the British public administration, the first dealing with the posts of private secretary and executive assistant as staff positions. The essay then goes on to address coordination problems arising from the proliferation of committees.

As we will soon see, between 1900 and 1939, there was indeed a British theory of public administration, just as there is one today and will be tomorrow. We should note that British scientific advances went beyond their own country, influencing administrative studies in the United States. In the 1930s what was happening there was followed with interest, which led to an article by Harvey Walker comparing the study of the discipline between his country and the United States (Walker, 1933).

We should note that Harold Laski, together with the Webbs, were not part of the “British administrative philosophy” but diametrically contrasted to it, due to their “radical” vision as Rosemund Thomas understood it. They were, however, a prominent part of the London Circle. Nor did Thomas agree with another notable thinker, Herman Finer, who had an enormous influence on the study of public administration in both Great Britain and the United States.

Harold Laski was one of the most respected political philosophers of his time, and remains so even today, many years after his death. One of his major works examines the state from its most diverse political aspects, without neglecting a treatment of the economy (Laski, 1929: 368). But it is mainly notable for its comprehensive, reasoned review of British public administration. Laski devoted many pages to a treatment of public administration as one of the problems of the state. On the basis of the fact that Great Britain has a parliamentary system, he explains that when the cabinet formulates a policy accepted by Parliament, it must then be immediately implemented. This is the origin of an executive function; namely to coordinate and inspect the administration of the state.

On this basis, questions are asked about the same problem that is raised by every practitioner of public administration of his time; namely, how to distribute all the issues and tasks among different ministries. Since there is no rigid system of categories by which issues can be grouped, he proposes, speaking broadly, to split based on one of two criteria: distribution of issues by persons or by services. He discards the former, finding that by default, it aims to
provide every kind of person with a variety of services, which are specialized by their nature, resulting in duplication of effort in each ministry. Laski painted an example in which one ministry would handle matters relating to children, another the unemployed, another one senior citizens, another veterans, and so on, each ministry occupied with meeting the needs of one social category (Laski, 1929: 369). He proposes, rather, the latter division, which implies specialized ministries; that is, one for national defense, another for public education and another for health, to name three examples. He concludes by stating that the argument for organizing ministries based on services is evident.

Laski next poses the problem of well-defined orbits for ministries, which inherently involves the problems of their organization and leadership. With respect to organization, there are five principles that should be observed. The first is that there must be a minister accountable to Parliament for the work done by his department; the second, that should be proper financial controls in every department (Laski, 1929: 369–370). The third principle requires that each ministry contain a parliamentary committee by means of which it establishes ordered, continuous relationships, while the fourth refers to the task of structuring a well-defined organization of inter-ministerial cooperation to solve problems they have in common such those shared by the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Labour. Lastly, the fifth principle entails the need to structure a research and study system.

It must be emphasized that the majority of treatises on public administration give more importance to the “administration” aspect, leaving “public” in second place. Laski does not do so, because he believes it is important that there be a direct relationship between the public and the executive power in its administrative performance (Laski, 1929: 375). Being a far-reaching area that is very open to new experiences, governments have in this respect been more conservative than in other branches of their activity. In this area, their attitude envelopes a secret orbit, more typical of an empire than a bureaucracy, that in a democratic state whose principles are simple, starting with the suitability of consulting most of the interests affected by their action, should not hold merely to rules, but interpret the words of those interests.

Herman Finer is the author of a famous phrase: government is politics plus administration, which can be explained as follows: one of the prerogatives of the government is to impose the will or desire of certain individuals or groups on the behavior of the rest or on society as a whole. This desire or will may emanate from one mind or arise spontaneously from many minds, or from a minority. The purpose of government is to convert all these desires or wills to a behavior that is authorized and directed to those who live within the scope of what is called state. Accordingly, the government is strictly divided overall into two parts, which, Finer says, are differentiable from each other, or even completely separable: the political process and the administrative process. The former comprises the origin, development and maturity of the social will to direct the people’s loyalties or at least compliance to the establishment of a law or a socially accepted convention. This involves simultaneously encouraging the organization of society such that it is capable of making direct and indirect sacrifices of time, money and expenditure, as establishing rewards and personal limitations necessary to invoke the more general will. The result of the
process is the formation of a reservoir of social will and power (Finer, 1949: 7–9). Meanwhile, administration is the use of that reservoir by a suitable public service, as well as by mechanical means, physical space and methods, in order to provide government services to those who are under the authority of the state.

Because of the importance of politics and administration with respect to civic well-being, the former is by far preferred, so that the administrative machinery is subordinate to the political portion of the government. And rightly so, because politics determines the will and the function, which is more important than the administrative apparatus. Finer points out emphatically that the will is first, then the function, with administration following far behind. Having thus defined and positioned the public administration, Finer understands the it as the application of a limited discretion, this being understood as an activity almost free in its character and volition. Thus public administration is a reflection of the political rules; a vessel with a meager discretionary content dependent on the accountability of the political masters. However, the politician should not minimize the administration, because it is a mistake to think that administration can not do benefit or harm like any act, omission or error of judgment on a political decision (Finer, 1949: 7–9). This gives a sense of proportion to public administration, from which Finer claims to have reached certain conclusions in his studies of administration that do not lead him to either undervalue or overvalue it in comparison to the government apparatus and process, a source of other inaccuracies.

The administrative thinkers examined here made important contributions, but none of them proposed to treat public administration as a science. Doing so was W.H. Moreland’s great distinction.
W.H. Moreland: the Epistemological Construction of the British Public Administration

It seems that until the publication of William Harrison Moreland’s article “The Science of Public Administration,” Great Britain had not entered the study of public administration as a scientific discipline. That is, before this work, no British author had examined the epistemological construction of this field of knowledge the way it had already been done in France, Germany, Spain and the United States as well as Colombia and Mexico. The article, which was published in the Quarterly Review in 1921, made it evident that Britain was one of the last countries to develop the discipline, and that the effort to create an academy to remedy the situation required rapid, determined action. As mentioned earlier, Moreland (d. 1938) lived part of his productive life in India, where he was a member of the civil service. In his books it was noted that Moreland was an “Indian civil servant” and “late of the Indian civil service,” since by 1920 he had retired from the civil service.

Moreland was not a “lone wolf” in the Great Britain of his time, when the active London Circle was also producing administrative ideas such as the effect of individual and institutional activism, but no scientific work. His writing, in spite of the British organizational setting where it was conceived, seems like something from outside the country when it comes to categories. In this sense, it not only represented an advance over his native land, but over the entire world, for many of his administrative ideas were developed before they appeared in the United States or in France. Shortly after the publication of his crowning article on the science of public administration, F. Merson would follow his steps closely to raise it up as a field of scientific knowledge.

India was, in short, the original laboratory where Moreland, like many other British civil servants, experienced and learned public administration. This fact is significant because it was Moreland who initiated the scientific study of public administration in Britain, having no background more vital and academic than India, which was also his favorite subject to write about. As a member of the civil service, he served as a director of taxes and property registration. Hence many of his books relate to India, to which he devoted his book India at the Death of Akbar, in which the second chapter is devoted to public administration (Moreland, 1920). His reflections, of which a substantial part deal with economy, especially finance, led him to explore the centralized imperial administration of public taxes. But what is particularly notable is Chapter II, which deals with the general administration of the country as well as with security issues and trade. It is there that he defines administration as the organization and methods by which a state strives to achieve its objectives. Hence its nature, in any given era, is rooted in the objectives it proposes.

In the India of Akbar, the two primary objectives were war and domestic security, stimulating the imperial administration to be configured on the basis of obtaining revenue (Moreland, 1920: 31). Finance had long been his primary interest, as can be observed in a work dedicated to the administration of revenue in the India of his time. Its origins were the courses taught by Moreland to new civil servants, because in his opinion, financial management is the
fundamental subject of their profession (Moreland, 1911). His knowledge of public administration was vast, as noted in an article published in 1929, in which explores Indian economic literature of antiquity and in which he said that the famous book by Kautilya, *Arthasastra*, is a treatise on public administration that sheds light on agricultural, commercial and industrial issues of the time—the fourth century B.C.E. (Moreland, 1929).

Moreland notes that before beginning his book, he had found practical studies of administration in his country, but none that treated theory. The studies he referred to are:


*Reports of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service*. Stationery Office, 1911, etc.


"And other works" (Moreland, 1921: 413).

It was then that he took up the historic task of writing the first theoretical work on public administration in Great Britain and thus founding the science of administration in his country. His task was possible because the times in which he lived were changing, mainly due to advances in the society and the economy, producing transformations that fostered the emergence of new duties of the state under the impetus of demands for nationalization of the railways, mines and other industries.

Moreland explains why the science of administration appeared late in Great Britain; the reasons for the lack of systematic literature are evident: the successes of British administrators took place in distant countries and passed almost unnoticed in the West. The British had been familiar with the post office, the tax collector and occasionally one or another inspector, but had very little contact with the central government. However, what was most surprising was that the educated men at its helm had not been tempted to reveal the principles of their art. No less unusual was the fact that the field of the science of public administration is clearly defined, especially when one takes as a reference the relationship between policy and administration. Certainly, while policy
determines which objectives are to be achieved, it is administration that implements the policy; that is, it does the things (Moreland, 1921: 413–414). Political science is thus essentially the means by which policy is formulated, while its relative, the science of public administration, begins where the former ends. The distinction is conceptual, because administrators can give their opinions on policy and statesmen can be engaged in administration, which underlines the need for a clear recognition of the difference. In fact, statesmen have a dual role as politicians and administrators, because a ministry is essentially an administrative agency, while having an active role in the making of policy.

Like Moreland, F. Merson also realized that awareness had been growing for some time in the fields of public administration of the need to establish principles that would guide the activities of public servants. In this regard, the Institute of Public Administration had participated primarily in studying the means of administrative action in the organization of society, consistent with the complexity of the modern state (Merson, 1923: 220). This was because the government could not continue under the domain of the spirit of opportunism that had characterized Britain since the late nineteenth century. The first task, then, was to define the scope of the new science of public administration, and, having done so, to review the methods of scientific study that would be applicable to the subject. Until this task had been done, Merson believed that it could not be claimed that a science of public administration existed.

If the government is studied scientifically, this will produce knowledge derived from the situations and conditions of all states of the world, not just the British Empire. But administrators and theoreticians will need to stop publishing works with no relationship to a defined science of public administration, because otherwise their contributions will lack any quality stemming from the comparison and communication of knowledge. When the scope of the science of public administration has been clearly defined, it will represent a decisive step towards growth and a large advance in the systematic literature on the theory of a of a needed subject (Merson, 1923: 225–226). J.S. Mill long ago spoke of a class consisting of professional civil servants whose job is to help each minister, based on their experience, in the business of his portfolio. But the public service can not claim the dignity of a profession unless it practices a kind of knowledge which is found only in the science of public administration.

Great Britain thus came to possess, although belatedly, a substantial collection of administrative knowledge, for these two brief works discussed above established the first principles of public administration in the country.
Chapter 9

INCORPORATION OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION INTO GLOBAL ACADEMIC CIRCLES

The prosperity, importance and external impact of a discipline originating in a country often depends on its ability to overcome "parochialism" and its capacity to adapt worldwide. The greatest limitation of German cameralism was its applicability within the German environment; that is, it was cultured in the German-speaking countries alone, with the exception of some translations into French and Spanish, which failed to take root in foreign soil. It was not until the early twentieth century that foreign authors began to study it, and it could be inserted into its place in the global discipline.

Great Britain was able to develop a science of public administration equal to that on both sides of the Atlantic through the adoption of foreign developments in the field and its own contributions to other countries. This process accelerated in the immediate postwar period, when British academics in the science of public administration expanded and increased their efforts. The road followed was that inaugurated by Moreland, although without any apparent intellectual contacts. In this academic effort a large group of professors is notable, all of them outstanding; William Robson, Richard Warner, E.N. Gladden, S.E. Finer, A. Dunsire, Peter Self, R.J.S. Baker, F.F. Ridley, R.G.S. Brown and D.R. Steel.

Maturation of British Administrative Thought

Richard Warner

Great Britain was no longer a country where public administration was extensively practiced as an art, or where such a thing was lauded and praised; and while it is not true that this should necessarily be a source of pride, it has never been a source of disgrace either. In the early 1920s, Moreland and Merson demonstrated plainly that the British could and should do more than the art of administration, raising it to a scientific construction, and that they should be pleased to do so. Some years later, an unknown administrative thinker endorsed this spirit and carried it further with his book, published in 1947, The Principles of Public Administration. Like Moreland, the author, Richard Warner, was not recognized among British experts in the field, let alone outside the country. Yet the importance of this book can not be overstated. First, it contributed to dispelling the existing silence about public administration as a scientific discipline. Secondly, by formulating the principles of public administration, it sets out to provide an epistemological conceptualization of the field. We can not ignore the subtitle, in itself suggestive, which states that the book is a study of the mechanics of social action. The author —of whom we can find no further biographical information— had a deep knowledge of his historical time as well as of its international administrative literature, for his bibliography includes American authors, French thinkers and those of other nationalities.
All indications are that Warner's work did not go unnoticed at the time, as demonstrated by the literature review published by Norman Wengert in 1947, which, though short and concise, summarizes the contents of Warner's book and shows its importance. Wengert did not ignore the differences between the American and British administrations, particularly by the scant treatment of issues such as budget and organization, and the emphasis on civil service traditions (Wengert, 1948: 998–999). However, Wengert could be criticized for neglecting the essence of the book; its scientific spirit. Warner's book also caught the attention of William Robson, who described it, together with others by British and American authors, in a brief review. Robson shows respect for Warner's work, mainly for its concept of "principle" as well as for its classification, but he refutes its disaggregation— even with decimals— and the disorder that results from mixing historical, factual, policy and analytical claims with constitutional doctrines and legal maxims without distinguishing between them. However, Robson did not care for the book at all, to the extent that he claimed it would be dangerous to recommend it to students of politics or public officials who want to know learn about their respective profession (Robson, 1949: 84–85). I find Robson's position too extreme, for a reading of Warner's book shows it to be much more useful than dangerous. If there is any danger, it lies rather in dogmatically discrediting books under inquisitorial viewpoints, such as that adopted by Robson.

The principles that infuse Warner's book are political leadership; public responsibility; social necessity; and the need for efficiency, organization, public relations, evolution and progress, and research. Warner states that by the mid-twentieth century, after two centuries of debate about a political philosophy created by the Greeks, it was unlikely that anyone should regard politics and administration as something new. But, he adds, public administration in its actual sense is new because it is a subject of study of our own time. By this he means that the state of affairs relating to government activity has transformed to an environment in which the British people have a great influence, but at the same time their life and many of the things they do are determined by the activities of public officials. This is called "social action," which must be distinguished from the limited activities of private individuals as it was practiced in the nineteenth century (Warner, 1947: VII).

The focus of this transformation is the executive branch of government, which has grown in importance and runs the public administration of the country. Hence Warner's book has as its purpose an examination of what the division of labor has achieved in complex modern societies, and the role of government in this process. After the politicians have done their work, it is administrators who have a more decisive effect on the happiness and well-being of individual citizens. By its meaning and influence, public administration acts as a force in the sphere of the affairs of social reality, where political disputes may be merely a succession of momentary disturbances, but not public administration. That is, in contrast to politics, public administration is not, nor can be, and probably never will be, stimulating (Warner, 1947: VII–VIII). His book, therefore, although it is an attempt to observe the field of public administration in an introductory way, sets out to develop a set of analytical principles by which its subject is treated as an area that can be separated out from within the framework of related social sciences.
In the public servants’ world, in which they work as practitioners of public administration, the construction of principles is judged to be unnecessary. But this is not the case when it is a question of its scientific analysis, on which two points must be considered. In principle, the fact of defining “principles” may seem like an attempt to treat public administration as a body of organized knowledge. Within this, it is important to distinguish the art of public administration, because anyone who professes practiced on a living thing that is shaped by the “atmosphere” of public administration according to the agency or department where they work (Warner, 1947: 54). The concept of atmosphere formulated by Warner is crucial to the administrative culture, because it essentially concerns the situational aspect of the art, since intangible influences emanate from it, as they do in isolated, uncertain environments. Of course, administrative atmosphere varies over time, making its nature in the mid-nineteenth century different from that of the era when Warner published his book. By that time, the mechanical typewriter and carbon copies were being replaced by more advanced mechanical devices and more modern word processing methods. These tools of the past, that reflect a certain atmosphere, vanish with the end of an era. Each atmosphere is a determining context of administrative life, and obviously serves as an incentive to alert the incoming official and make him sensitive to his personal experience, promoting and limiting the scope of what he learns at the same time. Such is the locus in which young British civil servants are educated in the complex problems of public administration, promoting the domain of the art inherent both to the atmosphere and to their personal life.

Warner sees atmosphere as a mysterious quality that over the course of the years is never absent from any effort at social cooperation aimed at dealing with a shared problem. Another element is administrative style, also a diffuse and elusive concept, which has an impact on public administration through the organizations that make it up (Warner, 1947: 2). The administrative atmosphere, in summary, moves in different directions, some indirectly, others with more direct impact on the “consumers” of administration; that is, the public or those who act on its behalf.
Edgar Norman Gladden

Edgar Norman Gladden was one of the most important administrative thinkers of Great Britain, and, without doubt, of the world. He joined the civil service in 1913, serving in the postal service, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social Security, to retire in 1958 as a member of the executive class. He was a practitioner with much experience in office processes, especially in supervision and management as well as postal procurement, engineering and contracts, accounting, statistics, social security and personnel training. However, he practised his profession not only in offices, but also in numerous other industries in the country where he was needed. But he found his administrative experience to be insufficient, and without any support from the government he served, he studied at the University of London, earning a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in Economics and a PhD with a thesis in public administration. He served as a consultant in several African countries as well as in Mexico. As if following Moreland’s recommendation, Gladden decided to develop the principles inherent in his art.

He authored the first textbook on the subject in Great Britain and wrote what is to our knowledge the most comprehensive history of public administration in the world (Gladden, 1972). His thought, simple but profound, yielded books that merit special mention; An Introduction to Public Administration (1945), The Essentials of Public Administration (1956), and Approach to Public Administration (1966). The first book, which has the merit of being the original text for the teaching of public administration in Britain, takes a panoramic tour of the country, starting with the state, which is the element that holds the science of administration, and then going on to address central government, local government and other public administrations. Its is clearly written for teaching, and despite not making grand theoretical claims, develops its concepts in great depth. The author simply set out to describe the administrative sectors of government in broad outline, and to provide a reasonably detailed map of a complex and not always well-defined field. Its scope also includes the study of government organization, its activities and its direction. Going deeper, he explores the confusion when speaking of “public service,” which to some authors means government activity overall, which Gladden sees as a mistake. Public administration, taken broadly, means, rather, direction of the affairs of political bodies (Gladden, 1952: XIII, 12).

Nevertheless, Gladden does not ignore the fact that public administration is outside the formulations made by politicians, legislation and justice, which make up the broader sphere of politics and government, and of which public administration is just one part. More precisely, it is only related to the administrative activities of government, and to managing the affairs of the people and in their interest. This is because the administrator is a servant, not a master, and so the study of public administration is associated with a cooperative activity and not with the use of power. Certainly, public administration is organized by the community for the fulfillment of its purposes, for at heart it is public cooperation that joins the state with society (Gladden, 1952: 18). In summary, it is related to those human beings whose job consists in managing things.
Twenty years after his first book, Gladden returned to the topic, because the idea still persisted that administration is an art developed with practice whose skills are born, not taught. His previous book had been an introductory text for students about the concepts of public administration. The intent of this book was to teach those who had no formal education in the field whatsoever; that is, those who were self-taught in this area. His book *Approach to Public Administration* is a teaching aid for public administration. Its purpose is to help a practicing official perceive what is in sight in his everyday work, but through constructive and contextual ideas that will not only explain what he does, and how he does it, but why (Gladden, 1966: 12). Even the definition of public administration is more grounded, so to speak, for it simply consists of the management of human affairs. In an immediate way, and no less simply, the book relates what the self-taught public servant observes around him, an agenda shaped by the scope of activity of public administration, its resources, personnel, methods, leadership and control, in addition to awareness of the need for educating himself as a professional civil servant.

 Particularly notable is his idea about the working process of the public administration by means of three stages; decision, administration and execution. These must be in different hands: one decides, another administers, another carries out the action. But Gladden persists in his idea of administration as a human problem; this is something that deserves to be emphasized, because it moves away from “managerialism,” which is subordinate in his version of public administration (Gladden, 1966: 12–14). While it is true that in general there is an equally universal concept of administration, according to its existence in organizations of all types, public administration has its own qualities, different from those of management. Its relationship with the government, to which is subordinate, determines its character and nature because it is up to public administration to lead or manage public affairs. Public administration is a tool of the government, of which it is part.

 The title of the book starts with the word “approach” because it proposes one of the many ways public administration can be visualized; it does not claim unanimity (Gladden, 1966: 20). It is, however, a focus that seeks to paint public administration as a universal activity, rather than one inherent to a particular administrative system –even the British– because otherwise readers of the book would have no more than an operational and organizational manual, not a book that aims to educate. Administrative ideas can, in any case, only transcend personal experiences with the strength of their ideas, abstracting from practical exercise, and reaching beyond. Gladden does not hope or expect that the British should lose their reputation for being practical in public administration, but rather that they also gradually begin to be theoretical.

 Between his two teaching texts, Gladden published a book in which he continued his mission of administrative education directed to students and other persons interested in the topic. In the *Introduction*, Gladden set out to make an extensive map of public administration, explaining where it belongs as a specialized area of topics in the area of politics, while in *The Essentials of Public Administration* he provided an intensive treatment. So, having answered the question of its form and extension in the first text, in this book he wrote about its essence and what it does, from a perspective that considers it as an
activity universal in time and space (Gladden, 1953: 3–4). The result is that the two books taken together form what Gladden called *A Prime in Public Administration*.

This work aims, among other objectives, to place British administrative thought on the academic world map. In it, Gladden occupies a central location.
By 1959, when C.H. Sisson’s comparative study on the spirit of the British administration was published, the science of British public administration had advanced substantially. The book originated with an article by Sisson which had appeared years earlier in The Cambridge Journal and is reproduced almost entirely in Chapter One. Sisson had also served as a civil servant since 1936, culminating his career as an elite member of the civil service: the administrative class. It was here that his interest in administrative problems emerged. However, like Moreland and Gladden, he was more interested in observing the public administration from a theoretical angle, and the article reflected this. As he states in the second edition of his book, the essay was not only written by a civil servant interested in the events of administrative processes, on which he has something to say, but for a student of government attracted by the practical angles of administration.

During his sabbatical from the civil service, Sisson toured several European countries and observed directly how they managed their public services and the experience of their public administrators as practitioners. This led him to Paris, Bonn, Vienna, Stockholm and Madrid. In France, for example, his studies focused on the Council of State, Napoleon’s master work. Six years since the publication of the first edition of the book, the text underwent a few changes in emphasis, but its principles remained intact. It is without doubt one of the most important books of many that were written in postwar Great Britain. Together with Gladden’s book, it is one of the most important achievements of British administrative thought of the 1950s, which is worth examining in a more general context of the science of public administration (Sisson, 1965: 11, 13). Two chapters are of particular interest for our study; the first concerns the definition of public administration, which the author says refers more to what a minister does than to what he thinks he should do. The minister has cabinet meetings, conversations to persuade representatives, discussions with senior officials, and other items which are related to his departmental responsibilities. His activities, thus, take place between the Chamber and his ministerial offices, including a close relationship with the civil service. In sum, the activities of a minister are extremely varied, which is why he does not only require assistance, but also counsel.

The administrators who make up the civil service are therefore responsible, in principle, for advising the minister on decisions to be taken, since they assist with the daily activities for which he is responsible. These include, among other things, writing memorandums and minutes, and preparing the material that the minister himself uses in his parliamentary debates. The work of civil servants comprises preparing replies to questions asked by parliamentarians and answering correspondence and the many queries received by the minister. The administrators help him with the complex processes and transactions inherent in his activities as a minister, many of them subject to the statutes that stipulate his duties, as well as the multitude of decisions that he must make based on his judgment. The mind of the minister, therefore, while obviously individual, must relate to a social context in which his skill and individuality are a decisive part of a government environment of great complexity.
When the minister carries out his characteristic work, which is to make decisions, this implies a proper understanding of the nature of public administration. The essential character of government, and by extension of public administration, is the pursuit of effectiveness and maintaining the unity of the group, a truth that includes both complex and simple administration. Sisson used a surprising example to personify the public administrator, for he did not single out a person from his own time, but the celebrated Sextus Julius Frontinus, a prominent Roman official who was responsible for the administration of the water supply in Rome (which was a stepping stone to his later position as governor of Britania). The other notable chapter discusses the intellect of the administrator, a very important section of the book because here Sisson uniquely contributes to an understanding of the mental processes inherent to the work of public servants. When Sisson begins to address the issue in a comparative vein, he notes that this methodology does not only involve a contrast between techniques but, more importantly, a confrontation between cultures (Sisson, 1965: 14–15, 19–20). And what better contrast to draw than between British and French cultures, both enjoying a reputation for their singular features? In fact, as he notes, the British official speaks in the language of Shakespeare, while the French official speaks in the language of Racine. Indeed, if the administrative culture of each nation exists as a unique, singular reference in itself, it is the language of each nation that not only conveys its thought but its way of life perpetuated from the past to the present. This is what Robert Catherine termed administrative style. The French reference is important because it comes from a pioneering text on the subject, which emphasizes how essential the style of written communications in public offices is, as these represent officials' way of thinking, as well as the language of the public function as a professional corporation (Catherine, 1969: 10–14). In itself, style enhanced the reports by Colbert's intendants as the clearest antecedent of a nascent administrative culture.

It is style, considered as a unique configuration of the government network, that explains why one administration is in itself hierarchical and centralized, while another is infused with self-managed systems and is highly decentralized, when each one considered alone is effective in its social and historical context.

The publication of the works of Warner, Gladden and Sisson left fertile ground for scientific cultivation of a British civil service which had achieved respectability on the world scale. At that time, their reputation was as high as the administrative studies being conducted on both sides of the Atlantic.
Consolidation of the Science of British Public Administration

In the 1970s, British thought on public administration was perhaps the most advanced in the world. This is due in part to the loss of primacy of the American public administration, which at the time was deep in a crisis that was called one of “identity,” but consisted more of a loss of creativity. In that decade the great masters were no longer active, and although the new thinkers worked hard and were very productive, they never reached the heights of the great men of the previous decades. British administrative thought found its place, not only because of the crisis, but because it was superior and there was no other country in the world to match it. It had by then grown out of its intellectual childhood and reached full maturity. So it was that the notable figures listed above gave way to a new generation of administrative thinkers of high intellectual standing, most notably F.F. Ridley, J.A. Cross, R.G.S. Brown, D.R. Steel, Peter Self, Michael Hill, Andrew Dunsire and R.J.S. Baker.

F.F. Ridley is a genuine representative of the advances in British administrative theory. He is a versatile author, whose work includes interest in the public administration of France, seen in two of his books, *Public Administration in France* (1969) and *The French Prefectural System* (1973). He is also the author of *Government and Administration in Western Europe* (1979). The latter drew the attention of teachers of comparative public administration, a field of study that seeks to identify a set of features common to England, France, Germany, Italy, Holland and Belgium. However, a particularly notable work by Ridley is the introduction he wrote for a book he edited. It contains an underlying thread that belongs very much to British administrative thought; namely, that public administration has a close relationship with government and politics.

In 1975, Ridley published a book that is important for understanding the British public administration, among other things, because it restores and reinforces its perspective as a scientific discipline and its links to political science (Ridley, 1975: 165). One of the main chapters deals with the subject of public administration, which by then was better delineated in Great Britain, and Ridley develops and specifies concepts formulated in previous books. In principle, he stresses that the British public administration attracts a trifold interest, depending on who examines it, for it holds a different interest for the academic, the professional and the citizen. Narrowing our interest only to the first, we note that his purpose can be deduced from the fact that he is concerned with the study of the country’s public administration; that is, how it is organized and how it works. The discipline also tries to explain why it works in a certain way, and how it works, in order to understand the administrative system overall.

However, the work that most interests us is not a book but an article which is an unvarnished look at the reasons for the delay in academic study of the British public administration in the past. Suggestively titled “Public administration: Cause for Discontent,” the article is dominated by the spirit of the British administrative political thought of its time. Ridley, a professor of
political theory and institutions at the University of Liverpool, also draws on the
traditions of the past science of administration on the continent, based on which
he refers to an “absent tradition” in Great Britain. Moreover, with a harshness
that an objective exposure of reality sometimes requires, he states that Great
Britain is an underdeveloped country when it comes to the establishment of
public administration as an academic subject (Ridley, 1972: 65). In fact, it was
only during the period when he wrote his work that a chair of public
administration was created. It was originally held by William Robson, who had
been teaching administrative law at the London School of Economics since
1947. The chair was subsequently held by Peter Self. Ridley mentions the prior
case of the Gladstone Chair at Oxford, which was renamed the Chair of Theory
and Institutions of Government and Public Administration in 1941.

The British academic underdevelopment contrasts with continental
developments achieved much earlier, among which the Prussian cameralist
courses established in 1727 are notable. Frederick William I called for his
officials to be taught the cameral sciences to remedy the deficiencies arising
from their training only in legal matters. Ridley notes that the cameralist
experience not only predates the study of political science, but also policy
sciences, with which it shares more than a few central features (Ridley, 1972:
65). From this successful experience, these disciplines gave rise to the science
of public administration, in which the fields of government action (the what of
the administration) and administrative procedures (the how of the
administration) can be distinguished. The eclipse of cameralism left a gap, but
its replacement in Germany by administrative law was justified by the increased
maneuvering that the state of law (Rechtsstaat) provided to German officials,
compared to the manifest narrowness of action permitted to British civil servants
under the rule of law. Invoking the cameralists, Ridley reclaims the “absent
tradition” for Great Britain, for while on the continent it gave rise to the modern
science of public administration, in English America it produced an approach to
the discipline that deliberately excluded the what and kept only the how. The
Americans emptied the science of administration of its substantive content,
reducing it to adjectives, and some Britons followed their example.

It was not too late to correct this deviation and follow the French example
with its National School of Administration founded in 1946. And so Great Britain
was inspired to establish the Civil Service College. In these types of institutes,
public administration is taught at the university level, because the science of
administration is a matter of learning, not training. Its basis is knowledge for
executing administration, not simply operation. Even outside of universities, the
teaching of public administration is still a question of learning (Ridley, 1972: 67–
68). In universities, the teaching of public administration is based on the what,
in addition to theorizing the why, while most professional schools deal more
with techniques; that is, the how. This is what defines a university professor as
a seeker of knowledge, while the professional instructor is a “utilitarian” man
who imparts the ability to perform. The former pushes the frontiers of knowledge
forward, while the task of the latter is to nourish practical training.

It is true that in the 1970s, traces of the debate about the scientific status
of public administration were still visible in Great Britain, as in other countries;
but the era of skepticism about the need for this discussion had certainly
passed. That skepticism even caused some authors of books about public administration to choose to title them with other terms. With a conservative mood prevailing, they continued to prefer writing semi-professional teaching and training texts, rather than treatises of the theory of public administration, when what was needed was the latter type of text. This was why Ridley persevered in his effort to make administrative science influential, which would eventually free Britain from academic underdevelopment (Ridley, 1972: 69). In this way, the British public administration became no longer an object of study based on art instead of science.

It was a difficult road to travel. Not only must the scarcity of British universities be considered, in contrast to the colossal educational resources in the United States, but also the fact that in the latter country its superiority is not due so much to its enormous institutional massas to the fact that public administration is treated there as a science and is called a science. In the United States there are more professors and less practising writing books on public administration, and when practitioners write them it is because they are also professors. It was in the United States, not in Great Britain that Max Weber, who greatly influenced the progress of the discipline, was translated; there fruitful and original theoretical work was developed because intensive research programs were already in place. This explains why there is a Herbert Simon and a Fred Riggs in the United States and not in Great Britain (Ridley, 1972: 72).

But throughout the twentieth century, Great Britain was the country that was best at learning administrative lessons from abroad, in addition to making a supreme effort and successfully meeting the challenge of climbing through the era of art to reach the era of science. Thus Ridley’s generation and those that follow were, as mentioned earlier, not only a whole new generation in their country, but the leading edge of administrative thought in the world. Among British thinkers in the 1970s, J.S. Cross is particularly notable. He wrote a book specifically intended for the British public administration. It should also be mentioned that in addition to giving a panoramic view of the public service of his country, he took care to conceptually place it within an overall concept of administration, which he defines on the basis of the concept of “cooperative human effort” (Cross, 1970: 1). The clear influence from the thought of Herbert Simon should not be underestimated. Cross adds that administration conceptualized this way is observable in a variety of institutional arrangements; for example, a business, a union, a church, or a school, not to mention the family. What interests him, however, is to focus on public administration as the proper management of a political organization. By this, he draws a substantial distinction between public and private administration, as well as others; and on this account characterizes the uniqueness of public administration by its interest in the formulation and implementation of public policy. It should be noted that Cross also produced a review of the administrative literature then in vogue. Among his references are cited the work of Luther Gulick and Fred Riggs, as well as contemporary compatriots, particularly Brian Chapman and Max Nicholson.

Cross noted that most of the material he consulted in the study of public administration had its source in the experience of developed countries, and the
majority of it dealt with studying organizations over time, examining their changes and inherent situations. And this can be seen in Great Britain more than any other country: its administration is more "chronological" than "logical." This is why the British public administration is a confusingly heterogeneous machinery, a place where traditional ministerial departments coexist with a variety of stranded semi-independent institutions. Originally, the British public administration mainly concerned itself with the Exchequer, the Foreign Ministry and the Royal Council, excluding the secretaries of state from its priorities (Finer, 1949: 755). It should not surprise us that this unique British situation has been considered by numerous authors to be the cause of many of the problems that led to Great Britain's decline as a world power, and the reason for what Nicholson called "misgovernment" (Nicholson, 1967). Chapman enjoyed high prestige in his country; while Nicholson was a former civil servant whose work on misgovernment in Great Britain drew mainly from his experience as a former civil servant.

Equally notable is the work of R.G.S. Brown and D.R. Steel, a pioneering text on the study of public administration in Great Britain. Originally published in 1971, the second edition appeared nearly a decade later (1979), after which a reprint was issued (1983), which is the version we cite. Brown (d. 1978) is noted for his dedicated administrative career in the public service, while Steel came from the ranks of academia. Their book is a detailed, comprehensive work on the organization and functioning of the British public administration, highlighting, of course, the civil service examination. Significantly influenced by the theory of organizations, especially by Herbert Simon, the authors enter into a detailed study of decision-making procedures and processes in the heart of the public administration. While in the first edition they focused on the theoretical aspects of public administration in order to more fully understand its functioning, in the second edition they put more emphasis on information from organizational studies (Brown, 1983: 11–15). Thus their academic concern focused on an examination of decision-making, particularly decisions made by senior public administrators who not only set policy, but also implement it. Among the set of topics treated in the book, of which a considerable part is devoted to a study of the civil service, an examination of the problems of management is notable. The authors made pioneering contributions to this subject.

The book provides a good review of the development of the study of public administration in Britain, clearly marking the time when the British made a significant contribution to the worldwide study of public administration. The administrative France of their time, as well as Germany and other countries, did not reach the British level of maturity achieved by Great Britain in cultivating public administration and the science of public administration. In the other countries, although important books on the science of public administration were published, the influence of administrative law was still very strong.

Michael Hill's book on the sociology of public administration is a typical product of the 1970s. It should be noted that two clearly distinguishable intellectual veins run in this book: first, the import of organizational schemes developed in the United States and brought to Great Britain, while sociology gradually exercised an increasing influence on the study of public administration in that country (Hill, 1972: VII–VIII). The second, parallel, intellectual vein is
visible in British tradition, which appears in an examination of obvious problems in the organization and mainly in the civil service. Viewed in a simple way, from the perspective of our time, the work does not seem to make a major contribution to the study of public organization; however, the very fact of importing American sociological analysis to Great Britain was a breakthrough, because these contributions were significant during the 1970s.

Within the pages of the book, we find two topics particularly important. One concerns the problem of administrative discretion, and the other deals with the differentiation between generalist and specialist officials, an issue on which Britain is not so much a receiver of ideas, but a producer and transmitter of public administration theory. We cannot help noting the timeliness of the work when it was published, not only to the British setting, but to all persons interested in the study of public administration during the 1970s, when analyses of complex organizations were making a decisive contribution to a better understanding of public administration which not a few had been observing from an elementary perspective.

Andrew Dunsire, one of the most eminent British thinkers, is the author of one of the milestones in British administrative thought, mainly because he goes deeply into topics not often treated by his colleagues. His 1973 book is one of the best treatments of the semantic problems of the word “administration,” as well as a state-of-the-art account of the discipline in the United States and his country. It notably includes an extensive bibliography, listing not only commonly known authors, such as Luther Gulick, Henri Fayol, Paul Appleby and Herbert Simon, but great figures from the broader spectrum of academic work such as Lorenz von Stain, Henri de Saint-Simon, Herbert Spencer, Gustav Schmoeller and Max Weber.

Dunsire is aware that in the past his country had made contributions to the study of public administration, as is evident in the books by Walter Bagehot and Jeremy Bentham, which contribute to knowledge of government, management, centralization and decentralization (Dunsire, 1973: 76). These works are not, however, classified as administrative science in the sense in which the term is used in the continent, because they do not come from the pens of academics or nor do they conform to the academic style that prevails in the thought of academics. Certainly, the majority of books on public administration are written by those who are not practitioners; that is, teachers and academics with little interest in the practice of civil service officials. Obviously these types of books are not administrative training manuals, although they could be used for that purpose; instead their design reflects more general educational goals, which include an equally general readership, within which the practitioners themselves could be counted.

So as not to put the tasks of the practitioner in contraposition to those of the academic, Dunsire paints a setting in which there is common ground and collaboration, consisting of the study and teaching of public administration (and this is neither administrative training nor a theory of public administration). The practitioner is not only he who administrates, nor is the theorist completely divorced from practice. At the time Dunsire’s book was published, there was in Great Britain neither a mature academic profession nor a group of professors
fully recognized as scholars of public administration, except for a chair at Strathclyde and a department at the University of Aston in Birmingham. Rather there were groups devoted to public administration and social administration, and societies, courses, and programs in nursing administration; as well as programs in municipal, industrial, business, and archive administration, among others (Dunsire, 1973: 98–99, 204–205). As can be seen, the common word in all these programs was “administration” and the same word was the reason for the existence of the Administrative Staff College at Henley, an institution dedicated to training administrators of all kinds. Due to the small number of British scholars of public administration at the time, most of them were still interested in a solid, conscientious education than in in-depth studies; that is, they maintained a reluctance to confront the highly theoretical aspects.

To our knowledge there is no text offering a thorough, profound exploration of the word “administration,” which would be very important for anyone interested in semantic precision, which is always important.

R.J.S. Baker is another notable name from the 1970s. He had previously been a civil servant in the postal service, serving as assistant secretary from 1951 to 1971. After retiring from the service, he devoted his time to writing his book at the invitation of William Robson. Barker wrote an article on organization theory and the public sector originally published in 1969, and reprinted in Chapman and Dunsire’s anthology cited below.

In Barker’s article, he has, as a long-serving civil servant, a very clear vision of what he defines as the operational functions of government departments. These are different from manufacturing processes and what public utilities do, he says, because these functions are regulatory and are based on the legal powers exercised over the citizenry (Baker, 1971: 137–138). These operating functions include many public services, and have to do with the relationship between the central government and local authorities, as well as with industry, unions and other institutions. By their nature, they are carried out through persuasion, consultation and advice, and if we must not forget that this is a broad sense of regulatory activities, we can not avoid the fact that discretion must be exercised in the office of public affairs. Finally, we must not forget that the government, whether at the national or local level, always operates in the real world made up of human beings, very different from a world of automata. It should be added that these functions are performed within the flow of a continuous process of changing activities that evoke a concept of policy where not only creation but also adaptation prevail; for a recently established government both formulates policies and adapts others that it has inherited.

Baker draws a distinction between private and public administration. Concerning the latter, as well as public administrators, it must be admitted that they are not generally loved. After beginning with claim, Baker devotes considerable space to the defining the words “administration” and “public,” to which he adds a study of the words “policy” and “management.” For example, when addressing the latter, he begins with the word “manage” whose origin is considered not entirely clear, but containing an echo of the word “manège” which suggests the idea of the domestic or the physical collection of things,
persons, or animals. He also discusses the word “policy,” which Baker relates to government, or a decision of what is to be done, and “administration,” for doing so. As can be observed, administration is related to the idea of serving and assisting in the making of policy. This being said, he notes that administration is related to forms and structures, functions, tasks and processes in public affairs (Baker, 1973: 12, 17). Having come this far, he does not merely decide to stop, but goes backwards, stating that since all science is based on the formulation of systematic hypotheses and that thought is subject to proof by experiment and observation, it is not visible in the object of public administration, which is constantly flowing, often observable only from within, and sometimes at a distance.

The most notable part of the book, despite what he writes at the end, is its spirit of scientific inquiry, something which the British have sparingly but to which they have a right, for which they deserve credit. This speaks of the indisputable possibility that an experienced person; that is, a person shaped in the practice of the daily affairs of public administration, can certainly contribute to a conceptual way not only of enriching activities in daily life, but of a complex conceptualization of the theory of public administration.
Chapter 10

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE THOUGHT

It might seem strange that from the 1990s on—and perhaps earlier—British administrative thought also led the world. In a very short time Great Britain, a practical, self-governing country, territorially and functionally decentralized to an extreme degree, turned into a publicly administered, strongly centralized nation based on a theoretical underpinning, which stimulated the creation of administrative ideas that came to be world leaders in academic circles.

The Theory of Public Administration

Over a prolonged period that began in the 1940s, a modest body of academics in various universities involved in the scientific study of public administration was taking shape, and their work was gaining ground and reputation. In the early 1980s, when the privatization of the British public administration was beginning to get underway, there was already a group of professors critically monitoring this process and subjecting it to a scientific analysis. This group led a debate against implementers of the reforms and their apologists. Alongside the British leaders of the privatization and new managerial reforms, an analytical circle formed, consisting of public administrators who maintained ongoing criticism of the movement and predicted its negative results. These included Peter Self, Richard Rose, Patrick Dunleavy, Christopher Hood, Vincent Wright and Les Metcalfe.

Peter Self was one of the most authoritative administrative thinkers of Great Britain as well as in the world. One of his major works, treated here, is a study of the process of government in his home country, as well as administrative experiences in the United States and France. Self notes that part of the theoretic deficit of the public administration is that practical case studies and theoretical interpretations are insufficiently linked. Most studies focus disproportionately on the former to the neglect of the latter (Self, 1974: 11–12). It must be emphasized that academics are usually more interested in diagnosing the insides of the public administration and drawing highly specific conclusions than proposing schemes that would be more general and therefore more useful for understanding the bigger picture. Self assumes that such problems are part of what he calls the “politics of administration;” that is, the relationship between political problems and the analysis of organizations and behavior within them.

One notable problem is that many studies of public administration approach organizations not only from the experiences of private management, but also with an emphasis on highly specific and factual problems. Thus private management experts propose a set of solutions for public administration that relate to a different reality, while scholars of public administration tend to treat a miscellaneous assortment of issues with little in common. It should also be noted that public administration is often categorized under political science or administrative law, while the clear conflict between managerial analysis and
studies of the administrative process tends to multiply and make public administration a "Cinderella" subject that does not make major contributions to its own scientific advancement (Self, 1974: 15). The result of this is a radical divide between administrative accountability and administrative effectiveness. Self’s book, besides providing an astute overview of the state of the art in public administration of its time, is important because of its significant contribution to an understanding of the government process in Great Britain as well as demonstrating the scientific progress of the country in the worldwide context.

Peter Self is one of the most read academic authors in Great Britain, as well as being one of the scholars who contributed the most to the lines of research that administrative thought acquired from management studies from a public administration perspective. In fact, Self can be described as a precursor of what would come to be the critical analysis of the new public management, along with Christopher Hood. In his work on bureaucracy and management, Self took a first exploratory approach to defining the nature of bureaucracy and management, seeking points of contact despite their underlying differences (Self, 1971: 61). He based this on the theory of organizations that was then in vogue. Self found that in the usual administrative literature, bureaucracy tended to be seen as a government process, while management was normally identified with the activity of private businesses. However, by using the theory of organizations, he suggested that common reference points can be found between the two spheres that go beyond the idea of the "bureaucratic man" and the "economic man."

Self was no stranger to long-standing theory, but since the mid-1960s he steered toward to what would become the new public management, then headed by Friedrich Hayek, which held that the state should be less bureaucratic and more managerial. But beyond this extreme view of state and management, Self notes that managerial features can be identified in government, mainly in connection with planning operations, decentralization, and techniques applied to finance and personnel management. (Self, 1971: 69–73, 80–81). He summarizes it in three concepts; planning, devolution and management. Most notable is his idea on the devolution of decision-making, which is closely related to problems of centralization and decentralization, an issue of enormous interest in Great Britain, especially if we take into consideration that a decentralized government shows balance between functional needs and management mechanisms. Without resorting to old patterns that treat public administration and business management as equals, but neither seeking a dichotomy; Self tries to find a pattern common to both through management, in order to contribute to a better understanding of both fields and establish an ongoing flow between government and the private sector and continuous dialogue between government and private businesses.

Few British thinkers from before the 1980s are known outside their country, even those whose works were translated from English to other languages. One is Christopher Hood, author of a book translated into Spanish some time ago, which has not received the attention it deserves (Hood, 1979). This book is a favorite of its author, to the extent that much later in one of his more famous works, he revisited topics that merit reconsideration (Hood, 1998). The latter, which includes the “art of the state” in an overall analysis and
consists of topics discussed several years earlier, is one of the great books of contemporary public administration.

Hood is definitely one of the most important British thinkers today, being not only responsible for the most important critical work on the new public management in Great Britain, but also contemporary contributions on the theory of public administration on the basis of the humanities. In a book coauthored with Michael Jackson, he noted that one of the central problems in the theory of contemporary public administration arises because the emergence of the new managerial paradigms have raised doubts about its value and usefulness, and that the potential supremacy these paradigms could acquire can not be discounted (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 157–158). However, the biggest problem is not so much that these paradigms could prevail but that their dominance is based on fiction, not truth, which generates a double epistemological problem of displacing the theory of public administration but without filling the resulting gap. Therefore, the dangers underlying the myths in public administration can never be overemphasized, for they are precisely the source of the econocrats’ and the new managerial consultocrats’ power. Their preeminence stems from their use of metaphor and fiction as weapons of communication, which explains the number of neoclassical economists recruited as persuaders in the administrative debate through the use of fiction rather than truth. Hence the need to again study the use of rhetoric and metaphor in public administration as effective vehicles for persuasion. This could explain the persuasiveness of neoclassical economics in the administrative debate: because of its fictions rather than its truths.

The theory of public administration could be strengthened by the use of the humanities, beginning with rhetoric capable of creating a doctrine that links theory and policy as a powerful channel for persuasion. This would mean understanding the key factor of approval, whose first element is the symmetry that represents the production of harmonic linguistic solutions to the social problems experienced by an audience. Metaphor, in turn, is a mode of thought which is useful when an eventual proof can not be achieved. This is followed by ambiguity, which is the ability to simultaneously talk to people with different interests and points of view; that is, to communicate the same idea to a diversified audience. A fourth element refers to the selection of maxims and arguments for successful persuasion to arrive at the desired conclusion (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 26–27, 467–488). The fifth element is removal of doubt by the persuaders, similar to the way an audience watches a play; that is, appealing to the sense of urgency to shorten the debate and continue on to a timely action. The last element, which is difficult to achieve, is to justify private benefit in terms of public interest. Two further elements that must be considered are hermeneutics and persuasion —through dialectic and rhetoric— which are the most powerful forces of debate in public administration to influence an audience which helps shape it. Hood and Jackson explained that the administrative debate consists in advocating doctrines by citing common sense maxims and selecting examples that ostensibly vindicate these maxims. Defined in this way, the field of administrative doctrine appears to be a place of interaction and discussion where the domain of an idea is not final or perpetual; rather dominance cycles through various ideas because the debate is rhetorical.
A vision like this warns of the current state of the science of public administration as it is universally considered because, as pointed out by Hood and Jackson, a public administration that consistently fails in exploring the link between argument and acceptance is negligent to the core (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 485).
Administrative Ideas In The New Managerial Age

The barely mature British science of administration soon faced a determined, tenacious siege from an emerging focus, which, though said to be novel, itself had long-standing antecedents: the new public management. After a decade of the implementation of privatization programs, that focus was consistently visible and soon not only gained academic ground alongside public administration, but pushed it out of its place of honor, although not a few authors judged that it aimed to replace it.

It is not difficult to identify the first targets of the privatization programs, identified in a sharp attack against the state because of their “size.” The problem was addressed directly by one of the most knowledgeable experts on government issues, Richard Rose, for whom the organization *par excellence*, the state, has the government as its official expression and its embodiment (Rose, 1984: 3). In fact, since the state is immeasurable since it constitutes an association of power, it is the government that should be assessed on terms of greatness or magnitude, avoiding references to its “size.” Indeed, the greatness of the state, its degree of complexity and its level of public performance is a heroic feat of modern Western civilization, a triumph against supra-state and infra-state powers. Yet more relevant than its size is the idea that it not be criticized for its large size, but for being deficient, since the vices or virtues resulting from its scale are accidental, not problems intrinsic to its nature.

Above all it should be understood not as a mere formal organization, but as an active process of the mobilization of financial standards and resources through public servants. Thus magnitude should be understood as a potential factor incurring deficiencies because of the multiplication of its organizations, which can hinder communication processes and produce internal paralysis; and the leaders should learn to cope with the problem as an inherent factor of the modern state. Indeed, the government itself is large due to the demands of society and its impact on society, and because of the amount of resources it has.

Therefore, the problem of government is not its size, but the effect it can cause in terms of the quality of public services provided. The direct and immediate causes of the size of government are the public goods it provides to society, particularly education, health and social security; the scale of their quantities may exceed the management capacity of government, producing deficiencies. The harmful nature of the government’s deficiencies by reason of its magnitude lie in the political consequences they produce, mainly in the degree of administrative efficiency and political consensus.

Its size is a product of the progress of Western civilized societies. Governments grew in size over a period of less than a hundred years, from the second half of the nineteenth century, based on the modern conceptualization of government that includes more than merely law enforcement and defense (Rose, 1984: 3). The ingredients that nurtured this growth were the transition from an agrarian to a industrial society, popular support for democratic governments, and the progress of representative regimes. Government size
and democracy have grown hand in hand. The size of the government is in direct proportion to its duties towards society. Lastly, size and growth should not be confused. Size is determined by growth, which gives it its degree and scope, and explains the suitable proportions favorable to public administration. In great measure, size represents a stage of the growth process, as can be observed in Western countries, whose governments experienced their highest growth rates in the 1930s. Because size is a fluid state which is determined by growth, the rate of progression was lower from the 1980s on, and resulted in a change in the size of government, as we now know.

In parallel to studies on the size of government, analyses of the new managerial reform obstinately focused on defining the scope of state activity. One of the main issues was therefore the state, particularly from the point of view of the scope of its functional limits, which many new managerial writers wished to restrict to the maximum. From the perspective of Patrick Dunleavy and Christopher Hood, the state, even under its “bureaucratic” model, is vital in industries where the government needs to do more than simply choose from a menu of goods and services whose origin and process are in the hands of the market beyond the control of the state (Dunleavy and Hood, 1995: 14). The new managerial reform, however, proceeded by means of measures unable to limit the essential functions of government, resulting in the possibility that the basic core of governmental powers would be formulated incrementally. This was done through a process whereby solutions from abroad were not applied uniformly in different areas of administrative activity. The absence of opposing pressure to identify, protect, maintain and develop a core of basic areas of responsibility could jeopardize the proper functioning of national governments. As can be observed, what was being elucidated for the new managerial reform was that the essential problems of the state are not simple operational issues of cost and short-term responses, but should be a constitutional debate that affects the bases and capabilities of politics.

To Vincent Wright, in turn, an exploration of the managerial reform of the state revealed clear inconsistencies, contradictions and hidden costs, since it exposed the limits of a purely minimalist, market-oriented privatization. The problem, therefore, lies in the nature of the state, although it is true that markets can be useful to help ensure that producers do not dominate, and take consumers into account. The state, with its dense hierarchical structures, can not be efficient nor responsive to demand, but replacing hierarchies by markets is a difficult measure (Wright, 1997: 40–41). This is also true when it comes to privatization of the state because, although its context is democracy and the rule of law, the government does take authoritarian decisions. It does so because this is how it insures equality and accountability with an organizational basis rooted in values of impartiality, objectivity, consistency, predictability, legality and legitimacy. The government of the state operates according to rules based on diverse and often contradictory political, legal, institutional, technical, social and economic reasons. This is because much of its functional system requires some form of “Weberianism,” emphasizing uniformity, impartiality, anonymity and legal standards.

Wright notes that it was appealing to believe that government somewhat resembles a business, but trying to make government work like a company
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raises troublesome issues because they operate with conflicting values, such as equality and efficiency. However, much of the new managerial reform strategy of the state has been clouded by the efficiency, and is based on a simplistic view of bureaucracy, a hallucinatory adulation of the market, an idealized view of the private sector, the ignoring of unexpected costs of the reform, excessive optimism about the practical results, and most importantly, a wrong view of the state (Wright, 1997: 39–40). This is the reason why the public sector is more disoriented from the effect of the changes stemming from the administrative reforms. Moreover, dismantling the administrative system is risky, especially if it is identified with the Weberian model, which is an ideal type whose characteristics are fictitious or are absent in some countries while other attributes remain important, and in other countries they configure a regulatory public administration.

The new managerial reform progressed quite differently in different countries, such as Sweden and Great Britain. Under the impact of convergent pressures, similar strategies were implemented in different countries, such as attempts to stabilize the size of the public sector and salaries of officials, privatization, provision of transparency, creation of new bodies, and the introduction of cutting-edge technologies (Wright, 1997: 40–41). Particularly notable is the enduring significance of the diversity of national contexts; Great Britain privatized, but also centralized; while privatization in France took place alongside decentralization; and in Spain there was radical decentralization with relatively little privatization. Finally, while the new public management had a determinant effect on some countries, such as Great Britain, in others, such as Germany, there was barely any effect.

The result of the new managerial reform that Wright was able to observe at the start of the twenty-first century was that in Europe the state is defined more in terms of its duties, and so the leaders, like the Crusaders in the Middle Ages seeking the Holy Grail of the core of the state, managed to adjust the public administration to that essential core. The state finds itself to be more divided as a result of internal competition for funds, and more disaggregated following decentralization and deconcentration. It is also farther from the citizen because the implementation was transferred to non-state actors, more deregulated through a variety of formulas, and more denationalized by the dual effects of globalization and regionalization.

It is perhaps a paradox that the director of the European School of Public Administration is a Briton; that is, a citizen of the country most resistant to full incorporation into the European Union, but whose eventual incorporation into the continent seems inescapable. Les Metcalfe became, obviously, the expert on the topic of integration of European public administrations, whose central problem has been precisely the extent of the sphere of action of each respective nation-state in the Union.

In the 1990s, a period during which European integration advanced towards consolidation, the outcome was different (Metcalfe, 1997: 45). When the Treaty on European Union was signed in early 1992, it left undecided how the political regime common to long-standing states would be configured when they had different political cultures and uncertain borders left over from past
wars. Metcalfe observed an environment where two different visions of that regime emerged; namely, a federation of states or a federal state. The latter approach would imply a commitment to gradually establishing a firm union whose ultimate objective would be to create a European federal state, with the intermediate forms of integration being steps leading to that goal. However, member nations are suspicious of being absorbed by the European federal state implied by this design (Metcalfe, 1995: 27). As can be observed, the underlying motives are not only administrative, but political, favoring a federalism of states as the first choice, which makes the problem of transferring power from member states to common institutions more complex. Basically, the European states do not want to stop being nations.

This being the case, the issue changes to one of developing institutional flexibility, which, however, has a purely operational characterization, and involves the separation of politics and administration. Moreover, flexibility has resulted a distancing from the essential principle of the process of European union, that all members must participate equally (Metcalfe, 1997: 50). One option proposed is a parallel reform of the national public administrations and the EU administration. Another option is adopting the new managerial paradigm from the corporate world as an organization–network model to provide the adaptive capacity to make organizations more sensitive to change. But since this concerns the design of the European Commission, the administrative body of the EU, Metcalfe assumes it involves a potential organization–network based on a tradition different from that derived from business experience, since its concern is to enhance the cooperation skills of the organizations involved in joint management. The role of an organization–network as visualized in this context is therefore to define the obstacles to effective collaboration, and promote joint activity to overcome them (Metcalfe, 1995: 26–27). This last option, which is opposite to the business perspective, makes it imperative to thoroughly reconsider the managerial proposals that emphasize short-term results and are subject to financial returns, since ongoing policies require methods very different from short-term pragmatic solutions.

Since it fell to him to design the organization–network, Metcalfe opted for a deeply rooted notion: the healthy prevailing system of European politics that described the formal scheme of public procurement contracts, telecommunications, and common agricultural policy and social policy. As defined, the system is a set of values, standards, principles and practices that guide the behavior of the actors involved in it (Metcalfe, 1995: 26–27). Moreover, their new meanings transcend purely political concepts, and involve economic concepts in which the standards are not based on coercive threats. The interpretation of system within this view goes beyond conventional definitions of standards because it includes both standards and ability to implement them. The idea of organization–networks endowed with flexibility facilitates a functional definition of each national state, with its regime, as well as the common system within an idea of federalism where each state perpetuates itself, giving a life of its own to a European Union that is not merely the sum of its parts.

The new managerial philosophy appeared to dominate the study of the British public administration, but it did not. Thomas Kuhn argued that academic
research publications may be an indicator of the state of the art, reflecting the relationship between the old and new paradigms and establishing which of the two predominates (Kuhn, 1970). In Great Britain, publications such as Public Administration (PA) and Public Policy and Administration (PPA), are public administration research journals. Public Money and Management (PMM) and International Journal of Public Sector Management (IJPSM), in turn, represent the new public management paradigm. As one administrative thinkers claimed, the fact that there are two journals about the new public management is not a coup d’état against public administration, but a parallel development (Boyne, 1996: 688–691). Also, PMM and IJPSM do not have the prestige of Public Administration, and so they have not shaken the foundations, only caused a small tremor. An analysis of issues of Public Administration and Public Policy and Administration published from 1976 to 1995 divided the articles into three types; policy, public management (public choice, management, markets, purchasing, human resources management and information management), and miscellaneous. The result of the study showed that the new public management made advances, but at the expense of disciplines other than political science. Political science articles were largely unchanged between 1970 and 1990.

The conclusion that can be observed from this analysis suggests that public management presented a challenge, but did not institute a scientific revolution. Moreover, public administration did not suffer an "identity crisis," as some academics claim. This has been confirmed by comparing the number of academic degree programs in public administration in the British university system, where they are dominant; in fact, only two public administration programs were transferred to business schools. The main research programs are carried out in public administration schools, not business schools, where they are an endogenous development. In short, there is no direct feud between public administration and the new public management nor a war between hostile paradigms or between the old and the new paradigm.

Perhaps the best example of this is Christopher Hood’s book on the art of the state, which retains the classicism of discipline when he recalls the contributions of distinguished scholars of the field, and the reincorporation of ancient subjects such as rhetoric. The book, which was published at the end of the twentieth century, runs parallel to much-cited public management studies, on which Hood is an expert, but also public administration studies, with the names of their main topics changed to fit them into public management. On a basis that builds on the administrative tradition, he defines public management as the problem of designing and operating public services, and itemizing the implementation of government tasks relating to the executive (Hood, 1998: 3). The book does not propose to give last word in this respect; rather, it offers constructive ideas and proposals on public administration, which attest to the degree of health it enjoyed even when the new public management was in its heyday.

Today, the public administration paradigm continues to dominate in Great Britain, whereas the model of the new public management inherent to privatization faded with denationalization.
EPILOGUE

Great Britain may appear to be a still pond, motionless from the effect of long-standing conventions which all seem to date from a distant past. But such is not the case.

One can say, rather, to paraphrase Joseph Schumpeter, that the life force of Great Britain, with its center in England, is “creative destruction.” The relative proportions of creation and destruction are not always balanced, and one or another tends to predominate in a given era. So it was with the Anglo-Saxon “predation” that so completely dismantled Roman civilization on the island, which not only leaves the impression that Roman culture had little depth in Britania, but the fact that its traces are so faint paints a misleading picture of the legacy left by the Romans. The Anglo-Saxons were left with so little creative leeway that they never established a nation during all their centuries, nor did they defend their island or establish a civilization. Destruction is also evident in the migration and settlement of the Anglo-Saxons, who pushed the Britons back to less civilized regions, where coexistence with primitive Celts led to their regression.

The balance in this two-sided creative destruction is more visible in invasion, revolution and expropriation, which are the most prominent features of the British historical process. The wave of invasions, especially the Nordic invasion, permanently revitalized the Germanic strain in the island’s people, and while only some of them built civilization and political order, it was enough to shape its character. The Danes annexed England to their empire in the time of Canute, and the Normans, “detached Vikings,” joined it to Europe forevermore. The revolutions of 1640 and 1789 accelerated British modernization of their political regime many years ahead of other countries. Great Britain is a country of expropriation, starting with the displacement of the Britons at the hands of the Anglo-Saxons, who in turn were displaced by the Normans. A new regime was created after each expropriation, looking to the Norman government as an emblem, until the nationalizations of the 1940s by which the public company was created. What can be said about the industrial revolution, which caused the original accumulation of capital that separated workers from the means of production?

There are two further formulas of creative destruction: delegation and devolution. Through delegation, by means of a generalized measure of the public burden, in the fourteenth century communities had to take on and support their own administration on behalf of the crown. Through devolution, that which was formerly delegated was returned to the central government throughout the twentieth century, ending a century-long process of administrative creativity that led first to self-government and then to the centralized regime. One of the greatest representative examples of the universal history of public administration is precisely self-government, described by one of the thinkers who knew it best.
As we mentioned in a previous chapter, Rudolf Gneist gave a rigorous explanation that the true essence of self-government lies in the following characteristic features: 1) self-government is an administrative system of the state; 2) all self-government arises, therefore, as a political commission given to the commons; and 3) all self-government is based on the political principle of the right of appointment. Thus the highest self-government authorities were upheld by the principle of royal appointment, be they sheriffs, justices of the peace, military commanders or military officers. In the time of the Normans, it was established that these functions are the right of the king and the obligation of the state. Under subsequent jurisdiction of the Privy Council of Parliament and the royal judges, they were never returned to the political estates nor to an elected position (Gumplowicz, 1877: 310–311).

At that time, the scholarly pen of John Stuart Mill confirms that the Crown, through the Lord Lieutenant, continued to appoint mainly from among those who already occupied the posts as local officials, with the exception of those who did not carry out their duty adequately, or who were of a different political stripe than the monarch, in which case they were removed from office. They were wealthy people, an oligarchy tolerated by the king, but which lost its appeal over time, exacerbating the main flaw of self-government, which has been the caliber of its officials (Mill, 1861: 215, 227, 254). New recruits were trained by means of apprenticeship, but self-government as a political training school yielded ever less competent graduates. When the rural oligarchy lost its ability to provide suitable candidates for public service, the middle class made an inadequate substitute as a recruitment pool. In the end, Mill preferred reforms that would departmentalize local government, similar to the central regime. The minimum of tasks related to the nation having been left to the center, local government, itself in decline, at least should retain the simple administrative tasks, a difficult distribution of tasks to accomplish. Given that local government is similar to the central government, and its performance is declining, it is hard to imagine that local government can limit itself to a few tasks of national interest.

Great Britain is also a country in which the parts of its regime have been able to be function in response to the era in question. Decentralization, then centralization worked effectively at different times in the same country. Self-government, the seed of the parliamentary constitution and the locus of individual and communal freedom, functional in times past, today has survived although worn down by the administrative centralization of local life, municipal corporations and bureaucratization, all of which are functional in the present day.

Great Britain is also a country of paradoxes: its history has followed not only different routes but opposite directions to those of the European continent. While the lands across the Channel centralized, Great Britain decentralized; when they bureaucratized, the island de-bureaucratized. While absolutism flourished on the continent, Great Britain cultivated its self-government; when continental professional civil servants were trained and even educated in special schools, here the public administration entrusted its positions to
amateurs recruited in their local areas.
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